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Preface 
 
In 2002 Michael O’Rourke and Corey Washington asked me to contribute to the Perry 
Festschrift they were going to edit. I wrote a piece on ‘Relativized Propositions’ (Recanati 
2007b). A few years later, I used materials from that (still unpublished) paper in a talk I gave 
in Barcelona ; the occasion was the 4th Barcelona Worshop on the Theory of Reference 
(BW4), organized by Genoveva Marti in June 2005. The LOGOS people in Barcelona were, at 
that time, involved in discussions of semantic relativism, in part under the influence of Max 
Kölbel, who was then visiting from Birmingham. Kölbel and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero were 
setting up a conference on relativism for the following academic year. Having noticed my 
interest for the topic, they invited me. I attended the conference without giving a talk, but was 
invited to contribute to the conference proceedings. So I started writing the piece called 
‘Moderate Relativism’ (Recanati forthcoming d). The paper soon became too long, however, 
and I had to cut it short, leaving entire sections out. Rather than leave the long version of the 
paper in its unfinished state, I decided to keep working on it and make it into a book, thus 
giving me space enough to incorporate also the ideas from ‘Relativized Propositions’. 
Everything fell into place and it took me a relatively short time to complete the book in 
question, even though I eventually included a lot of material (on the mode/content distinction) 
that was not part of the original plan. 
 I am indebted to many people besides those I have already mentioned. The main issues 
dealt with in the book —mental indexicality, relativity, reflexivity, and the mode/content 
distinction — were all in the foreground of the discussions that had been taking place in the 
‘Indexicality’ reading group at Institut Jean Nicod for several years. I am most grateful to 
Jérôme Dokic, with whom I have co-organized the reading group, and to the other 
participants. I owe a lot in particular to the (former or current) graduate students of mine 
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whose work bear, or bore, upon the same set of topics : Pascal Ludwig, Isidora Stojanovic, 
Julien Dutant and Marie Guillot. My students at Ecole Normale Supérieure, where I lectured 
on ‘Experience and Subjectivity’ in the fall of 2006, provided helpful feedback ; thanks in 
particular to Johann Frick for many interesting suggestions. The talks I gave on the topics of 
the book in various places (Stockholm, Birmingham, Milan, Paris) in 2005 and 2006 were 
other opportunities for learning from other people’s reactions. I learnt a great deal also from 
the discussions that took place during the two conferences on relativism I attended in the fall 
of 2005 (that in Barcelona and another one in Oslo, organized by Herman Cappelen). 
 Peter Momtchiloff asked three reviewers to read drafts of the book, and their 
comments, criticisms or suggestions were most useful in preparing the final version. One of 
them was Manuel Garcia-Carpintero ; his comments went well beyond what you can expect 
from such a review — it looked more like a review article — and I benefitted much from 
them. Other people who provided comments in some form or other, on this book or on 
materials that went into this book, include Emma Borg, Brit Brogaard, Stéphane Chauvier, 
Philippe De Brabanter, Eros Corazza, John MacFarlane, Ruth Millikan, John Perry, Philippe 
Schlenker, Savas Tsohatzidis, and Neftali Villanueva-Fernandez. For discussion of the issues 
I am also indebted to Ned Block, Robert Brandom, Paolo Casalegno, Michael Devitt, Paul 
Egré, Paul Horwich, Stephen Neale, Peter Pagin, Stefano Predelli, Marco Santambrogio, 
Barry Smith, and Jason Stanley, among others who will (I hope) forgive me for omitting their 
names. 
 Working at Institut Jean Nicod has always been a great pleasure. This is due to the 
intellectual enthusiasm of my colleagues, both junior and senior, and to their argumentative 
readiness. I had several opportunities to present my new ideas to them and to benefit from 
their insights. I am especially grateful to them. 
F.R., January 2007 
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 Introduction 
 
 
 
I. Context-dependence in language 
 
Context-dependence is now the focus of much attention in the philosophy of language. This 
has not always been the case. Philosophers of language in the analytic tradition were 
originally concerned with logic and the formalization of scientific discourse, areas in which 
the quest for objectivity and explicitness makes context-dependence unwelcome. Indeed there 
was a time when context-sensitivity was considered a defect of natural language, along with 
ambiguity and the lack of correspondence between logical form and grammatical form. 
 The situation has greatly changed. Language theorists now take context-sensitivity 
very seriously, and new frameworks such as DRT or situation semantics give it pride of place. 
The need for a proper account of context-dependence is often mentioned as what motivates 
the ‘dynamic turn’ in the semantics of natural language. More generally, the 
semantics/pragmatics interface has become the new frontier — or one of the new frontiers — 
in language research. Yet, as I argued in Literal Meaning and elsewhere, we are still in the 
grip of the literalist prejudice. Philosophers of language no longer hold that context-
dependence is a defect, nor that it is an eliminable feature — a practical convenience with no 
theoretical significance. They take it seriously. But they keep downplaying it because they 
tend to reduce it to a specific, limited form, namely indexicality. 
 To be sure, indexicality can be taken in a broad as well as in a narrow sense : 
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— In the broad sense, indexical expressions are expressions whose semantic content 
depends upon the context.
i
 Only a particular occurrence of such an expression carries 
semantic content. Independent of context, the expression type possesses a 
conventional significance, or ‘linguistic meaning’, that falls short of determining the 
expression’s content. 
—  In the narrow sense, indexical expressions are expressions whose semantic content 
depends upon the context, as I have just said, but whose linguistic meaning 
additionally encodes this dependency upon the context of speech. The meaning of the 
expression type is, or includes, a token-reflexive rule which tells us how, for each 
particular token of the expression, we can determine the content carried by that token 
as a function of the circumstances of utterance. (Thus the meaning of ‘I’ is the rule 
that a token of that word refers to the producer of that token, the meaning of ‘today’ is 
the rule that a token of that word refers to the day on which the token is produced, the 
meaning of ‘we’ is the rule that a token of that word refers to a group that contains the 
speaker, and so on and so forth.) 
 
Expressions that are semantically under-specified and function as ‘free variables’ to which a 
value must be contextually assigned are indexical only in the broad sense. Their content 
depends upon the context, but they are not token-reflexive. A good example of under-
specification is the genitive construction, as in ‘John’s car’ : this phrase refers to a car bearing 
a certain relation R to John, which relation is determined in context, without being 
linguistically specified. (It may be the car John bought, or the car he dreamt of last night, or 
anything.) This is not indexicality in the narrow sense. The linguistic meaning of the 
construction does not encode a token-reflexive rule telling us how, for each particular token 
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of the expression, we can determine the content carried by that token as a function of the 
circumstances of utterance.
ii
 
 The distinction between indexicality in the broad and the narrow sense is irrelevant to 
my present claim, however. When I say that we are still in the grip of the literalist prejudice 
because of the widespread tendency to reduce context-dependence to indexicality, what I have 
in mind is not the tendency to reduce all indexicality to indexicality in the narrow sense. Such 
a tendency undoubtedly exists, and is regrettable, but it is not as prominent as it used to be. 
Many linguists and philosophers acknowledge the distinction between genuine token-
reflexivity and mere under-specification. Be that as it may, what I have in mind is another 
unfortunate tendency — the tendency to reduce to indexicality (in whatever sense) other 
forms of context-dependence which belong to a different category altogether. What I deplore 
is the fact that contemporary linguists and philosophers typically fail to acknowledge non-
indexical context-dependence. 
 
* 
 
Non-indexical context-dependence itself comes in several varieties. In Literal Meaning I 
emphasized ‘modulation’, a contextual process that affects content without being triggered by 
a linguistic property of the expression whose content is affected. When an expression is 
indexical, whether in the broad or the narrow sense, a linguistic property of the expression 
(semantic under-specification or token-reflexivity, as the case may be) triggers and mandates 
a contextual process of completion or value assignment through which the semantic content 
of the expression is determined. Such a process I call ‘saturation’. Independent of that 
contextual process, the expression does not carry a complete semantic content — that is what 
makes the expression indexical (in the broad sense). With modulation the situation is quite 
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different. The expression may well carry a complete semantic content beforehand ; what 
modulation does is modify that content. Since the expression at issue already possesses a 
content, modulation is not a mandatory process, as far as semantic interpretation is concerned. 
It is optional and takes place only to make sense of what the speaker is saying. In other words 
what triggers the contextual process of modulation is not a property of the linguistic material, 
but a property of the context of utterance. The meaning of words is adjusted through some 
kind of pragmatic coercion. 
 Even though, in Literal Meaning, the main emphasis is on modulation, another type of 
non-indexical context-dependence is also discussed (Chapter 8). That other form of context-
dependence, to which a large part of my earlier book Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta is 
devoted, is the dependence of the ‘circumstance of evaluation’ (Kaplan), also called the 
‘index’ (Lewis), upon the context. That form of context-dependence has been somewhat 
neglected, even though it is made explicit in standard frameworks such as Kaplan’s. 
 In Kaplan’s framework, the context plays two roles : it determines the content of 
indexical expressions, and it determines the circumstance with respect to which that content is 
evaluated. Whether or not the sentence is indexical, its truth-value will depend upon the 
context of utterance since the circumstance of evaluation itself depends upon the context. Like 
modulation and unlike indexicality, this form of context-dependence is not tied to a particular 
class of expressions ; it is a general feature of language use. It should, therefore, figure 
centrally in the literalism/contextualism debate, since it is relevant to one of the main 
questions at issue in that debate : How generalized is context-dependence ? 
 The reason why the context-dependence of the evaluation index has not figured 
centrally in that debate so far is twofold. First, the interesting form of context-dependence as 
far as the literalism/contextualism debate is concerned is the context-dependence of content. 
But the content is what we evaluate at a circumstance. The circumstance itself is not part of 
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the content to be evaluated — it is external to that content. It follows that the context-
dependence of the circumstance has no bearing upon the context-dependence of content and 
its possible generalization ; so it is irrelevant to the contextualism/literalism debate. What the 
context-dependence of the evaluation index entails is simply that the truth-value of an 
utterance depends upon the context, whether or not the sentence is indexical. 
 A second reason why the context-dependence of the circumstance of evaluation has 
not attracted much attention is that it is (allegedly) a rather trivial affair. According to Kaplan 
and Lewis, the index of evaluation is the ‘index of the context’, period. The circumstance 
(world, or world and time) against which we evaluate an utterance is the circumstance (world, 
or world and time) of the context in which the utterance is made. An utterance is made at a 
certain time, in a certain world, and it is evaluated for truth at that time and world.
iii
 
 Both reasons seem to me wanting. Let us start with the first one, which is the more 
important. It is true that the content of an utterance is what we evaluate at a circumstance. The 
circumstance, therefore, is not an aspect of content. But this claim should be qualified. The 
circumstance is not an aspect of content in a certain sense of ‘content’ — precisely the sense 
in which the content is what we evaluate (at a circumstance); but there is another sense of 
‘content’, and in that other sense, the circumstance is an aspect of content. 
 The content which we evaluate with respect to a circumstance has relative truth-
conditions ; it is true with respect to some circumstances, and false with respect to others. It 
may but need not have absolute truth-conditions. For example, Kaplan, following Prior, holds 
that tensed sentences express ‘temporal propositions’ — propositions that are true at certain 
times and false at others. Such propositions are not true or false absolutely. They cannot be 
evaluated unless a particular time is singled out as the time of evaluation. According to Frege, 
this shows that such ‘propositions’ are not genuine contents. They are not genuine contents 
because they do not have absolute truth-conditions, but only relative truth-conditions. (Only 
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an utterance of a tensed sentence carries absolute truth-conditions, with the time of utterance 
serving as time of evaluation.) — Whatever we think of this debate, it is clear that distinct 
notions of content are at play. We may decide to call ‘content’ what we evaluate with respect 
to a circumstance, whether or not that content is truth-evaluable tout court. Or we may decide 
to reserve the term ‘content’ for contents that have absolute truth-conditions. To avoid empty 
terminological disputes, let us call the former ‘explicit content’, and the latter, ‘complete 
content’. In view of that distinction, the fact that the (explicit) content of an utterance is what 
we evaluate with respect to the relevant circumstance only shows that the circumstance in 
question is not part of that explicit content. But it is possible to argue that the circumstance is 
part of the complete content of the utterance. 
 In the temporal case, we can maintain, with Prior and Kaplan, that a tensed sentence 
expresses a temporal proposition — a proposition which is not truth-evaluable tout court — 
and still accept Frege’s contention that only an utterance of a tensed sentence carries a 
complete content, since a complete content must be truth-evaluable in absolute terms. On this 
view the complete content of an utterance involves the time of utterance (serving as time of 
evaluation) in addition to the temporal proposition which is evaluated with respect to that 
time. This suggests that the complete content of an utterance is made of two ingredients : the 
explicit content (what we evaluate) and the contextually determined circumstance of 
evaluation.
iv
 The circumstance turns out to be an ingredient of content, in a certain sense of 
‘content’, hence the context-dependence of the circumstance is no longer irrelevant to the 
context-dependence of content. As I write in Literal Meaning, 
 
The circumstance of evaluation is not an aspect of the content to be evaluated, but an 
entity with respect to which that content is evaluated. Still… the circumstance of 
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evaluation is an aspect of content in a broader sense of ‘content’. And that aspect of 
content is irreducibly contextual. (Recanati 2004 : 115) 
 
 The second reason for not paying too much attention to the context-dependence of the 
circumstance was the alleged automaticity/triviality of the contextual process at issue. This 
too I contest: I reject the claim that the index for the evaluation of an utterance is bound to be 
the ‘index of the context’. In discourse, I argue, the situation of evaluation is fixed by the 
speaker’s intentions, the topic of the conversation, the previous discourse, and similar factors. 
It need not coincide with the situation of utterance. (Thus an utterance such as ‘It is raining’ 
need not be evaluated with respect to the place of utterance ; it may concern some other place 
that is being talked about.) The circumstance of evaluation is determined by the context, but it 
is not (or, rather, need not be) the circumstance of the context. This liberty extends to the 
world feature of the index. An utterance which is made in the actual world may well concern 
an imaginary situation, hence some unactualized possibility. 
 
* 
 
So far, I have distinguished three types of context-dependence : indexicality, modulation, and 
circumstance-relativity. There is a fourth type, which is trivial but which I should mention for 
the sake of completeness. It is the dependence of the expression’s conventional meaning upon 
the context of utterance. That ‘pre-semantic’ form of context-dependence covers two things. 
First, which language is being spoken is determined by context, and that feature will, of 
course, affect the meaning that is assigned to the sounds that are produced. (See below, p. 00, 
the quotation from Bar-Hillel.) Second, even after the language is fixed, the meaning of a 
given utterance is still susceptible to contextual variation, if the linguistic form is lexically or 
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syntactically ambiguous. Disambiguation is the contextual process through which the 
intended reading is selected. All in all, to fix the (complete) content of an utterance, we need 
to go through language determination, disambiguation, saturation, modulation, and 
circumstance-determination. Figure 1 summarizes the various forms of context-dependence I 
have distinguished.
 v
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 In the resulting framework, a number of alternative analyses are possible when faced 
with an alleged case of context-sensitivity. Consider the example I have just given. In one 
context ‘It is raining’ says that it is raining in Chicago, the city we are currently talking 
about ; in another context it says that it is raining in Paris, the city in which the utterance is 
made. To account for this variation, a number of decisions have to be taken. First, is the 
sentence (which we assume to be an English sentence) the same in both cases ? It sounds and 
looks the same, but some theorists might be willing to argue that this appearance is superficial 
and deceptive : maybe the sentence is elliptical in one of the two cases but not in the other. 
For example, we might take the surface form ‘It is raining’ to be elliptical for ‘In Chicago it is 
raining’ in the first case, while in the second case it is just the ‘simple’ sentence ‘It is raining’, 
used to talk about the place of utterance (Paris). If so, then two distinct sentences are 
involved, and the surface form ‘It is raining’ turns out to be ambiguous. This analysis treats 
the context-dependence at issue as pre-semantic, to some extent at least.
vi
 Let us put it aside, 
and assume that the context-dependence at issue is wholly semantic. Then a second decision 
has to be made, concerning the locus of context-dependence. Is it the explicit content (the 
lekton, as I call it in the present book) or is it merely the situation of evaluation ? According to 
the situation-theoretic approach, the (explicit) content of the sentence does not vary from one 
occurrence to the next, but that content is evaluated with respect to distinct situations, viz. the 
situations that are determined as relevant in the respective contexts. This is the situation 
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talked about (Chicago) in the first context, and the situation of utterance (Paris) in the second 
context. Other theorists take the lekton to be the locus of context-dependence, and they have 
to make a third decision. Is the context-dependence of the lekton a matter of indexicality (in 
the broad sense) or is it a matter of modulation ? If the former, one will appeal to saturation 
and attempt to locate a free variable or hidden indexical somewhere in the logical form of the 
sentence, in such a way that the various interpretations will correspond to distinct assignments 
of value to that variable (Stanley 2000). Alternatively, one may argue that the verb ‘rain’ does 
not contribute the lexically encoded predicate RAIN in the examples but, through contextual 
modulation, a modified predicate such as RAIN-IN-PARIS or RAIN-IN-CHICAGO, as the case may 
be (Recanati 2002). 
 In the ‘It’s raining’ case, the pre-semantic approach is not particularly appealing. But 
there are other cases where it is. Take polysemy. Most people take a polysemous expression 
to be ambiguous between distinct (and related) readings. ‘John got the virus’ has two 
readings, on this view : it can mean that John has caught the virus and is ill, or that he has 
acquired a sample of the virus (this example comes from Pelczar 2000). Yet there are also 
theorists who think a polysemous expression has a constant, general content which is 
contextually modulated in ways that are partly conventionalized. Still other theorists take 
polysemous expressions such as ‘get’ to have an under-specified meaning which needs 
saturation to determine a complete content. Or take contextual domain restriction. One may 
handle it by appealing to ellipsis, to circumstance-relativity, to indexicality, or to modulation. 
All types of analysis have been put forward in the literature. The cases in which we know, or 
think we know, which type of context-dependence is at issue are relatively rare. Even scope 
assignment, which is traditionally treated as pre-semantic, is considered by some as a matter 
of semantic under-specification. Or the so-called ‘Travis-examples’, which are grist to the 
mill of the contextualist and provide a strong case for modulation, are sometimes treated as a 
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matter of indexicality (Szabo 2001) or circumstance-relativity (Predelli 2005a,b). Similarly, 
cases that are almost universally treated as requiring saturation, such as ‘John is ready’ or 
‘John is tall’, remain vaguely controversial : it has been argued that they could be handled in 
terms of (something like) modulation (Cappelen and Lepore, 2005), or in terms of (something 
like) circumstance-relativity (MacFarlane forthcoming a). 
 
II. Context-dependence in thought 
 
When we move from language to thought, the role of context seems to be more widely 
accepted, as if ‘literalism’ was out of place in this area. The majority view has it that no 
content is wholly independent of context : the content of mental representations essentially 
depends upon the environment. Thus ‘Externalism’ is the dominant position in the philosophy 
of mind. 
 Yet the contrast with the philosophy of language should not be overestimated. The sort 
of context-dependence that Externalism generalizes is rather trivial. It is the content of mental 
representation-types that is said to depend upon the environment — e.g. the environment in 
which the species has evolved, or the environment in which the concepts whose content is at 
issue have been acquired. As I wrote in Direct Reference, 
 
Mental contents are (…) environment-dependent in the sense that the existence of a 
certain type of content depends on there being systematic causal relations between 
states of the mind/brain and types of objects in the external world. Thus a (type of) 
configuration in the brain is a concept of water only if it is normally tokened in the 
presence of water. It follows that there would be no water-concept if there were no 
water. This sort of environment-dependence is what Externalism is concerned with. It 
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affects mental states considered as types : the content of a mental state type depends 
on the environment — namely, on what normally causes a tokening of the type. But 
there is another form of environment dependence which affects tokens rather than 
types. The ‘wide’ content of a particular token of the thought ‘This man looks happy’ 
is environment-dependent in the (stronger) sense that it depends on the context of 
occurrence of this token : it depends on the particular man who happens to cause this 
tokening of the thought. (Recanati 1993 : 214-15) 
 
The distinction between the two forms of environment dependence is analogous to the 
distinction between pre-semantic and semantic forms of context dependence. At the pre-
semantic level one must fix the meaning of expression types. At the semantic level what is at 
issue is the content carried by (a token of) an expression endowed with linguistic meaning 
when the context comes into the picture in addition to the linguistic meaning of the expression 
type. So the fact that Externalism generalizes context-dependence in the realm of  mental 
representations does not imply that Externalism is the philosophy of mind counterpart of 
Contextualism in the philosophy of language. If it was, then, indeed, the dominance of 
Externalism would show that context-dependence is taken more seriously in the philosophy of 
mind than it is in the philosophy of language. But it is not taken more seriously, because the 
generalization of context-dependence advocated by Externalism is not comparable not to the 
generalization advocated by Contextualism. It is, rather, comparable to the trivial 
generalization of context-dependence that is forced upon us as soon as we acknowledge the 
pre-semantic forms of context dependence. 
 In his classic paper on indexical expressions, Bar-Hillel emphasized the triviality (and 
universality) of pre-semantic context-dependence : 
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Let me (…) mention a brand of dependency which embraces even the non-indexical 
sentences. I mean the fact that any token has to be understood to belong to a certain 
language. When somebody hears somebody else utter a sound which sounds to him 
like the English ‘nine’, he might sometimes have good reasons to believe that this 
sound does not refer to the number nine, and this in the case that he will have good 
reasons to assume that this sound belongs to the German language, in which case it 
refers to the same as the English ‘no’. In this sense, no linguistic expression is 
completely independent of the pragmatic context. But just because this kind of 
dependence is universal, it is trivial, and we shall forget it for our purposes. (Bar-Hillel 
1954/1970 : 80) 
 
For Bar-Hillel the pre-semantic form of context-dependence is trivial because it is universal. 
But if Contextualism is right and modulation itself is a universal feature of language use, does 
it follow that this form of context-dependence is trivial ? I do not think so. When I say that 
pre-semantic forms of context-dependence are trivial, what I mean is, simply, that they are not 
controversial. The form of context-dependence which Contextualism wants to generalize is 
controversial, hence it is not trivial (in the relevant sense). But the form of context-
dependence that Externalism generalizes is trivial : it is quite obvious that the same ‘syntactic’ 
configuration in the brain would have a different content, or no content at all, if it was found 
elsewhere than in the brain of organisms with a certain habitat and a certain history of living 
in that habitat. 
 
* 
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The other form of (mental) context-dependence which I mention in the extract from Direct 
Reference is the dependence of the (truth-conditional) content of a mental state token upon the 
context of tokening. Insofar as it affects the content carried by a particular token, rather than 
the constant meaning of the type, it is similar to the dependence of the content of an indexical 
sentence upon the context of utterance. Indeed the dependence of the ‘wide’ content of a 
thought upon the context of thinking is sometimes referred to as ‘mental indexicality’ ; a label 
that is is motivated, in part, by the fact that the thoughts whose content is dependent upon the 
context in this way are typically expressed by indexical sentences such as ‘This man looks 
happy’ or ‘I am hot’. 
 Is it controversial that thoughts exhibit this form of context-dependence, in addition to 
the trivial form that Externalism talks about? Well, it used to be. Not so long ago, it was 
thought that indexicality was a linguistic phenomenon, to which nothing corresponds in the 
realm of thought. This view was motivated by the fact that indexicality, like ambiguity, has to 
do with the relation between the sentences we utter and the thoughts we thereby express. 
Being such a relational property, indexicality can no more be found at the level of thought 
than ambiguity can. That I take to be, or to have been, the canonical argument against mental 
indexicality — an argument that can be traced back to Frege and that is worth spelling out in 
some detail. 
 Let us start with ambiguity, which provides the model. Ambiguity is a property that is 
instantiated when the same sentence, or what superficially looks like the same sentence, 
expresses distinct thoughts. If we abstract from the linguistic expression of thoughts and 
consider the thoughts themselves, ambiguity disappears : the thoughts themselves cannot be 
ambiguous, only their linguistic expression can. As Jerry Fodor puts it, « whereas it’s 
thoughts that equivocal sentences equivocate between (…), there doesn’t seem to be anything 
comparable around that could serve to disequivocate thought » (Fodor 2003 : 56). 
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 Were this argument against mental ambiguity correct, it would apply to mental 
indexicality as well. Indexicality is a property that is instantiated when a given sentence 
expresses distinct thoughts in different contexts and does not express any thought independent 
of context. If we abstract from the linguistic expression of thoughts and consider the thoughts 
themselves, indexicality disappears : the thoughts themselves cannot be context-dependent, 
only their linguistic expression can. As we might put it, paraphrasing Fodor : whereas it is 
thoughts that indexical sentences express with respect to context, there doesn’t seem to be 
anything comparable around that thoughts themselves could express with respect to context. 
Thoughts don’t express anything — they are what we express.  
 At this point we must clearly separate the terminological issue from the substantive 
issue. Terminologically, we may follow Frege and decide to reserve the term ‘thought’ for 
that which we express. The thought, thus understood, must be distinguished from the thought-
vehicle. The thought-vehicle may be ambiguous (if it expresses distinct thoughts) or indexical 
(if it expresses a thought only with respect to context). Once this terminological decision is 
made, it immediately follows that thoughts themselves cannot be ambiguous or indexical, 
since ambiguity and indexicality are both fundamentally properties of the expression relation. 
Only vehicles qua vehicles can be indexical or ambiguous. But the theorists who maintain that 
there are indexical (or, for that matter, ambiguous) thoughts typically do not use ‘thought’ in 
the Fregean sense. By saying that there are indexical thoughts, what they mean is that, just as 
linguistic thought-vehicles can be indexical, there are mental thought-vehicles that can be as 
well. The idea is precisely that the content/vehicle distinction applies in the realm of thought 
as it does in the realm of language. Natural language sentences may express different contents 
(different propositions or Fregean thoughts) in different contexts. Similarly, it is possible to 
entertain ‘thoughts’ (in the vehicle sense) that express different propositions — have different 
truth-conditions— in different contexts. Whether or not there are such ‘thoughts’ is the 
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substantive issue at stake, and what I called the ‘canonical argument’ against mental 
indexicality has absolutely no bearing on this issue. 
 
* 
 
Is there mental indexicality ? Is it possible to find ‘thoughts’ (in the vehicle sense) that have 
distinct truth-conditional contents in different contexts ? Of course it is. Remember the 
example I discuss in the passage from Direct Reference: ‘This man looks happy’. Imagine a 
subject who entertains that thought while having a certain visual experience. Let us suppose 
the man he perceives is Bob. Since Bob is mentally referred to, the thought’s truth will 
arguably depend upon Bob’s properties : it will depend upon whether Bob (is a man and) 
looks happy. Had the context been different, the man whom the subject perceives would have 
been someone else — say Bill. Then Bill would have been referred to, and the thought’s truth-
conditions would involve Bill. That is so even if we suppose that no qualitative change occurs 
in the subject’s visual experience from one context to the next : the thought that is expressed 
changes purely as a result of an external change in the context. One thought is true iff Bob (is 
a man and) looks happy, the other is true if and only if Bill (is a man and) looks happy. Since 
one thought could be true and the other false, this is sufficient to show that the two thoughts 
are distinct, by Fregean standards. (For Frege, two thoughts are distinct if they can take 
different truth-values.) In the vehicle sense, however, the thoughts are arguably the same : 
internally, the subject’s state of mind is the same. In both cases he thinks ‘This man looks 
happy’ while having a visual experience that is qualitatively identical in the two cases. This is 
similar to the subject’s saying ‘This man looks happy’ twice and thereby expressing distinct 
Fregean thoughts simply because the context, hence the referent of the demonstrative, has 
changed from one occurrence to the next. Conclusion : Whether the subject speaks or merely 
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thinks, in both cases it is possible for a single (linguistic or mental) vehicle to express distinct 
propositions in distinct contexts. 
 We reach the same conclusion if we consider Frege’s second ‘criterion of difference’ 
for thoughts — the cognitive criterion, distinct from the truth-conditional criterion I have just 
mentioned. According to Frege, if it is possible for a rational person to entertain a thought A 
with assent while, at the same time, dissenting from a thought B, this shows that A and B are 
not the same thought. Now consider the thoughts I would express by saying either ‘I  am 
French’ or ‘François Recanati is French’. The thoughts are truth-conditionally equivalent 
(both are true if and only if
vii
 I am French, since I am Recanati) but they are different thoughts 
by Frege’s second criterion. If, because of amnesia, I don’t remember that I am Recanati, and 
if, because of ‘his’ name, I believe that Recanati is Italian, I may, without irrationality, 
disbelieve that Recanati is French while still believing that I am French. This is sufficient to 
show that the thought that Recanati is French is distinct from the thought that I am French. 
Using the cognitive criterion, we can, following Perry (1979), establish that there are 
‘essential indexicals’ : indexicals which cannot be replaced by a non-indexical expression on 
pains of changing the thought that is expressed. This provides further support to the claim that 
indexicality is not merely a matter of language. If indexicality was only a linguistic matter, a 
façon de parler that does not affect what is expressed, it ought to be possible to eliminate the 
indexicals from a sentence without changing the thought that it expresses. 
  
* 
 
The mental ambiguity idea is still controversial. It is hard to make sense of, even if one 
recognizes that the argument for its impossibility is a nonstarter.
viii
 In contrast, the mental 
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indexicality idea is no longer controversial. Castañeda, Perry and others have managed to 
convince most philosophers that it is right. Yet some aspects of the idea remain controversial.  
 Let me try to distinguish what is controversial and what is not (or not as much) in the 
idea of mental indexicality as I have introduced it in the previous section. What is hardly 
controversial is this : that there are thoughts (in the vehicle sense) whose truth-conditional 
content depends upon the context, just as there are sentences whose truth-conditional content 
depends upon the context. What is controversial is the idea that the thoughts whose truth-
conditional content depends upon the context are like mental sentences that contain indexical 
vocabulary-items (concepts, in the vehicle sense) whose function is similar to that of indexical 
words. On this view, there is a ‘concept of self’ that is the mental counterpart of the word ‘I’. 
When Castor and Pollux both think ‘I am hot’, they entertain distinct thoughts by Frege’s 
lights, since the truth-conditions of the thoughts differ (one is true if Castor is hot, the other iff 
Pollux is hot). Different though they are, the two thoughts share the same vehicle, and that is 
where we find the concept of self. Both Castor’s thought and Pollux’s thought involve that 
concept construed as the mental vehicle through which one refers to oneself. This is the 
mental couterpart of the linguistic first person. Just as the word ‘I’ refers to distinct 
individuals and therefore acquires a different sense (content) in different contexts, the mental 
‘I’ also refers to distinct individuals and acquires a different content in different contexts. 
 This view has been elaborated by John Perry, among others. Perry uses Kaplan’s 
content/character distinction and applies it to the analysis of thought. The thought-vehicle is a 
mental state whose constant meaning or ‘role’ is or determines a function from contexts to 
contents. In context the vehicle carries a content that is what the subject assents to or dissents 
from. But the subject’s assent or dissent depends upon the vehicle. One may assent to a 
certain content when that content is carried by a certain vehicle (e.g. ‘I am French’) and not 
when it is carried by a distinct vehicle (‘Recanati is French’). Same content, different 
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vehicles, different behaviours. In the other direction, the fact that Castor and Pollux use the 
same vehicle — are in the same state — is indicated by their common behaviour : when they 
think ‘I am hot’, they both take off their sweater or open the window, or do something like 
that. Different contents, same vehicle, same (type of) behaviour. (See Perry 1977 and Kaplan 
1989.) 
 That is not the only possible way of dealing with mental indexicality, however. 
Another way of dealing with it, advocated by David Lewis (1979a), appeals to the idea of 
circumstance-relativity instead of pursuing a strict analogy between indexical sentences and 
indexical thoughts. 
 As we have seen, circumstance-relativity yields truth-conditional differences that 
cannot be traced to the vehicle. On the situation-theoretic analysis, the same sentence ‘It is 
raining’ expresses different propositions in different contexts not because it is ambiguous or 
involves hidden indexicals, but because the (explicit) content that is expressed by that 
sentence— the lekton, as I call it — is evaluated with respect to varying circumstances. What 
is contextually variable, in this sort of case, is the circumstance, not the content we evaluate ; 
but the complete truth-conditional content of the utterance involves the circumstance as well 
as the explicit content : the utterance is true iff its (explicit) content is true with respect to the 
relevant circumstance. If we change the circumstance of evaluation, we change the overall 
truth-conditions. Can this idea be applied to the phenomenon at stake — indexical thought? 
 It can. Note, first, that we can think ‘It is raining’, just as we can say ‘It is raining’. 
Like the utterance ‘It is raining’, the thought ‘It is raining’ is arguably true iff its (explicit) 
content is true with respect to the relevant circumstance. So the idea of circumstance-relativity 
unproblematically applies to thought. Now, according to Lewis, some thoughts that we would 
express by using an indexical sentence are actually best handled in terms of circumstance-
relativity. For Lewis, there is a thought content (not merely a ‘vehicle’) which Castor and 
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Pollux share when they both think ‘I am hot’ ; but that content is not a classical proposition. 
Rather than a classical proposition, true at some worlds and false at others, the common 
content of their respective thoughts is the property of being hot, which Castor and Pollux each 
self-ascribes. Rather than draw a distinction between the vehicle (or character) and the content 
of their beliefs, we need to relativize the truth of what they think to the right sort of 
circumstance. In the case of belief and other attitudes, the circumstance of evaluation is a 
world centered on the believer at the time of belief, and the explicit content of the attitudes, to 
be evaluated with respect to the believer’s centered world, is a property rather than a classical 
proposition. To believe something is, for Lewis, always to self-ascribe a property, e.g. the 
property of being hot, or the property of living in a world in which Frege died in 1925. In this 
framework indexical belief falls out as a particular case.
ix
 
 In this book, like Lewis, I appeal to circumstance-relativity and advertise its 
usefulness and explanatory potential in dealing with various phenomena discussed in the 
philosophy of language and mind. In particular, I argue that a good deal of context-
dependence and putative ‘mental indexicality’ can be handled by taking into consideration the 
relativization of truth to partial situations such as the situation the perceiving subject is in. But 
I do not think we have to give up the standard treatment of mental indexicals à la Perry. I 
offer a more refined picture in which we have both indexicality and circumstance-relativity. 
 
III. Circumstance-relativity and the mode/content distinction 
 
If we relativize truth to centered worlds and/or partial situations, the contents to be evaluated 
no longer need to be truth-evaluable in the absolute sense. The lekton — what we evaluate 
with respect to the contextually determined index — need not possess anything more than 
‘relative’ truth-conditions. In this framework, do we still need the classical distinction 
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between the linguistic meaning of the sentence and the proposition it contextually expresses ? 
That distinction was needed because contents/propositions were said to be essentially truth-
evaluable, and the linguistic meaning of an indexical sentence-type is not : independent of 
context, the sentence ‘I am French’ is neither true nor false, hence, arguably, it does not 
express a determinate content. In the new framework, however, there are two sorts of 
content and two sorts of evaluability. Complete contents are truth-evaluable tout court, they 
have absolute truth-conditions, while explicit contents (lekta) may have only relative truth-
conditions : e.g. temporal propositions are true with respect to certains times and false with 
respect to others. Evidently, linguistic meanings are not truth-evaluable tout court, but don’t 
they have relative truth-conditions ? Are they not true with respect to certain contexts (e.g. 
contexts in which the person uttering the sentence is French) and false relative to others ? 
They are ! It follows that the new framework, with its distinction between two levels of 
content (the lekton, and the complete ‘Austinian proposition’ featuring the lekton together 
with a situation of evaluation), makes it possible to get rid of the classical distinction between 
linguistic meanings and propositional contents understood as what we evaluate with respect to 
the relevant circumstance. We can directly put the linguistic meaning of the sentence-type on 
the side of the lekton, and the context of utterance on the side of the situation. On this simple 
view, we do not need an intermediate level of content between the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence and the full Austinian proposition. The content to be evaluated — the lekton — is 
the linguistic meaning of the sentence. 
 The position I have just described is reasonably close to that which David Lewis 
advocates in his paper ‘Index, Context, and Content’. It contrasts with the more complicated 
position held by David Kaplan. Kaplan maintains a distinction between the linguistic meaning 
of the sentence-type (its ‘character’) and the ‘content’ it expresses in context. Kaplan’s 
contents have relative truth-conditions : they are true with respect to world-time pairs, or 
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world-time-place triples. To determine a truth-value, a contextually determined world-time 
pair is needed as circumstance of evaluation. So Kaplan’s contents are intermediate between 
characters and full Austinian propositions. They depend upon the context (in contrast to 
characters, which are context-independent) yet, not having absolute truth-conditions, they 
cannot be equated with the utterance’s complete content. To get absolute truth-conditions we 
need to pair the content with a contextually determined circumstance and reach the level of 
the full Austinian proposition. 
 What is the argument for positing such an intermediate level of content ? Kaplan 
invokes the need for a two-dimensional semantics to account for the rigidity of indexicals. 
Indexicals take their value from the context of utterance even if the index of evaluation is 
shifted by an operator taking scope over the sentence in which the indexical occurs. So we 
need a systematic distinction between context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation : 
we cannot merge them, as the old ‘index theory’ did. The context/circumstance distinction in 
turn leads us to the Kaplanian distinction between ‘content’ (function from circumstance to 
truth-value) and ‘character’ (function from context to content). 
 To this argument, Lewis has replied that we can go two-dimensional without buying 
the character/content distinction (Lewis 1980). The context/circumstance (or context/index) 
distinction is sufficient : we can construe the linguistic meaning of a sentence as a function 
from context-index pairs to truth-values. Thus understood the linguistic meaning can be the 
lekton. To evaluate it with respect to the context of utterance is to evaluate the function with 
respect to the context and the index of the context. So Kaplan’s two-dimensional argument is 
irrelevant to the issue at stake. 
 
* 
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Exactly the same issue arises in the analysis of thought. If we accept the relativist move and 
take mental contents to be evaluated with respect to (say) centered worlds, as Lewis suggests, 
should we construe those contents — the mental lekta — as context-independent or should we 
think of them as context-dependent, in the manner of Kaplan’s ‘contents’ ? Here also, Lewis 
argues in favour of context-independence. What is admittedly context-dependent is the 
complete content of the attitudes, that is, the content qua endowed with absolute truth-
conditions. In the narrow psychological sense, however, the content of the attitudes is what is 
‘in the head’ of the attitudiner, hence it is context-independent. Consider the thought one 
would express, at a certain time t, by saying ‘This man looks happy’ (in reference to Bill). In 
one sense, the content of the speaker’s belief is the classical proposition that Bill looks happy 
at t. That proposition is admittedly context-dependent : in a different context, the same mental 
vehicle would have carried the proposition that Bob was happy at t’. In the narrow 
psychological sense, however, the content of the belief is internal and context-independent. 
That narrow content of the belief, akin to the conventional meaning of the sentence-type in 
the linguistic case, can be construed as a mental ‘character’ (Perry), but it may also be 
construed as a relativist content. Thus, for Lewis, the narrow psychological content of the 
belief in this case is a property that the believer self-ascribes, namely the property of seeing a 
man who looks happy. That is the same property whether the man happens to be Bill or Bob 
and whether the time of the episode is t or t’. 
 In this book, I depart from Lewis and offer an argument in favour of a position very 
similar to Kaplan’s. I argue that we do need an intermediate level of content between the 
complete truth-conditional content of an intentional state, on the one hand, and its purely 
psychological content, narrowly individuated, on the other hand. 
 Let us be clear about what is at stake. In this debate, everybody (including Lewis) 
agrees that the content of the attitudes can be individuated either ‘broadly’ or ‘narrowly’ (in a 
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context-independent manner). So no one denies Kaplan the right to take the content of the 
attitudes to be context-dependent, in some sense. The question at stake is whether we need an 
intermediate level between the context-independent content of the state, narrowly 
individuated (its ‘character’, in the Kaplan/Perry framework), and the complete truth-
conditional content. Those who think we do not need such a level assume that the content of 
an intentional state, broadly individuated, should be equated with its complete truth-
conditional content. That is precisely what I deny. I reject the claim that we need only two 
levels : the complete content and the purely psychological content. On the more complex 
picture I offer, the explicit content of an intentional state (the lekton) may be individuated 
broadly or narrowly, but however we individuate it it must be distinguished from the complete 
content of the state. So the content of the attitudes, when broadly individuated, is indeed a 
level of content intermediate between the purely psychological content and the complete 
truth-conditional content. 
 
* 
 
In a first sense the content of an intentional state is its complete truth-conditional content — a 
classical proposition endowed with absolute truth-conditions. (In the relativist framework this 
corresponds to the Austinian proposition, or rather, to an equivalence class of Austinian 
propositions). In a second sense the content of an intentional state is what is ‘in the head’ of 
the subject, independent of context (except in the trivial sense in which, according to 
Externalism, no content is context-independent). Now there is a third sense, which is relevant 
to the point I am making. In the third sense, the ‘content’ of a mental state essentially 
contrasts with its ‘mode’ (Searle 1983). For example, if the relevant intentional state is a 
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visual experience (mode), the content of the state will be what is seen ; if the state is a 
memory (mode), the content of the state will be what is remembered ; and so on and so forth. 
 Let us consider our pet example once again. At a certain time t, the subject has a  
visual experience and forms a judgment he might express by saying : ‘This man looks happy’. 
Let us suppose that that counts as a perceptual judgment (rather than a judgment based on 
inference) : the subject sees the man and notices his happy face — he sees him as happy, or as 
looking happy. As we have seen, the content of the visual experience may be individuated 
narrowly (the subject sees a man standing at a certain place in egocentric space, looking 
happy), or broadly (the subject sees Bill, looking happy). The man who happens to be seen 
(Bill) and the time of seeing (t) both find their way into the complete truth-conditional content 
of the visual experience: the latter will not count as veridical unless Bill actually looks happy 
at t. Yet, I claim, this complete truth-conditional content of the experience is not the same 
thing as its content broadly individuated. My case rests on the following fact : there is a sense 
in which Bill is part of what is seen (broadly individuated) while t is not. 
 Even if we individuate the content of the experience broadly, in a context-dependent 
manner, I take the content thus determined to be semantically incomplete by Fregean 
standards : it is a temporal proposition, true at certain times but not at others. The time of the 
seeing, which is relevant to the evaluation of the visual experience, is arguably not part of 
what is seen. In general, the content of a perception is to be evaluated with respect to the 
situation of perception. The situation of perception includes the time of perception, and that is 
how the relevant time gets into the complete content : the perceptual state is veridical only if 
what the state represents is the case at the time of perception. 
 The situation of perception involves not only a specific time, relevant to the evaluation 
of what is perceived, but also a certain relation between the perceiver and what is perceived. 
A perception cannot be veridical unless that relation (the perception relation) holds, yet the 
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relation is no more part of what is perceived than the time of perception is. The subject does 
not perceive that he perceives, though he is aware of it : he perceives an external state of 
affairs, and, simply in virtue of being in such a perceptual state, is justified in assuming that 
he stands in a certain causal relation — the perceptual relation — to the state of affairs which 
the state represents. 
 On this picture, the complete content of the state is jointly determined by its content 
and by its mode. The mode determines the situation with respect to which the content of the 
state is to be evaluated. In the case of perception, the content of the state is to be evaluated 
with respect to the situation of perception — a situation that is contemporaneous with the 
state, and which involves the subject of the state’s standing in a certain causal relation to what 
the state represents. So, when the subject sees Bill looking happy, Bill is explicitly 
represented, he is part of what is perceived broadly construed, while the time at which Bill 
looks happy is only implicitly represented, via the contribution of the perceptual mode. When, 
some time later, the subject remembers Bill looking happy, the content of his intentional state 
is arguably the same, but the contribution of the mode is different. In the case of memory the 
mode determines that the content of the state is to be evaluated with respect to a past situation 
of perception — a situation that is not contemporaneous with the state the remembering 
subject is in. So the temporal difference between perception and memory is not a difference in 
content stricto sensu — a difference between what is perceived and what is remembered — 
but a difference in mode ; a difference that affects the complete content of the state, without 
affecting its explicit content. 
 Of course, one might accept all this, and still maintain, with Lewis, that the lekton is 
context-independent in addition to being relativist. One might argue that what is seen, in the 
‘narrow psychological sense’, does not involve Bill : what the subject sees is a man at a 
certain place looking happy. That this man is Bill is determined by the fact that, in the 
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situation of perception, Bill happens to stand at the right place and in the right causal relation 
to the perceiver’s visual state. But there is no reason why we should not be allowed to 
individuate what is seen broadly if we want to, and if we do, we find that the content thus 
individuated is something intermediate between what is in the subject’s head and the 
complete truth-conditional content of the visual state. 
 
* 
 
Let us take stock. In the language case I have drawn a distinction between the explicit content 
of an utterance (the lekton) and the complete content which involves a situation of evaluation 
in addition to the explicit content. In the mental case, I have argued that the mode/content 
distinction introduces something very similar : the mode determines the situation with respect 
to which the content of an intentional state is to be evaluated. Since the mode contributes in 
this way to the state’s complete content, the explicit content of the state need not possess 
absolute truth-conditions. Indeed, in the perception and the memory cases, I claim that the 
explicit content is a temporal proposition. 
 The mode’s contribution to the complete content corresponds to what the intentional 
state implicitly represents. Thus a perception of Bob’s looking happy implicitly represents the 
time at which Bob looks happy. When it comes to thoughts in the first person — attitudes de 
se, to use Lewis’s terminology — we can also distinguish between the subject’s implicit 
involvement arising from the mode’s contribution to complete content, from the subject’s 
explicit self-identification. This distinction enables us to account for the well-known 
phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). Whenever there is IEM, 
this is evidence that the explicit content of the state does not involve any self-identification on 
the subject’s part (Evans 1982). The state is ‘first personal’ only in the sense that its mode 
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determines that its content is to be evaluated with respect to the subject of the state. I follow 
Lewis here : in such cases the explicit content of the state is a property which the subject self-
ascribes. Consider the example of IEM which Evans discusses. If, without looking, the 
subject senses that his legs are crossed, he self-ascribes the property that his legs are crossed, 
a property we can represent as : (x) x’s legs are crossed. The fact that he himself is the 
person whose legs are crossed is guaranteed by the fact that the information about the position 
of the legs is gained ‘from inside’. What I call the internal mode (involving proprioception 
and kinaesthesis) imposes the subject of the state (at the time of the state) as the relevant 
circumstance of evaluation for the explicit content, namely the property that one’s legs are 
crossed. In such cases the subject is not explicitly identified, and that is the reason why he 
cannot be misidentified : as Evans puts it, the thought is ‘identification-free’. In contrast, if 
the subject sees in the mirror that his legs are crossed, he explicitly identifies himself as the 
person whose legs are crossed, and he may be wrong. (Note that, even in this case, the fact 
that he himself is the person who stands in the appropriate perceptual relation to the mirror is 
guaranteed by the perceptual mode. In this respect, the thought remains immune to error 
through misidentification.) 
 In this framework, as I said above, there is both mental indexicality in the strict sense 
and circumstance-relativity. There is mental indexicality in the strict sense when, on the side 
of explicit content, we find a concept of self through which the subject explicitly identifies 
himself/herself as the bearer of this or that property. For example, when I think that I was 
born in 1952, I explicitly identify myself. That must be so because there is no way in which I 
could acquire this piece of information ‘from inside’. The self’s involvement cannot come 
from the mode, in such cases, hence it must come from the content. When information about 
the position of one’s limbs is at issue, the situation is different : such information can be 
gained from inside or from outside, hence the subject’s involvement may be implicit or 
 35 
explicit. Whenever the subject’s involvement is implicit, there is immunity to error through 
misidentification. It is easy to check that there is no possibility of IEM with thoughts like ‘I 
was born in 1952’. 
 
IV. A brief summary of the book 
 
The structure of the book is as follows. There are fourty-one very brief chapters grouped into 
parts of three or four chapters each. The parts themselves are grouped into three main ‘books’ 
of three or four parts each. Both chapters and parts are continuously numbered. 
 In book I (« Moderate Relativism ») the general framework is introduced, with its 
distinction between two levels of content : the lekton and the full Austinian proposition (part 
1). One of the most obvious applications of the framework is to the analysis of tense in 
language and thought. There are standard, influential objections to this type of analysis and to 
the notion of ‘temporal proposition’ it appeals to ; they are discussed (and rebutted) in parts 2 
and 3. In part 4, I discuss the possibility of treating indexicality as a special case of 
circumstance-relativity, by putting the linguistic meaning of the sentence-type on the side of 
the lekton and the context of utterance on the side of the situation. I focus on the 
Kaplan/Lewis debate, and conclude that the arguments that have been adduced in favour of an 
intermediate level of Kaplanian ‘content’ between linguistic meanings and full Austinian 
propositions do not carry conviction. One of the aims of the book is precisely to offer a better 
argument. 
 In book II (« Experience and Subjectivity ») I turn to the philosophy of mind. Searle’s 
mode/content distinction is introduced and discussed in part 5. Applying the ideas from book 
I, I argue that the mode determines the situation of evaluation, and that the content or lekton, 
in the case of perception and episodic memory, is a temporal proposition. Part 6 is devoted to 
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the central phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification, which provides a 
privileged field of application for the framework. IEM is shown to characterize thoughts that 
are ‘implicitly’ de se, as opposed to thoughts that involve an explicit self-identification. 
Thoughts that are implicitly de se involve no reference to the self on the side of the lekton : 
what makes them de se is simply the fact that the content of the state is evaluated with respect 
to the subject of the state. An alternative analysis of such thoughts, appealing to (explicit) 
reflexivity rather than to relativization, is presented and criticized in part 7. Finally, in part 8, 
thoughts that are implicitly de se are shown to involve a ‘subjective’ perspective that is 
lacking from thoughts involving an explicit self-identification. The phenomenology of 
memory and imagination, and the semantic analysis of memory reports and imagination 
reports, are shown to support the basic distinction between the two types of thought. The 
comparison between memory and imagination additionally reveals an interesting difference : 
the property which the subject imagines himself/herself to have in implicit de se imaginings 
can also be implicitly ascribed to someone else. This phenomenon — the ‘quasi-de se’ — 
shows that the content of an intentional state need not be evaluated with respect to the subject 
of the state. In such cases what I call the ‘Reflexive Constraint’ is violated. 
 Book III (« Egocentricity and Beyond ») precisely bears on issues involving that 
constraint and a generalization of it. To what extent can we say that our thought and talk 
always concern ourselves — our present situation in the world ? How egocentric are we ? Can 
the situation of evaluation shift away from the situation in which the representation is 
tokened ? I ascribe to Lewis the view that our thought and talk respect the ‘Generalized 
Reflexive Constraint’ : the index of evaluation is always the index of the context. To be sure, 
the index can be shifted by means of an operator, for Lewis, but the sentence whose 
evaluation is relative to such a shifted index can only be part of a more complex sentence, 
which is evaluated with respect to the index of the context (unless it, too, is part of a more 
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complex sentence). The GRC applies to autonomous sentences — sentences that are not 
themselves parts of more complex sentences. 
 As I make clear in book III, I reject the GRC. In part 9, I reject an idea which I trace to 
Perry’s work on unarticulated constituents, to the effect that a parameter relevant to the 
determination of truth-value belongs to the situation of evaluation (rather than to the content 
to be evaluated) only if it is rigidly anchored to the context of use and cannot shift away from 
it. I argue that the situation of evaluation need not be anchored to the external context and 
may vary quite freely as the discourse unfolds and the topic of conversation changes. In part 
10 I discuss Perry’s early objection to the use of ‘relativized propositions’ in dealing with 
indexical thought. In his paper ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Perry argued as 
follows : Unless the circumstance of evaluation is anchored to the context and cannot vary 
independently, it will not be possible to capture the peculiarity of first person thoughts by 
appealing to relativized propositions true at some persons and false at others. If we say that a 
subject S who thinks ‘I am making a mess’ takes such a proposition (the relativized 
proposition that x is making a mess) to be true with respect to himself, we do not capture the 
first person quality of his thought, since a bystander might very well take the same 
proposition to be true with respect to S. I respond that relativism only helps us to deal with 
implicit de se beliefs, for which the mode indeed anchors the situation of evaluation to the 
context, in conformity to the Reflexive Constraint. Perry’s and Lewis’s respective theories of 
indexical belief should therefore not be seen as competitors : they complement each other. 
 In part  11, I distinguish various forms of shiftability and discuss their interrelations. 
In discourse, I claim, the situation of evaluation can be shifted more or less at will (‘free 
shiftability’). As for mental representations, their mode often determines a situation of 
evaluation which violates the GRC, thus giving rise to what I call ‘m-shiftability’.x Both in 
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discourse and thought, therefore, we find that the situation of evaluation can shift away from 
the situation in which the representation is tokened. 
 Which relation is there between free shiftability, m-shiftability, and shiftability by 
means of operators (o-shiftability)? In GRC-based theories such as Lewis’s, free shiftability 
and m-shiftability alike have to be construed as instances of o-shiftability. The memory mode 
is treated as a circumstance-shifting operator akin to the past tense, while free shiftability is 
typically handled through the notion of ellipsis. If, in a conversation about a distant place l, I 
say ‘At this time of the year, it is raining’, my statement will be construed as elliptical for ‘At 
l, at this time of the year, it is raining’, where ‘at l’ is an operator which shifts the situation of 
evaluation for the embedded sentence. In this way, the apparent violation of the GRC can be 
explained away (since the complex sentence ‘At l, at this time of the year, it is raining’ is 
evaluated with respect to the subject’s egocentric situation). — In contrast to this sort of view, 
I argue that o-shiftability presupposes free shiftability, so that the order of priority is reversed. 
Free shiftability itself I construe as an instance of m-shiftability, involving a special mode : 
the anaphoric mode. In the anaphoric mode the situation of evaluation for a given 
representation is some situation that has been explicitly represented at a previous stage and 
now serves as cognitive background for the new representation. I see the emergence of the 
anaphoric mode as a fundamental step in the transition from animal thought to human 
thought, a step whose conditions of possibility I recommend as a potentially fruitful object of 
study. 
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NOTES
                                            
i
 By ‘semantic content’, I mean the expression’s contribution to the satisfaction conditions 
(truth-conditions, obedience-conditions, etc.) of the utterance in which it occurs. 
ii
 Since, to overcome semantic under-specification, one must appeal to pragmatic 
considerations involving salience, speaker’s intentions, and so on, one can (artificially) 
construe an under-specified expression as token reflexive by ‘internalizing’ those 
considerations and making them part of the meaning of the expression at issue. Thus instead 
of saying that the (unbound) pronoun ‘she’ refers to an under-specified female individual, one 
will say that it refers to the female individual who is most salient in the context of utterance, 
or the female individual who the speaker intends to designate. This cheap and, at the same 
time, unparsimonious move is a good example of what Barwise and Perry call ‘the fallacy of 
misplaced information’ (Barwise and Perry 1983 : 38). 
iii
 For those who take the circumstance to be a world (rather than a world-time pair, as Kaplan 
does) there is an additional reason for not paying much attention to the context-dependence of 
the circumstance. Context-dependence matters only when it yields contextual variation ; 
when it does not, it can be ignored. Now our utterances always take place in reality, and this 
entails that the world of evaluation is invariant : whether an utterance is true or false always 
depends upon how the (actual) world is. Being invariant, this context-dependent determinant 
of truth-value can be ignored — so the argument goes. 
iv
 Such a ‘complete’ content, made of an ‘explicit’ content together with an appropriate 
circumstance of evaluation, I call an Austinian proposition (after Barwise and Etchemendy 
1987). 
v
 An additional variety of context-dependence, not represented in Figure 1, is the post-
semantic variety, which does not affect the truth-conditional content but adds a second layer 
of content, thus introducing a ‘duality’ within the overall meaning of an utterance. 
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Conversational implicatures and irony belong there. See Literal Meaning for discussion of 
various forms of duality within utterance meaning. (The notion of ‘overall meaning’ I have 
just introduced is distinct from the notion of ‘complete content’ : by ‘complete content’ I 
mean the complete truth-conditional content of an utterance, but the ‘overall meaning’ 
includes aspects of speaker’s meaning that go beyond truth-conditional content.) 
vi
 I say ‘to some extent’ because a measure of semantic context-dependence in introduced, on 
that analysis : the simple sentence ‘It is raining’ talks about the place of utterance, in a 
context-sensitive manner, and that form of context-dependence is not analysed in terms of 
ellipsis. 
vii
 ‘If and only if’ will henceforth be abbreviated as ‘iff’. 
viii
 One of the few philosophers who take mental ambiguity seriously is Ned Block : « An 
ambiguous word often corresponds to an ambiguous mental representation, one that functions 
in thought as a unitary entity and thereby misleads » (Block 2002 : 217). 
ix
 Roderick Chisholm held a similar view. He held that ‘the believer can be said to be the 
object of his believing’ (1979 : 326), the content of a belief always being a property which the 
believer directly attributes to himself (where ‘direct attribution’ can only be attribution to the 
believer himself). See Chisholm 1979, 1981 and, for an overview, Boër 1986 : 85-92 and 
2007 : 66-71. See also Castañeda 1987 for presentation and discussion of the Lewis-Chisholm 
view. 
x
 Only in special cases does the situation of evaluation determined by the mode conform to 
the GRC. In perception the situation of evaluation is the situation in which the perceiving 
subject finds herself, in conformity to the GRC, but that is not true of memory, for example : 
as we have seen, the time of evaluation for a memory is distinct from the time at which the 
subject remembers. Memory still obeys the (simple) ‘Reflexive Constraint’, since the content 
of a memory state is evaluated with respect to some earlier perceptual situation involving the 
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remembering subject. But the quasi-de se is a type of case in which even the simple Reflexive 
Constraint is violated. 
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The framework
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Chapter 1 
The distribution of content 
 
 
Relativization 
 
In modal logic, propositions are evaluated relative to possible worlds. A proposition may be 
true relative to a world w, and false relative to another world w’. A proposition whose truth-
value varies across worlds is said to be contingent (as opposed to necessary). Similarly, in 
tense logic, propositions are evaluated relative to times. A proposition (e.g. the proposition 
that Socrates is sitting) may be true relative to a time t, and false relative to another time t’. A 
proposition that has this property is said to be temporal (as opposed to eternal). 
Further applications of the relativization idea easily come to mind. The proposition 
that it is raining (at a given time, in a given world) is true relative to some places, and false 
relative to others. The proposition that one is a philosopher is true relative to some persons, 
and false relative to others. The proposition that spinach is delicious is true relative to some 
standards of taste, and false relative to others. The proposition that the treasure might be 
under the palm tree is true relative to some epistemic situations, and false relative to others. 
The proposition that John is tall is true relative to some standards of height, and false relative 
to others. 
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As I understand it, the relativization idea has two component sub-ideas, which I will 
call ‘Duality’ and ‘Distribution’. Distribution presupposes Duality but, as we shall see, it is 
possible to accept Duality while rejecting Distribution. 
 
1. [Duality] To get a truth-value, we need a circumstance of evaluation as well 
as a content to evaluate. (As Austin puts it, ‘It takes two to make a truth’.)xi 
2. [Distribution] The determinants of truth-value distribute over the two basic 
components truth-evaluation involves : content and circumstance. That is, a 
determinant of truth-value, e.g. a time, is either given as an ingredient of 
content or as an aspect of the circumstance of evaluation. 
 
 
Distribution 
 
The distribution idea is apparent in the literature that stems from John Perry’s work on 
unarticulated constituents.
xii
 According to Perry (1986b), if something is given as part of the 
situation which an utterance (or, for that matter, a mental representation) concerns, and 
against which it is evaluated, it does not have to be articulated in that representation. Thus 
Perry draws a distinction between ‘It is raining here’, which explicitly mentions a place, and 
‘It is raining’, which leaves the place out of the picture. Perry describes the content of the 
latter not as a complete proposition but as a propositional function, true of some places and 
false of others. The place which actually determines the truth-value of the utterance is fixed 
not by the content of the utterance but by the situation which that utterance concerns (the 
situation the speaker manifestly intends to characterize). When I say ‘It is raining here’ the 
situation which my utterance concerns is typically more complex since it involves several 
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places at once, between which a contrast is drawn (Recanati 1997, 2000b). In this case the 
place must be articulated and cannot be left out of the picture, since it is not independently 
fixed by the situation talked about. 
The distribution idea also comes up in Kaplan’s well-known argument for temporal 
propositions (Kaplan 1989 : 502-504). Kaplan’s argument is based on the existence of 
temporal operators. The contents temporal operators operate on must be temporally neutral, 
Kaplan argued, for if they are not — if they are temporally specific — the temporal operators 
will be vacuous. A temporal operator specifies the time(s) with respect to which the 
proposition it operates on is to be evaluated. If the proposition itself specified a time, 
embedding the proposition under the temporal operator would have no effect whatsoever ; for 
temporally specific propositions keep the same truth value at all times of evaluation. It 
follows that temporal operators must operate on temporally-neutral propositions — 
propositions which are true with respect to some times, and false with respect to other times, 
but which do not themselves specify a time. 
To sum up, if a determinant of truth-value is an ingredient of content, it is pointless to 
attempt to provide it by manipulating the circumstance of evaluation (Kaplan). Being an 
ingredient of content, it is fixed ‘before the encounter with the circumstance of evaluation’. (I 
borrow this metaphor from Kaplan, who uses it in a slightly different context.) Conversely, if 
it is given as an aspect of the circumstance of evaluation, it does not have to be articulated in 
the representation whose content is evaluated (Perry). The general principle which emerges is 
a principle of economy or optimality according to which a determinant of truth-value is either 
given as an ingredient of content or as an aspect of the circumstance of evaluation. The richer 
the circumstance, the poorer the content evaluated with respect to that circumstance can be ; 
and the richer the content, the poorer the circumstance. In particular : 
 
 47 
• If the circumstance consists of a possible world only, the content must be a complete 
proposition (something that determines a function from possible worlds to truth-values). 
• If the circumstance is richer and involves a time and a place in addition to a world, then the 
content can be less than fully propositional : it can be place- and time-neutral and determine 
only a propositional function (a function from place-time pairs to functions from possible 
worlds to truth-values, or equivalently, a function from centered worlds to truth-values). Such 
a content is ‘poorer’, less determinate, than a classical, full-fledged proposition. It is what, 
after Perry (1979/1993b : 42), I call a relativized proposition. 
 
The debate over Temporalism 
 
A number of authors have agreed to relativize (the truth of) propositions to indices other 
than/richer than possible worlds. This move has been especially popular where time is 
concerned : in part because of Kaplan’s argument, it has long been the majority view that 
tensed sentences express temporally-neutral propositions — propositions true at some times 
and false at others. The success of Priorean tense logics, based on that idea, has played a 
major role in making this the orthodoxy. But Temporal Relativism (or ‘Temporalism’, for 
short) has met with considerable resistance in the recent philosophy of language, and the 
emerging consensus is that Temporalism rests on a mistake. Since Temporalism is supposed 
to be the most defensible form of relativism, rejecting Temporalism amounts to rejecting 
relativism entirely.
xiii
 
In parts II and III I will present, and attempt to defuse, influential objections to 
Temporalism : semantic objections (part II) and epistemic objections (part III).
xiv
 This defense 
is part of my advocacy of a generalized, yet moderate, form of relativism which I am now 
going to describe in general terms. To do so, I start by considering what is perhaps the most 
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basic objection to relativism : the Fregean objection, based upon the indeterminacy or 
incompleteness of the contents evaluated with respect to rich circumstances (e.g. centered 
worlds). As we shall see, there are two possible responses to that objection, and they 
correspond to two distinct brands of relativism : Moderate Relativism and Radical Relativism. 
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Chapter 2 
Radical vs. Moderate Relativism 
 
 
 
The objection from incompleteness 
 
Frege took fictional sentences to be endowed with content yet he considered them 
unevaluable. The author of a fictional statement does not attempt to characterize the actual 
world, he argued, so we are given a content without any circumstance of evaluation for it. 
One possible conclusion to draw from Frege's remarks on fiction is that, to get a truth-value, a 
content is not enough; we need to connect that content with the actual world, via the assertive 
force of the utterance, in virtue of which the content is presented as characterizing that world. 
Frege also held that, if a sentence lacks the force of a serious assertion (because the speaker 
does not attempt to characterize the actual world but is engaged in a different enterprise such 
as poetry), making the content of the sentence more complex by means of operators such as 'it 
is true that' or ‘I assert that’ will not change the situation. Whether or not an utterance is 
serious and characterizes the actual world is a pragmatic matter — a matter of 'force', not a 
matter of content. 
 From what I have just said, it follows that Frege accepted something like Duality. But 
he would have rejected Distribution, for Distribution entails that there are sentential contents 
that are not fully propositional. Such contents are unacceptable, from a Fregean point of view. 
Frege rejected the very idea of a temporal proposition, i.e. a proposition that is true at 
some times and false at other times. Such a proposition is not a genuine proposition, he held, 
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because it is not evaluable as true or false, or at least, it is not evaluable unless we are given a 
particular time. In the absence of a time specification, the alleged proposition is only 'true-at' 
certain times and 'false-at' others. It is, therefore, semantically incomplete by Frege's lights: 
 
A thought is not true at one time and false at another, but it is either true or false, 
tertium non datur. The false appearance that a thought can be true at one time and false 
at another arises from an incomplete expression. A complete proposition or expression 
of a thought must also contain a time datum. (Frege 1967 : 338 ; quoted in Evans 1985 : 
350) 
 
As Evans points out, the problem of semantic incompleteness does not arise in the modal 
case. Even if a thought is said to be 'true at' one world and 'false at' another, as in modal logic, 
this does not prevent it from being true (or false) tout court. It is true tout court iff it is true-at 
the actual world. But the 'thought' that it is hot cannot be evaluated as true or false tout court. 
In the absence of a contextually supplied time it can only be ascribed relative, 'truth-at'-
conditions. Only a particular, dated utterance of such a sentence can be endowed with genuine 
truth-conditions.
xv
 What this shows is that the time of utterance is part of the (complete) 
content of the utterance, or, in a Fregean framework, part of the expression of such a content; 
hence it cannot be considered external to content and treated like the world of evaluation. So 
the objection goes. 
The same objection evidently applies to the place-neutral content of ‘It is raining’ : 
such a content is not complete, since the utterance cannot be evaluated unless a place is 
contextually provided. The contextually provided location is an ingredient of the (complete) 
content of the utterance, or, in a Fregean framework, it contributes to the expression of such a 
content. 
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A first relativist response 
 
There are two possible responses which a relativist can make, corresponding to two forms of 
relativism. A radical relativist will insist that the partial contents we are led to encompass if 
we accept Distribution are complete. Thus the Stoics posited ‘lekta’ that were « in many 
respects reminiscent of the ‘propositions’ that many modern philosophers postulate as 
meanings of eternal assertoric sentences », save for the fact that they were « temporally 
indefinite in the same way as occasion sentences » (Hintikka 1973 : 70). Such lekta were 
thought by them to be complete, despite their temporal neutrality. In his review of Mates 
1953, which brought Stoic logic to the forefront of attention, Geach wrote that for the Stoics, 
« though the truth-value of ‘Dion is alive’ changes at Dion’s death, the sentence still 
expresses the same complete meaning (lekton) » (Geach 1955 : 144).
xvi
 This idea, which 
aroused Prior’s interest, Evans later found incomprehensible and even incoherent. If the 
lekton is complete, Evans argued, it can be evaluated as correct or incorrect ; but if the lekton 
is temporally neutral, its evaluation as correct or incorrect will vary with time, hence it will 
not be evaluated as correct or incorrect once for all. Does this not entail that the lekton cannot 
be evaluated as correct or incorrect (tout court) after all ? Evans writes : 
 
To say that the sentence-type ‘Socrates is sitting’… expresses a complete meaning 
seems to imply that… to know what assertion is being made by an utterance of a 
tensed sentence all you need to know is which tensed sentence was uttered ; you do 
not need further information to tie the sentence down to a particular time… It would 
follow that such an ‘assertion’ would not admit of a stable evaluation as correct or 
incorrect ; if we are to speak of correctness or incorrectness at all, we must say that the 
assertion is correct at some times and not at others (Evans 1985 : 349) 
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For Evans, this consequence (the instability of evaluation) is a reductio of the whole 
position. At this point, however, it is useful to consider MacFarlane’s discussion of future 
contingents, for MacFarlane seems to bite Evans’ bullet. MacFarlane (2003) argues that a 
sentence like ‘There will be a sea-battle tomorrow’ is neither true nor false when it is uttered 
(since the future is indeterminate) but turns out to be true or false, as the case may be, when it 
is evaluated the next day. So MacFarlane gives up the constraint that the evaluation of a 
thought as correct or incorrect must be temporally stable : the truth-value of an utterance may 
well depend upon the context of evaluation (e.g. the time at which it is evaluated), so an 
utterance or thought that is evaluated in a certain way at a certain time may be evaluated 
differently at a different time. In such a framework, reminiscent of Aristotle, we could 
maintain that the tensed sentence ‘Dion is alive’ expresses a complete content, and is 
(therefore) evaluable (at any given time), since we reject the constraint that the evaluation 
process itself must be ‘eternal’, hence stable, rather than context-sensitive and unstable.xvii 
 
A second relativist response 
 
Whatever we think of this Aristotelian line of argument, I will not be concerned with the 
radical forms of relativism in this book, but only with a moderate form which I myself 
advocate. In response to the Fregean objection, a moderate relativist will concede that the 
complete content of the utterance/thought ‘Dion is alive’ involves more than the temporally 
neutral lekton it expresses ; it additionally involves the time of utterance, which is tacitly 
referred to and against which the utterance is meant to be evaluated. Distribution can be 
construed as saying that the complete content, in the sense of Frege and Evans, distributes 
over the two components which Duality posits, namely the circumstance of evaluation (which 
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may include more than a world) and the content to be evaluated. Once it is admitted that we 
need these two components, we can tolerate contents that are not 'semantically complete' in 
Frege's sense, i.e. endowed with absolute truth-conditions. We can, because the circumstance 
is there which enables the content to be suitably completed. Thus the content of tensed 
sentences is semantically incomplete, yet the circumstance (the time) relative to which such a 
sentence is evaluated is sufficient to complete it. It follows that we must distinguish two levels 
of content. The content we evaluate with respect to the circumstance is the explicit content; it 
may, but need not, be semantically complete by Frege's lights. What is semantically complete 
in any case is the content in a more inclusive sense, consisting of the (explicit) content and the 
circumstance with respect to which that content is meant to be evaluated. Distribution only 
induces us to analyse the complete content of an utterance into two components, 
corresponding to those distinguished in Duality. 
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Chapter 3 
 Two levels of content 
 
 
 
Aristotle vs Frege 
 
In his interesting article on ‘Time, Truth and Knowledge in Aristotle and Other Greek 
Philosophers’, Hintikka presents the Aristotelian view as follows :  
 
It is obvious that the sentence, ‘It is raining’, as uttered by me today, is made true or 
false by a set of facts different from those that verified or falsified my utterance 
yesterday, ‘It is raining’. But it is very natural to say that in some sense the state of 
mind or attitude toward my environment that is expressed by the two utterances is the 
same. The facts to which yesterday’s utterance refers are referred to today by the 
sentence, ‘It was raining yesterday’. But the ‘state of mind’ that this utterance appears 
to express seems to be entirely different from that expressed by yesterday’s present-
tense utterance, ‘It is raining’. (…) Hence the idea that spoken words are symbols for 
unspoken thoughts encourages the idea that one and the same temporally indefinite 
form of words expresses one and the same belief or opinon at the different times when 
it is uttered. (Hintikka 1973 : 85)
xviii
 
 
For Aristotle as well as for the Stoics, the thought expressed by ‘It is raining’ stays 
constant on distinct occurrences. The truth-value changes, but that does not show that the 
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thought in question is somehow incomplete. The truth-value changes because the facts 
change. The truth-value of a thought depends upon the correspondence (or lack of 
correspondence) between that thought and the facts. Since the facts change (from rain to 
nonrain) as time passes, the change in truth-value does not entail that there is a change also in 
the expressed content. 
 From a modern, Fregean point of view, this way of looking at the matter is 
unacceptable. A complete thought content can only be true or false, tertium non datur. Now 
the thought that it is raining is true (when entertained on a rainy day) and false (when 
entertained on a sunny day) ; it follows that that ‘thought’ in question is not a genuine thought 
— a complete content — by Fregean standards. The shift in truth-value is sufficient to show 
that the thought expressed (in the Fregean sense of ‘thought’) changes from one occurrence to 
the next.
xix
 
 Aristotle did not have the modern, Fregean notion of thought content at his disposal. 
Hintikka argues that that notion would have been most useful to him, given his doctrine that 
only substances can take contrary attributes at different times and nevertheless remain 
numerically one and the same (Categories 5. 4
a
 10 ff). The changing truth-value of the 
thought that it is raining is a prima facie counterexample, which Aristotle could have disposed 
of by appealing to the Fregean notion, had such a notion been available to him. Instead, 
Aristotle ruled out the counterexample by means of what Hintikka takes to be ‘a rather 
unsatisfactory manœuvre’. « The fact that the modern view was not even considered by the 
author of the Categories, although it would have served his purpose perfectly, illustrates the 
hold of the contrary view on him » (Hintikka 1973 : 68). 
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A synthesis 
 
Contrary to Aristotle, we do have the Fregean notion of (complete) ‘thought’ at our disposal. 
But that does not mean that we should reject anything in the quotation from Hintikka with 
which this chapter began. That quotation emphasizes the naturalness of the Aristotelian notion 
of thought content. It is, indeed, natural and appealing, but acknowledging this is compatible 
with the adoption of a broadly Fregean framework. That is so because the Fregean and the 
Aristotelian notions of thought content need not be seen as competing. It is possible to 
construe them as complementary notions, and such conciliation results in the framework I call 
‘Moderate Relativism’. 
To a modern reader, familiar with the Fregean notion of content, the Hintikka 
quotation suggests that the complete content of an utterance (that which determines its truth-
conditions, i.e. the ‘facts’ which make it true or false) involves two factors : the (Aristotelian) 
thought that is expressed, and the time at which it is expressed. The sentence ‘It is raining’ 
expresses the same thought whenever it is uttered, and that thought is evaluated with respect 
to the time of utterance. Since the latter changes, the truth-value is liable to change. The truth-
conditions also change : An utterance of ‘It is raining’ at t is true iff the thought expressed by 
the sentence is true at t ; an utterance of the same sentence at t’ is true iff the same thought is 
true at t’. On this view the complete content of two successive utterances of ‘It is raining’ 
need not be the same, since the speaker does not merely express a certain content, but also 
tacitly refers to a certain time (the time of utterance) as relevant for the evaluation of that 
content. The complete content, individuated à la Frege, corresponds to the utterance’s truth-
conditions which, according to Hintikka, depend upon an external factor, namely the time at 
which the utterance is made or the thought entertained. 
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Dummett on Prior 
 
In a similar vein, Dummett attempts to make sense of Prior’s position (in response to Evans 
1985) by distinguishing two levels. He points out that temporal propositions are, for Prior, the 
contents of sentence-types. The content of a sentence-type is a function from times to truth-
values, hence a sentence-type only has relative truth-conditions: it is true at some times and 
false at other times. This does not prevent us from introducing a notion of absolute truth, by 
shifting to the level of utterance content. According to Dummett, when a sentence is uttered 
the function which is its content is applied to some contextually provided time (typically, the 
time of utterance). The time in question serves as circumstance of evaluation for the 
utterance: the utterance is true tout court iff the sentence is 'true-at' the contextually provided 
time. As Dummett points out, 
 
The variable truth-value and the absolute truth-value attach to different things; it is the 
type sentence that is true at one time, false at another, but the utterance that is true or 
false simpliciter (Dummett forthcoming : 44) 
 
 Since there are two distinct levels, corresponding to the sentence-type and the 
utterance, there is no harm in taking the utterance to possess a 'content' also (contentu), 
distinct from that of the sentence (contents). For example, we can treat the utterance as 
expressing a structured proposition consisting of (i) the contextually provided time as subject, 
and (ii) the content of the sentence-type, predicated of that time. But if we do so, we must 
acknowledge the unarticulated nature of the 'subject' in the contentu of tensed utterances. As 
Prior says, "tensed propositions are understood as directly or indirectly characterising the 
unmentioned time of utterance" (Prior 1977 : 30). Hence there is a trade-off: if we want to 
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restrict ourselves to what is linguistically articulated, we must focus on the contents, which is 
'semantically incomplete' by Frege's lights — it corresponds to the content of a predicate 
rather than to that of a complete sentence in a logically perfect language. If, following Frege, 
we want to focus on the complete content of the utterance, that which makes it truth-evaluable 
in absolute terms, we must acknowledge the role played in that content (contentu) by 
unarticulated constituents corresponding to the circumstances in which the contents is 
evaluated. 
 
Barwise and ‘Austinian propositions’ 
 
Another author who ought to be mentioned in connection with Moderate Relativism is Jon 
Barwise. Barwise also put forward a semantic theory with two levels of content : the ‘infon’ 
or ‘state of affairs’, and the ‘Austinian proposition’. « Whenever we make a claim », Barwise 
and Etchemendy write, « it is a claim about some situation or other » (1987 : 176), so « all 
propositions contain an additional contextually determined feature, namely, the situation they 
are about » (1987 : 29). The infon is the content to be evaluated with respect to a given 
situation — the claim we make regarding that situation — and the Austinian proposition is the 
proposition to the effect that that situation supports that claim. In what follows I will use the 
notion of Austinian proposition, corresponding to the complete content of an 
utterance/thought. But I will use the Stoic term ‘lekton’, rather than Barwise’s theoretically-
loaded term ‘infon’, to refer to the content to be evaluated.xx So ‘It is raining’ expresses a 
constant lekton whenever and wherever it is used, a content that can be modeled as a function 
from situations to truth-values or as a set of situations (viz. the set {s : it is raining in s}); but 
the complete content of an utterance of ‘It is raining’ is the Austinian proposition that a 
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certain situation (that which the utterance/thought ‘concerns’) fits that lekton, i.e., belongs to 
the set of situations in question. 
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Chapter 4 
Branch points for Moderate Relativism 
 
 
 
Is the lekton context-dependent ? 
 
In Dummett’s framework the relativized content — which I call the lekton —  is the content 
of the sentence-type. That content is admittedly incomplete : it is like the content of a 
predicate. To get a complete content we need a situation, which the utterance context provides 
and the lekton can be predicated of. Change the situation, you change the complete content of 
the utterance, even though the content of the sentence (the lekton) remains constant. 
Barwise’s view is very similar, but there is a significant difference. The infon, 
according to Barwise, is the content of the sentence with respect to context : if the sentence 
contains indexicals, the contextual values of the indexicals contribute to the infon. On this 
interpretation, the lekton itself is context-dependent, and we have three levels rather than 
merely two. The three levels are : the meaning of the sentence-type, the lekton, and the 
complete Austinian proposition. On this version of Moderate Relativism, which I will 
elaborate in this book, the context comes into the picture twice : first, it provides values for 
the indexicals, which values contribute to the lekton ; second, it determines the situation 
against which the lekton is to be evaluated. The complete content of the utterance involves the 
lekton together with the situation of evaluation. 
So there are two possible interpretations for the notion of lekton within the moderate 
relativist framework, depending on the option we choose with respect to the issue I have just 
raised. Is the lekton context-dependent (Barwise), or can it be equated with the meaning of the 
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sentence-type (Dummett)? The first option corresponds to what MacFarlane calls ‘Non-
indexical Contextualism’ (MacFarlane forthcoming a). It is a view famously held by Kaplan 
and his followers (e.g. Salmon), since Kaplanian ‘contents’ do not determine a classical 
proposition unless a circumstance (involving a time and, possibly, a place in addition to a 
world) is contextually provided. The second option corresponds to Lewis’s position, as we 
shall see in part IV, when we discuss the proper treatment of indexicality, and again in parts X 
and XI, when we discuss the analysis of attitudes de se. 
As far as I am concerned, I will follow Barwise and Kaplan and construe the lekton as 
the content of the sentence in context, so that an indexical sentence will express different lekta 
in different contexts. My main reason for taking the lekton to be an extra level of content, 
intermediate between the meaning of the sentence and the complete content, is that this 
enables us to represent what the sentence (or possibly the thought) explicitly articulates (in a 
possibly indexical manner). Again, ‘It is raining here’ says something different from what ‘It 
is raining’ says, even in a context in which they are both true iff it is raining at the place of 
utterance. The difference lies in the fact that the place in question is (indexically) articulated 
in the former case while it is left unarticulated in the latter. It follows that the lekton differs, 
even though the truth-conditions are the same. 
 
What do we do when the lekton is a classical proposition? 
 
The second branch point concerns the special case in which the content of the sentence is not 
semantically incomplete, but is already a fully-fledged, classical proposition. In such a case 
the lekton determines a function from possible worlds to truth-values, hence the only thing we 
need to determine a truth-value is a possible world. No further relativization is needed. 
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It seems that, with sentences whose content is not semantically incomplete, there is no 
need to invoke a double layer of content. The content of the sentence, insofar as it has an 
absolute truth-value, is the only thing we need. Or, to put it in slightly different terms : in such 
cases the lekton is the complete content. This position defines one version of Moderate 
Relativism, namely the weak version (‘WMR’, for ‘weak moderate relativism’). But there is 
another, strong version, which has been argued for by Barwise and which I also advocate. 
Before proceeding, we should note that this issue is orthogonal to the first issue I 
raised (the context-dependence of the lekton). If we are context-independentists, the special 
case we are talking about is the case in which the content of the sentence-type is a classical 
proposition, i.e. the case in which the uttered sentence is eternal. If, like Barwise and Kaplan, 
we take the lekton to be context-dependent, then the special case at issue is the case in which 
the content of the sentence-in-context is a complete proposition. Suppose the speaker says ‘It 
is raining here and now’, without leaving anything unarticulated (save the world of 
evaluation). Both the time and the place are explicitly articulated, hence they are both part of 
the lekton. It follows that we do not need a rich circumstance to evaluate that content : we 
only need a possible world. Here the sentence is not eternal, but it is fully articulate, so that no 
further relativization is needed. 
Whether we construe the lekton as context-dependent or not, the special case in which 
it is a classical proposition can be handled in two ways. Weak Moderate Relativism says that, 
in such a case, the lekton is the utterance’s complete content ; so the distinction between the 
two levels of content only holds in the cases in which the lekton is not classical. Strong 
Moderate Relativism (‘SMR’) rejects that conclusion. According to SMR, the content of a 
sentence (whatever the sentence) is a function from situations to truth-values. Hence the 
relativity of truth, construed as a property of sentences: the same sentence may be true relative 
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to a situation and false relative to another one. That is so even if the sentence itself is not 
semantically incomplete. 
 
Strong Moderate Relativism 
 
Even when the sentence is truth-evaluable in the absolute sense — when it is 'semantically 
complete' by Frege's lights — SMR says there is a principled distinction between the content 
of the sentence (the lekton) and the content of the utterance (the Austinian proposition). In 
such a case, the lekton will be a 'classical' proposition (a function from possible worlds to 
truth-values), but the Austinian proposition will still contain a situation in addition to that 
proposition. What the utterance 'says' is that the situation in question supports the proposition 
in question. It follows that two distinct evaluations are possible, in such cases. We can 
evaluate the sentence itself (i.e. evaluate the proposition with respect to the actual world), or 
we can evaluate the utterance, that is, evaluate the proposition with respect to the situation 
figuring in the Austinian proposition.  
To illustrate this point I usually quote my favourite example, from Barwise and 
Etchemendy (1987 : 29, 121). Commenting upon a poker game I am watching, I say: 'Claire 
has a good hand now'. What I say is true, iff Claire has a good hand in the poker game I am 
watching at the moment of utterance. Suppose I made a mistake and Claire is not among the 
players in that game. Then my utterance is not true, because the situation it concerns (the 
poker game I am watching) is not one in which Claire has a good hand at the time of 
utterance. Whether we say that, in this sort of case, the utterance is false, or truth-value-less 
because of presupposition-failure, is irrelevant to our present purposes. But suppose that, by 
coincidence, Claire happens to be playing bridge in some other part of town and has a good 
hand there. There certainly is a sense in which, in such circumstances, what is said can be 
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considered as ‘true’ (true by accident, as it were). So we have conflicting intuitions about 
such a case. Is the utterance true or false ? In the SMR framework, we can accept both 
answers. What is said is true, absolutely speaking, but it is not true of the situation the 
utterance purports to characterize. To put it slightly differently : the sentence (or the sentence-
in-context) is true: for it says that Claire has a good hand at the time of utterance, and Claire 
has a good hand (somewhere) at the time of utterance. Still, the utterance is not true, for the 
situation it concerns is not one in which Claire has a good hand at the time of utterance. If we 
evaluate the lekton abstractly, we get one verdict ; if we evaluate the full Austinian 
proposition, we get another verdict. 
This two-level approach can easily be extended to deal with standard problems such as 
that of quantifier domain restriction. It is natural to hold that ‘All Fs are G’ expresses a 
proposition that is true (in a world, at a time) if and only if the Fs are all G (in that world, at 
that time). Thus ‘All students are French’ expresses the proposition that all students are 
French. Many theorists feel compelled to give up this natural view, and claim that the 
sentence is semantically incomplete or covertly indexical, so that it expresses no proposition 
(independent of context).
xxi
 They say so because they are impressed by the fact that the truth-
conditions of an utterance of that sentence typically involve a contextually restricted domain 
of quantification. In the SMR framework, however, we can stick to the simple and 
straightforward view regarding the proposition expressed by ‘All Fs are G’, while fully 
acknowledging contextual domain restriction. The two layers of content enable us to do just 
that. The sentence is said to express a proposition that is evaluable with respect to an arbitrary 
world (or, perhaps, an arbitrary world-time pair) — the proposition that all students are 
French — but that proposition can also be evaluated with respect to the specific situation that 
features in the Austinian proposition. That is what happens when we evaluate an utterance of 
this sentence, instead of evaluating the sentence itself.
xxii
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Part Two 
 
 
The debate over Temporalism (1) : 
Do we need temporal propositions ?
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Chapter 5 
Modal vs extensional treatments of tense 
 
 
 
It is common nowadays to reject the idea that tenses should be represented as analogous to the 
sentential operators of modal logic. This idea, on which Arthur Prior built the new discipline 
of tense logic in the middle of the twentieth century, had been widely accepted among 
philosophers for almost twenty years, but the development of formal semantics as an 
autonomous discipline within linguistics, and the widespread adoption of a non-modal 
framework for dealing with tense by practitioners of that discipline, led to a gradual 
abandonment of the idea. 
Now, if the tenses are not operators, then the argument that we need time-neutral 
propositions for such operators to operate on collapses. The abandonment of the tense-logical 
approach by practitioners of formal semantics has thus been used to argue against temporal 
propositions. A recent instance of that line of argument can be found in King’s paper ‘Tense, 
Modality, and Semantic Values’ (King 2003). 
In part II I attempt to show that Temporal Relativism (and Moderate Relativism in 
general) is not threatened by arguments along those lines. I start by presenting the reasons that 
have been adduced for giving up the modal framework in the theory of tense. 
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Partee’s objection to Prior 
 
A first objection to the Priorean treatment of tense is due to Barbara Partee (1973). She argues 
that a certain class of examples, in which reference is made to a specific time (indicated by 
the tense of the verb), speak against a treatment in terms of operators. In her most famous 
example, ‘I did not turn off the stove’, the past tense is understood deictically : the speaker 
refers to a specific time in the past. As Partee writes, 
 
When uttered, for instance, halfway down the turnpike, such a sentence clearly does 
not mean either that there exists some time in the past at which I did not turn off the 
stove or that there exists no time in the past at which I turned off the stove. The 
sentence clearly refers to a particular time. (Partee 1973/2004 : 51) 
 
Tense-logical operators, Partee says, cannot capture the referential nature of these uses of 
tenses. The ‘past’ operator of tense-logic presents the proposition it operates on as true with 
respect to some time in the past, but does not refer to a particular time. In contrast, she points 
out, there is a striking parallel between tenses and pronouns, a parallel that justifies treating 
tenses as variables rather than operators. Like pronouns, tenses have not only deictic, but also 
anaphoric and bound uses. The existence of all three uses suggests that it would be more 
fruitful to exploit the analogy with pronouns and to handle tense in terms of reference to, and 
quantification over, times, rather than in terms of temporal modalities. 
Interesting though they are, Partee’s remarks are not sufficient to dispose of the tense-
logical approach. Even if we hold that the past tense functions like an operator which presents 
its operand as true with respect to some time in the past, we can easily account for prima facie 
deictic uses. The deictic reading arguably results from restricting the implicit domain of 
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quantification in a manner that mimics singular reference. Thus ‘I didn’t turn off the stove’ 
can be analysed as saying that, in the contextually relevant period (that which immediately 
follows my last use of the stove), there is no time at which ‘I turn off of the stove’ is true. On 
this analysis what the sentence encodes is the general proposition that there is no time at 
which I turn off of the stove, and the context provides a temporal situation for that statement 
to be evaluated against (for a recent proposal along those lines, see Lasersohn 1999 : 537 
fn).
xxiii
 
Note that tenses, unlike pronouns, admit of ‘existential’ uses. The future tense 
sentence ‘I will go to China’ may be understood in two ways : either the speaker is referring 
to some specific future time, made salient in the context, and she says that she will go to 
China at that time ; or she is merely saying that there is a future time at which she will go to 
China.
xxiv
 Such an existential reading is not available with pronouns : ‘He is bald’ cannot 
mean that some male or other is bald, even within a clearly identified group of people. This 
casts some doubt on the ‘tense as pronoun’ analysis. 
To sum up, if we say that the tenses are always (implicitly) quantificational, because 
they are fundamentally operators, we can still account for the ‘deictic’ uses — and, 
presumably, for the anaphoric uses as well — in terms of contextual domain restriction ; so 
we can give a unified analysis of existential and deictic uses. But if tenses are to be treated as 
referential variables (as Partee 1973 suggests), the variables in question must be different 
from pronominal variables : they must be optional variables. An optional variable, when 
unbound, may be contextually assigned a specific value or undergo existential closure. 
Whether there are such variables is unclear, and can be disputed (see Recanati forthcoming a). 
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‘Referential’ operators in the tense-logical framework 
 
Be that as it may, let us assume that Partee is right and that the tenses have a genuinely 
referring use, irreducible to their existential use. This fact, by itself, does not show that the 
tenses cannot be analysed as tense-logical operators. To be sure, the standard temporal 
operators — the ‘P’ and ‘F’ operators of Prior’s tense logic — are (implicitly) quantificational 
rather than referential ; but nothing prevents the introduction of 'referential' operators in the 
tense-logical framework. We find seeds of that idea in Prior’s own work (see e.g. Prior 1967, 
chapter 6, and Prior 2003 :183, 227-9),
xxv
 and recently tense-logicians have developed 
extensions of Priorean tense logic in which arbitrary reference to times is possible (see e.g. 
Blackburn 1994). In such a hybrid system one can have a tense-logical operator ‘@t’ such 
that, when it is prefixed to a sentence, the result is true iff the embedded sentence is true at 
time t (Blackburn 2000 : 347-8).
xxvi
 And of course, early in the development of tense logic, 
Hans Kamp had introduced indexical operators such as ‘N’ (for ‘now’) which refer to specific 
times (the time of utterance, in the case of ‘N’). Among the expressions which function like 
‘now’ and can be modeled in the same sort of way, Kamp mentioned ‘then’, which is the 
counterpart of a pronoun in the temporal domain (Kamp 1971 : 230, Vlach 1973). So the 
possibility of introducing ‘referential’ operators into tense-logic alongside the traditional 
‘quantificational’ operators was already taken on board even before Partee raised her 
objection to the tense-logical approach. It follows that that objection is not an objection to the 
tense-logical approach per se, but only to a particular version of that approach. 
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Explicit quantification over times 
 
That is not to deny that we can account for the tenses by construing them as pronominal 
devices in an extensional framework, as Partee 1973 suggested. In his pioneering paper 
‘Formal Properties of ‘Now’’, Kamp himself briefly mentioned (in a footnote) « the 
possibility of [using] explicit quantification over moments. Such a symbolization… would 
certainly be possible ; and it would even make the operators P and F superfluous » (Kamp 
1971 : 231). It is interesting in retrospect to look at the two objections which Kamp then 
levelled against such an alternative approach — precisely the approach that has gained wide 
acceptance among linguists and philosophers recently. As we shall see, these objections are 
far from convincing. 
About the extensional approach with explicit quantification over moments, Kamp 
wrote : 
 
Such symbolizations are a considerable departure from the actual form of the original 
sentences which they represent — which is unsatisfactory if we want to gain insight 
into the semantics of English. Moreover, one can object to symbolizations involving 
quantification over such abstract objects as moments, if these objects are not explicitly 
mentioned in the sentences that are to be symbolized. (Kamp 1971 : 231 fn.) 
 
The second objection is a Quinean sort of objection : one should not quantify over, hence 
ontologically commit oneself to, dubious entities such as moments or possible worlds. But 
from the point of view of Prior, a quantified statement commits us to no more and no less than 
its substitution instances do. So we can generalize from ‘I hurt him by treading on his toe’ to 
‘I hurt him somehow’ or ‘I hurt him in some way’. The existentially quantified statement we 
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end up with does not commit us to the existence of ‘ways’ anymore than the original sentence 
‘I hurt him by treading on his toe’ does (Prior 1971 : 37-39). Given Prior’s ‘non-objectual’ 
understanding of quantification,
xxvii
 the Quinean argument that one should not quantify over 
objects that one may not be prepared to countenance in one’s ontology has no force. 
 What about the first argument ? Prior insisted on treating the tenses as modifiers akin 
to adverbs rather than as pronominal elements. The logical form of tensed sentences analysed 
à la Prior is simpler than the logical form that results from explicitly quantifying over 
moments, and this matches the corresponding simplicity of the natural language sentences. 
The formulas one gets when one explicitly quantifies over moments are simply too long ! 
However this argument has lost much of its weight. Tense theorists have developed 
frameworks with explicit quantification over times in the object-language, and such 
frameworks turn out to offer elegant and perspicuous ways of representing complex facts 
about natural-language tenses (for example, sequence-of-tense phenomena, which King uses 
as example in his 2003 paper)
xxviii
 — facts which the tense-logical approach can handle only 
by introducing extra complexities which offset the initially appealing simplicity of the 
approach. Thus I said that it is possible to account for referential and anaphoric uses of tenses 
within the tense-logical framework. To do so, however, one arguably has to introduce a series 
of new operators 
 
[whose definition] tends to become very complicated and [whose] number tends to 
grow with every new phenomenon that cannot be expressed with the previous 
operators. For that reason, more and more people take a language with quantification 
over times as basis, and just define the operators they need in them… For the simple 
cases this has the disadvantage of length… For the longer cases that has the advantage 
of readibility and keeping track of the interpretation (Landman 1991 : 135) 
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To be sure, the tense-logical formulas are closer to surface grammar than their long-
winded extensional counterparts — that is, presumably, what Kamp meant when he said that 
the latter ‘depart from the actual form of the original sentences which they represent’ — but 
contemporary semanticists mostly care about another level of syntactic representation, 
namely, that which is the input to semantic interpretation (the so-called ‘Logical Form’, 
distinct from surface grammar). 
I conclude that there are, indeed, two possible approaches to tense : the tense-logical 
approach whose operators implicitly quantify over (and possibly refer to) times but do not do 
so explicitly ; and the extensional approach with explicit quantification over (and reference 
to) times in the object-language. Far from being the only correct way of representing natural 
language tenses, the tense-logical approach tends to be disfavoured as less flexible and 
perspicuous than the other approach. It follows that one may, but certainly need not, construe 
the tenses as operators. So Kaplan’s argument that we need temporal propositions for such 
operators to operate on weighs very little. Or rather, it has weight only for someone who is 
antecedently committed to the correctness of the tense-logical approach as opposed to the 
other approach. There still are such people, but they are a minority in the present theoretical 
landscape. That is the gist of King’s argument against temporal propositions. 
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Chapter 6 
What is at stake? 
 
 
 
We have just seen that there are (at least) two theoretical options for the treatment of tense. 
Basically, one is free to adopt one framework or the other. As Ogihara writes, 
 
[The] choice of logical language should not be taken as an important theoretical 
decision… The only important issue is whether the language has enough tools to 
describe the target construction in natural language. (Ogihara 1996 : 28, quoted in 
King 2003 : 218) 
 
King disapproves of this ‘pragmatic, almost instrumentalist’ attitude. He holds that there are 
substantive reasons for giving up the modal approach. I disagree. In this chapter and the next 
one, I will argue that, to the extent that there are deep theoretical reasons at stake, they favour 
the approach in terms of operators. 
 
The expressive power argument 
 
For a long time there has been a theoretical argument around, to the effect that the extensional 
approach is to be preferred, on grounds of expressive power. The argument runs as follows. 
Using the technique of ‘Standard Translation’ modal languages may be shown to be 
fragments of standard first-order languages (van Benthem 1985). If natural language tenses 
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can be dealt with within a modal framework, as Prior suggested, it would seem to follow that 
the full power of classical logic is not needed. Conversely, if the full expressive power of 
first-order logic is needed to deal with natural language tenses, it would seem to follow that 
they cannot be dealt with in a modal framework. Starting with these premisses, the argument 
is straightforward. It has been established that the full expressive power of first-order logic is 
needed to deal with natural language tenses. (See e.g. van Benthem 1977, Cresswell 1990, 
chapters 2-4.) Does it not follow that natural language tenses cannot be dealt with in a modal 
framework, and that we need to go extensional ? 
No, it does not ! The conclusion does not follow because, as we have seen, the modal 
language can be enriched with new operators, such as Kamp’s ‘N’ operator (corresponding to 
‘now’) or Vlach’s ‘K’ operator (corresponding to ‘then’). Such an enrichment can proceed 
until the modal language one works with has itself acquired the full power of standard first-
order languages. Quine has demonstrated that this is possible, since quantification can be 
expressed without variables, by using suitable operators (Quine 1960). Thanks to those 
operators, first-order languages themselves can be translated into modal languages (Kuhn 
1980). Exploiting the Quine-Kuhn techniques, one can therefore provide modal languages in 
general (and tense-logical languages in particular) with the full expressive power of standard 
first-order logic (Cresswell 1996, chapter 1). So the formal argument that we need explicit 
quantification over times on grounds of expressive power is a nonstarter. 
 
King’s argument 
 
King is well-aware of all this, and the expressive power argument is not what he appeals to 
when he claims that the tense-logical approach is no longer a live option. He argues as 
follows : 
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My claim that English tenses cannot be viewed as operators cannot be based on the 
claim that to treat them in this way would be to not capture the expressive power of 
English… Rather, the claim is that treating tenses as e.g. involving quantification over 
times (and expressing relations between times) rather than index shifting sentence 
operators (i) allows for a simpler, more elegant, less ad hoc treatment of tenses and 
temporal expressions than does an operator treatment ; and (ii) allows for a more 
plausible account of the relation between the surface structures of English sentences 
and the syntactic representations of those sentences at the level of syntax that is the 
input to semantics… This, in turn, explains the fact mentioned above : that virtually all 
current researchers trying to give a treatment of the complex temporal data in natural 
languages eschew an operator approach to tenses in favor of treating tenses as 
something like quantifying over, referring to and/or expressing relations between 
times. (King 2003 : 221) 
 
King overstates his case, however. He invokes a majority of semanticists who indeed prefer 
the extensional approach to the modal approach on overall grounds of elegance and 
simplicity, and concludes that « if the complex temporal facts present in natural language are 
most readily and easily represented by viewing tenses as involving explicit quantification over 
time and as expressing relations between times, that is a good reason for thinking that tenses 
really work this way » (King 2003 : 218). King therefore dismisses Ogihara’s pragmatic 
attitude by appealing to the very preferences which Ogihara and his colleagues manifest. But 
such preferences are perfectly compatible with, indeed can hardly be dissociated from, the 
pragmatic attitude in question. Everything being equal, one naturally prefers the framework 
that is most convenient given one’s other commitments in syntax and semantics. Natural and 
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important though they are, such preferences remain superficial and Ogihara’s pragmatic 
attitude toward them is perfectly appropriate.
xxix
 If there were deep conceptual reasons for 
preferring the modal framework, they would possibly override such pragmatic preferences. So 
the question we must ask is : Are there, or are there not, deep conceptual reasons for treating 
the tenses as operators ? 
 
The internal perspective 
 
I think there is at least one, and it has been concisely stated by Patrick Blackburn (one of 
those who still work within Prior’s tense-logical framework). Blackburn writes : 
 
Prior insisted on the primacy of the internal view of time. This view situates the 
speaker firmly inside the temporal flow : the speech-time centred ordering of past, 
present and future, rather than the absolute earlier-than/later-than relation, is 
considered central to the analysis of tensed talk. This is natural :  we live in time, and 
the internal perspective is imprinted on natural language in many ways. 
Prior’s insistence on the internal perspective led him to develop his temporal 
calculi as modal logics, not classical logics. Classical logic, with its explicit variables 
and binding, offers a God’s-eye-view of temporal structure ; modal logic, on the other 
hand, uses operators to quantify over structure ‘from the inside’. (Blackburn 1994 : 
83) 
 
Following Blackburn, I will argue that the main reason one has for treating the tenses as 
operators is that, in this way, one captures the internal perspective on time which 
characterizes our thought and talk. This is independent of any preference one may have for or 
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against the ‘A-theory’ of time and the metaphysical view Prior called ‘presentism’. One may 
be a ‘B-theorist’ and hold that, metaphysically, the earlier-than/later-than relation is all there 
is to time, while still accepting that, from the cognitive point of view, the internal perspective 
is primary. Such a view has been argued for by Hugh Mellor (1998). Whether one follows 
Prior or Mellor in the metaphysics of time, in both cases one may accept, as a deep constraint 
on our theorizing, the need to capture the primacy of the internal perspective in dealing with 
the representation of time in language and thought. 
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Chapter 7 
Modal and temporal innocence 
 
 
 
By way of introduction to this chapter, let me give another quote from Blackburn, this time 
from his ‘Hybrid Logic Manifesto’ : 
 
Modal languages talk about relational structures in a special way : they take an 
internal and local perspective on relational structure. When we evaluate a modal 
formula, we place it inside the model, at some particular state w (the current state). 
The satisfaction clauses (and in particular, the clause for the modalities) allow us to 
scan other states for information — but we’re only allowed to scan states reachable 
from the current state. The reader should think of a modal formula as a little 
automaton, placed at some point on a graph, whose task is to explore the graph by 
visiting accessible states. (Blackburn 2000 : 341-2) 
 
What matters to us — and what I will focus on in this chapter — is the dissymmetry between 
the current state and the other accessible states, to which the modal operators take us. The 
modal operators shift the point of evaluation from the current state to some other accessible 
state. The dissymmetry consists in the fact that the current state is antecedently given and does 
not have to be represented, in contrast to the other states which have to be explicitly 
introduced for the shift to take place. 
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Unarticulatedness 
 
That the point of evaluation for a sentence is not, or at least does not have to be, represented 
in that sentence is one aspect of the ‘Distribution’ idea. Let us first consider the simple case in 
which the point of evaluation is a possible world. Clearly, the possible worlds relative to 
which propositions are evaluated are not themselves represented in, or an aspect of, the 
propositions in question. Thus ‘Brigitte Bardot is French’ is true, with respect to a world w, iff 
Brigitte Bardot is French in w ; but the sentence ‘Brigitte Bardot is French’ only talks about 
Brigitte Bardot and the property of being French. The world of evaluation is not a constituent 
of the content to be evaluated. 
To be sure, one can bring the world into the content by making the statement more 
complex. The complex sentence ‘Possibly, Brigitte Bardot is French’ (or ‘Brigitte Bardot 
might be French’) tells us that in some possible world Brigitte Bardot is French. The modal 
statement one makes by uttering that sentence is about possible worlds, not merely about 
Brigitte Bardot and the property of being French.
xxx
 In hybrid logic, one can even make 
statements ‘referring’ to specific possible worlds, just as it is possible to make statements 
referring to specific times. The hybrid-logic formula ‘@wp’ tells us that p is true at world w. 
The modal statement ‘Actually, Brigitte Bardot is French’ itself can be seen as talking about 
the actual world as well as about Brigitte Bardot and her nationality. But the worlds that are 
thus introduced into the content of the complex statement (via modal operators such as 
‘possibly’, ‘actually’ or ‘@w’) are used in evaluating the simple — or simpler — statement 
that is embedded within the modal statement. The modal statement itself is evaluated, and it 
shares with the simple statement the property that the worlds with respect to which it is 
evaluated are not themselves represented in the statement under evaluation. 
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To appreciate the unarticulated character of the circumstance of evaluation in the 
modal framework, it is worth looking at what happens when, using the techniques of Standard 
Translation, we transpose a modal statement into first-order logic, by explicitly quantifying 
over possible worlds. Simplifying somewhat, the translation runs as follows : ‘Necessarily p’ 
becomes ‘w p(w)’, ‘Possibly p’ becomes ‘w p(w)’, etc.xxxi All complete sentences are 
transformed into predicates (of worlds). A simple categorical statement such as ‘Rain is wet’ 
will be represented as ‘p(w)’, where ‘p’ is the proposition that rain is wet transformed into a 
predicate of worlds, and ‘w’ is a free variable to which the actual world is contextually 
assigned as default value. 
The big difference between the modal statement and its standard translation is that, in 
the extensional framework, the circumstance of evaluation (the world) becomes a constituent 
of content. The contrast between content and circumstance is lost. Now that contrast makes a 
lot of sense. To evaluate a sentence, we determine whether the state of affairs it describes 
obtains in some ‘reality’ which serves as circumstance of evaluation. But that reality — the 
actual world, say — is not itself, or at least doesn’t have to be, among the constituents of the 
state of affairs in question, i.e. among the entities that are talked about and articulated in the 
content of the statement. The world comes into the picture for purposes of evaluation, but the 
thoughts that are evaluated need not be metaphysically elaborated thoughts about the world. 
Indeed the users of the language need not even have the ability to entertain such thoughts. 
Only the theorist needs to be able to talk about the world of evaluation, in her metalanguage. 
 
Modal innocence 
 
Let us consider a simple language without modal operators or other means of talking about 
worlds ; let us go further and assume that the users of the language do not possess the 
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reflective abilities necessary for thinking about modal issues. They entertain only nonmodal 
thoughts such as ‘Rain is wet’.xxxii The possible-worlds semanticist who studies their language 
will still need to think and talk about the possible worlds relative to which the sentences of the 
language are evaluated (he may, for example, want to draw a distinction between contingent 
propositions and necessary propositions) ; but, contrary to what the standard extensional 
translation suggests, mention of the possible worlds in question will be confined to the 
theorist’s metalanguage. 
Now suppose the users of the object-language become sophisticated and start thinking 
about metaphysical issues. Suppose they come to talk and think about what is actually the 
case as opposed to what might be the case. Such modal talk can be formally represented in 
two ways, as we have seen tensed talk can : by using sentence operators, or by explicitly 
quantifying world variables in the object-language. If we use the modal framework and 
introduce modal operators such as ‘actually’ or ‘possibly’, nothing will be changed for the 
fragment of the language that does not involve those operators. The sentence ‘Rain is wet’ 
will still be a simple, modally innocent sentence. The language will simply have been 
enriched by the introduction of new resources enabling us to construct more complex 
sentences. But if we use the standard extensional framework and represent modal sentences 
(‘It might be that…’, ‘Actually…’) by means of explicit quantification over possible worlds, 
as suggested above, then, unless special precaution is taken to avoid that consequence, a 
change of language takes place, not merely an enrichment. In the new language, all sentences 
(including simple sentences) now contain a hidden argument-place for a world. Modal 
innocence is lost. 
 I think this move is (almost) as damaging as the previous one — the ascription of 
thought and talk about possible worlds to modally innocent subjects. Even if the users of the 
language are sophisticated enough and can think about modal issues, it is misleading to 
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suggest that they always think and talk about such issues even when they entertain simple 
thoughts or utter simple sentences such as ‘Rain is wet’. By forcing us to construe e.g. the 
assertion that rain is wet as involving a covert argument-place which the actual world fills, the 
extensional translation blurs the cognitively important distinction between the simple, 
modally innocent assertion ‘Rain is wet’ and the modal assertion ‘Actually, rain is wet’. To 
maintain that distinction, we have to see modal sentences as constructed from simple 
sentences by the application of modal operators to them. In this way we can analyse the 
ability to use and understand modal sentences as resting on two distinct abilities : the 
(modally innocent) ability to use and understand simple sentences ; and the (modally 
sophisticated) ability to imagine other possible worlds and to contrast the actual world with 
them. The first ability is independent of the second : we can use and understand simple 
sentences (e.g. ‘Rain is wet’) even if we lack the ability to think reflectively about the actual 
world. 
 
Temporal innocence 
 
The difference we have found between two ways of representing modality can be found also 
between two ways of representing tense, one which preserves temporal innocence in simple 
sentences and one which does not. 
In tense logic, as we have seen, tense is represented by means of sentence operators. 
Alternatively, tenses can be represented by adding extra argument-places (and predicates) for 
times.
xxxiii
 If we choose the latter course, it is no longer possible to consider adjectives such as 
‘warm’ or ‘yellow’ as denoting properties ; they have to be considered as denoting relations 
— relations between the objects which have the alleged properties and the times at which they 
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have them. As Michael Dummett has pointed out, this relational approach significantly 
departs from our habitual way of thinking : 
 
We think of adjectives such as « warm », « smooth », « slender » and so on as denoting 
properties ; properties that a thing may have at one time, and not at another, but 
nevertheless properties rather than relations between objects and times. And this goes 
with the way in which we come to understand such adjectives. (…) We do not begin by 
learning in what relation an object must stand to an arbitrary time for it to be warm or 
wet at that time, and then, having learned what time is referred to by the adverb 
« now », derive from this a grasp of what it is for it to be warm now. Rather, we first 
learn what it is for something to be warm, wet, smooth or slender, that is to say, for the 
predicate « is warm (wet, smooth, slender) » to be applicable to it, where the verb « is » 
is in the true present tense. From this we advance to an understanding of what is meant 
by saying of an object that it was or will be warm, etc., at some other time. The 
advance is made by our acquiring a general grasp of the past and future tenses. That is 
to say, to understand « was warm » or « will be warm », we apply to our prior 
understanding of what is meant by saying that something is warm our general 
comprehension of what it is to speak of how things were or will be at another time. In 
so doing, we are in effect treating the tenses (and other indications of time) as operators 
applied to sentences in the present tense of which we have previously acquired an 
understanding, just as the tense-logical semantics treats them. We could not learn the 
language in any other way. (Dummett forthcoming : 16-17) 
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Dummett’s complaint about the relational treatment of tenses parallels my complaint about 
the extensional rendering of modal talk. The relational treatment threatens temporal 
innocence, just as overt quantification over possible worlds threatens modal innocence. 
 
The present tense 
 
In the temporal case there is a possible objection, due to the fact that tense is (to put it 
crudely) obligatory in English — or nearly so. Since it is, one may argue that time should not 
be treated like modality : There are simple, nonmodal sentences, whose characteristics must 
admittedly be preserved and captured, but there is no such thing as nontemporal talk, hence 
no such thing as temporal innocence. 
 From the tense-logical point of view, this objection is misguided. The present tense is 
not a tense like the past or the future. It is more primitive and, in a sense, temporally 
neutral.
xxxiv
 Someone can think ‘It is hot in here’ even if she has no notion of time 
whatsoever, hence no mastery of the past and the future. If this is right, mastery of genuine 
temporal talk rests on two distinct abilities : the ability to use and understand simple, 
temporally neutral sentences (i.e. sentences in the present) and the ability to think about times 
and to constrast the past and the future with the present. As in the case of modality, the first 
ability is independent of the second. 
 It is true that, when we say or think ‘It is hot in here’, we talk (or think) about what is 
presently the case ; we characterize the situation at the time of utterance. Yet this is not part 
of what the sentence itself expresses. The content of the sentence, from the tense-logical point 
of view, is a function from times to truth-values. When the sentence is uttered, the function is 
applied to the time of utterance. That is so whether the sentence is in the present or any other 
tense. Even if I say ‘It has been hot’ or ‘It will be hot’, I characterize the time of utterance 
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(and, in relation to it, some earlier or later time). The time of utterance, which the sentence is 
used to characterize, is the time with respect to which we evaluate the sentence. The best 
thing I can do here is to quote Prior : 
 
If tenses are formed by attaching prefixes like ‘It has been the case that’ to the present 
tense, or to a complex with a present tense ‘kernel’, it is not always true to say that 
what is in the present tense is understood as a characterisation of the time of 
utterance ; rather, it characterises whatever time we are taken to by the series of 
prefixes. The presentness of an event, we may say, is simply the occurrence of the 
event, and that is simply the event itself. But every complete tensed sentence 
characterises the time of utterance in some way or other, and other times only through 
their relation to that one. (Prior 1977 : 30)  
 
To sum up, the time of utterance is not represented, it does not feature in the content of tensed 
sentences ; it only comes into the picture as the circumstance with respect to which the 
content of a tensed sentence is evaluated. As Prior neatly says in another paragraph (already 
quoted) on the same page, « tensed propositions are understood as directly or indirectly 
characterising the unmentioned time of utterance ». 
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Chapter 8 
Temporal operators and temporal propositions 
in an extensional framework 
 
 
 
King’s argument rebutted 
 
We have seen that, in the modal/tense-logical framework, modal and tensed sentences are 
constructed from simple sentences by means of operators. This enables us to construe simple 
sentences as modally and/or temporally neutral, and thus to preserve modal/temporal 
innocence. So the dialectic is reversed. Rather than arguing from the presumed existence of 
temporal operators to the need for temporal propositions, as Kaplan did, we argue from the 
need for temporal propositions (in order to secure temporal neutrality) to the necessity of 
construing the tenses as operators. Temporal propositions are required, not in order to make 
sense of temporal operators (since it is not antecedently obvious that there are such operators), 
but in order to secure temporal neutrality. And temporal neutrality, which is what temporal 
propositions give us, is required to capture the fact that our thought and talk is situated in 
time. The context of our thought/talk fixes the time of evaluation, which is therefore given 
and does not have to be represented, in contrast to the shifted points of evaluation to which 
the operators take us. 
This does not mean that one cannot ‘go extensional’. I said above that, by explicitly 
quantifying over worlds or times in the object-language, one runs the risk of losing 
modal/temporal innocence, unless special precaution is taken. But, as the qualification 
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suggests, we can preserve modal (temporal) innocence even if we opt for an extensional 
approach. The apparatus of variadic functions presented in Recanati 2002 enables us to do 
that. 
  
Modal innocence in an extensional framework 
 
In order to preserve modal innocence, only two things are required. First, simple sentences 
must be modally neutral. Second, modal sentences must be viewed as constructed from 
simple sentences by means of sentential operators. None of this precludes us from 
representing modal talk extensionally if we want to. 
In Recanati 2002 I analysed 'Everywhere I go it rains' as resulting from the application 
of a locative variadic operator to the locationally-neutral sentence 'It rains'. That operator does 
two things. First, it modifies the adicity of the predicate in the sentence it applies to: it adds an 
extra argument-place for a location, which can be represented by a free variable. Second, it 
introduces a restricted quantifier which binds that variable. The operator can be paraphrased 
as 'for every location l such that I go to l, in l it is the case that'. 'Necessarily it rains' can be 
represented in the same way, by applying to the modally neutral sentence 'It rains' a sentence 
operator which explicitly quantifies over possible worlds and can be rendered as: 'for every 
world w, in w it is the case that'. Since the variable 'w' is introduced by the variadic operator, 
we don't have to treat the emergence of modalities as a radical change in the language, but 
simply as an enrichment of it; an enrichment which does not affect the simple (nonmodal) 
sentences, hence preserves modal innocence. 
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Temporal innocence in an extensional framework 
 
The possibility of such a mixed system shows that there are two orthogonal issues when it 
comes to time and tense. One has to do with the proper representation of tense : are the tenses 
best modeled as tense-logical operators, or do they involve the apparatus of (explicit) 
reference and quantification ? The second issue is the loss of modal and temporal innocence 
which goes with the adoption of the referential/quantificational framework unless special 
precautions are taken. The availability of a mixed extensional system with variadic operators 
shows that, even if the arguments against the modal approach to time and tense are correct, 
still we can have temporal propositions and operators operating on them. So the standard 
arguments against the tense-logical approach do not threaten Temporal Relativism. 
If we want to represent tense in such a mixed system, we will have to do two things. 
First, we will have to analyse e.g. the past tense as a variadic operator, ‘for some past time t, 
at t it is the case that’.xxxv (Likewise for the future tense.) Second, sentences in the present will 
be construed as temporally neutral. This means that we will give the present tense no temporal 
value whatsoever, in contrast to other tenses such as the past or the future. 
This move may sound revolutionary, but in fact the view that the present is temporally 
neutral is old hat in linguistics. Many theorists, from different traditions, have come up with 
that idea (see e.g. Malmberg 1979 : 86 for an example from the glossematic tradition). I 
myself have argued along such lines (Recanati 1995a), and recently, Uli Sauerland has 
defended that position as well. In a note in Snippets 6 (2002), he argues that « the English 
present tense is semantically vacuous and its interpretive effect is characterized by pragmatic 
competition with other English tense morphemes, notably the past tense ». This is very 
Priorean in spirit, even though Sauerland presumably intends to work within an extensional 
framework with explicit reference to and quantification over times.
xxxvi
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 Of course, it is not enough merely to say that natural language tenses could be 
captured within such a mixed system. The work has to be done, and it is only by doing it that 
one can see the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach. However, my aim in this 
chapter was very limited. I only wanted to respond to King (2003), by showing that we have a 
use for temporal propositions, whether one opts for an intensional or an extensional 
framework. 
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Part Three 
 
 
The debate over Temporalism (2) : 
Can we believe temporal propositions ?
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Chapter 9 
An epistemic argument against Temporalism 
 
 
 
Temporal propositions and belief reports 
 
In ‘Temporalism and Eternalism’, Mark Richard put forward what many take to be a knock-
down argument against Temporalism (the view that there are temporal propositions). 
According to this argument, « the temporalist is unable to give an adequate treatment of 
attributions of belief » (Richard 1981 : 3). 
Richard asks us to consider the following piece of reasoning : 
 
[1] Mary believed that Nixon was president 
[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed 
Ergo 
[3] Mary believes that Nixon is president 
 
As Richard points out, « this argument is not a valid argument in English » and « we ought to 
reject any position which is committed to [its] validity » (Richard 1981 : 4). Temporalism, 
Richard claims, is one such position. For the temporalist holds that ‘Nixon is president’ 
expresses a temporal proposition p
1
, true at any time t iff Nixon is president at t. Let us 
assume, plausibly enough, that a belief report ‘x believes that S’ states that the individual 
referred to by the subject term is belief-related to the proposition expressed by the embedded 
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sentence. It follows that ‘Mary believes that Nixon is president’ expresses the proposition that 
Mary believes p
1
. On the equally plausible assumption that the past tense in the embedded 
clause of ‘Mary believed that Nixon was president’ is semantically vacuous, it follows that 
[1], ‘Mary believed that Nixon was president’, expresses the proposition that Mary believed 
p
1
. Now this, together with [2] (the proposition that Mary still believes everything she once 
believed), entails that she still believes p
1 
, i.e., that she still believes that Nixon is president ! 
Since that conclusion does not actually follow, there is something wrong with Temporalism. 
 
‘Moderate Temporalism’ 
 
Richard takes his argument to show that « the objects of belief expressed by sentences are all 
eternal » (Richard 1981 : 10), i.e., they are classical (Fregean) propositions, not temporal 
(Aristotelian) propositions. Temporalism can be rescued, Richard points out, if we give up the 
assumption that « a sentence expresses at most one thing (a proposition) at a time » (1981 : 9). 
Moderate Relativism as I have described it precisely rejects that claim, since it posits two 
levels of content for every utterance. I will return to Moderate Relativism in the next section. 
Richard himself describes a view which he calls ‘Moderate Temporalism’, which rejects the 
‘single content’ assumption : 
 
We distinguish two different relations of expressing (say, expresses
1
 and expresses
2
) 
and two distinct classes of objects, which we may call contents and propositions. 
Expression1 is a relation between sentences and contents ; expression2 is a relation 
between sentences and propositions. Contents may be either eternal or temporal ; 
propositions are all eternal. 
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We now take contents to be the bearers of truth and falsity expressed by 
sentences, propositions to be the objects of belief so expressed. A sentence S is true, 
relative to time t, iff there is a content c such that S expresses1 c at t and c is true at t. A 
sentence S expresses, relative to t, a belief of a person u iff there is a proposition p 
such that S expresses2 p at t and u believes p at t. (Richard 1981 : 10) 
 
In terms of temporally neutral content, we can make sense of the claim that, in a certain sense, 
two persons who say that it is raining (at different times) ‘say the same thing’ : that it is 
raining. And their respective utterances are true iff and only if that constant lekton is true at 
the times of their respective utterances. But what Richard’s argument about belief reports is 
supposed to establish is that the content of belief is not such a temporally neutral lekton : the 
content of belief is a classical (eternal) proposition. For a moderate temporalist of the sort 
Richard describes, what is said is a temporal proposition, but what is believed, or what the 
utterance presents the speaker as believing, is a classical proposition. 
 Richard does not find Moderate Temporalism particularly attractive, because there are 
utterances like ‘What you say is true and I believe it, too’ which show that the object of 
assertion is, or at least can be, the same as the object of belief. At this point, Richard argues, 
the moderate temporalist will have to distinguish the object of assertion thus understood (a 
classical proposition, like the object of belief) from ‘what the speaker says’ in the temporally 
neutral sense (the lekton). But that temporalist notion of ‘what the speaker says’, distinct both 
from what the speaker asserts and from what she believes, becomes suspicious, and it is 
unclear that we need it. « Until some clarification of this notion of ‘what is said’ by an 
utterance is given », Richard concludes, « we should remain sceptical » (Richard 1981 : 12). 
 
What a moderate relativist would say 
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I have spelled out Richard’s argument in some detail, in order to make clear where the 
moderate relativist differs from the hypothetical moderate temporalist described by Richard. 
Like Richard’s moderate temporalist, the moderate relativist distinguishes two types of 
content and two relations of expressing ; but he would deny that one type of content is what is 
said, and the other what is believed. The distinction between the two types of content cuts 
across the distinction between saying and believing. That means that, whether we consider the 
speaker’s assertion or the speaker’s belief, we can distinguish two things : the lekton and the 
complete content or Austinian proposition. Richard himself comes close to that conclusion 
when, on behalf of the temporal relativist, he draws a tentative distinction between what is 
asserted (a classical proposition) and what is ‘said’ (a temporal proposition). In a later paper, 
he gives examples like 
 
(1) When Susan saw Kate two winters ago, she swore that Kate was pregnant, and 
when Mindy saw her this Spring, that’s what she said too. 
 
and he comments as follows : 
 
(1) seems to report Susan and Mindy as literally saying the same thing ; if they do, 
presumably they each say something temporally neuter. But… suppose that last spring 
Susan saw Kate and said to herself, ‘(I guess that) she wasn’t pregnant two winters 
ago, but she is now’. Then we can surely go to Kate and say, 
 
(2) When Susan saw you two winters ago, she said that you were pregnant, but 
now she takes that back/denies that/denies what she said. 
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All this, it might be said, suggests what when someone utters a tensed, but temporally 
unspecific, sentence, two distinct reports of what she said will be possible : one 
reporting her as having said something temporally specific, and one reporting her as 
having said something temporally unspecific. And this suggests that utterances of 
temporally unspecific sentences express, or at least typically express, two things, one 
temporally unspecific, the other specific. (Richard 2003a : 39-40) 
 
That is exactly what a moderate relativist will say ; and the moderate relativist will point out, 
as Richard himself does in the later paper, that the same point can be made with respect to 
belief. 
Richard gives the following example of a belief ascription where the object of belief 
seems to be a temporal proposition : 
 
(3) Bob went to the monkey house, and now he thinks that he’s been infected with the 
Ebola virus. Every time he goes there he thinks that ; he’s convinced one of the 
monkeys is a carrier. 
 
The word ‘that’ in ‘Everytime he goes there he thinks that’ must refer to a temporal 
proposition, it seems ; for it cannot refer to a classical (eternal) proposition. Why ? Because 
what Bob believes is said to remain constant across episodes (he thinks that everytime), while 
the eternal proposition believed by Bob after visiting the monkey house changes from one 
visit to the next. (After each visit, he thinks he has been infected during that particular visit.) 
Richard, however, thinks the evidence is misleading. He has a complicated story to tell 
regarding examples like (3), which story does not appeal to temporal propositions as objects 
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of belief.
xxxvii
 His reason for resisting the view that there are two possible objects of belief, 
corresponding to the two levels of content distinguished by the moderate relativist, is that 
« diachronic agreement or disagreement seems to be, of necessity, a matter of agreement or 
disagreement about something temporally specific » (Richard 2003a : 40). So we are back to 
Richard’s original argument : whether one changes one’s mind or retains one’s belief is a 
matter of still believing (or ceasing to believe) the same classical propositions. When it comes 
to assessing inter- or intra-individual (dis-)agreement, only classical contents count. So if we 
know that Mary retained all of her previous beliefs, we will not conclude that she still 
believes that Nixon is president even though we know that, twenty years ago, she believed 
that Nixon was president. On this issue, Richard has not changed his mind from 1981 to 2003, 
and his objection to temporal propositions as the objects of belief still stands. 
 97 
 
Chapter 10 
Rebutting Richard’s argument 
 
 
 
The duality of belief 
(and the ambiguity of belief reports) 
 
In response to Richard, the moderate relativist can point out that belief reports have at least 
two distinct functions. First, one may report someone’s beliefs in order to assess their 
(dis)agreement with the facts, or with the beliefs of other people (or the beliefs held by the 
same person at different times) about the same facts. Such belief reports will typically focus 
on the truth-conditional properties of the belief, hence on its complete content. Second, one 
may report someone’s beliefs in order to draw some ‘internal’ connection between those 
beliefs and other states or acts of the same person, for example her sensory experiences, her 
actions, or other beliefs potentially or necessarily held by her. Such belief reports focus not on 
the referential properties of the belief but on what McGinn calls its ‘intra-individual causal-
explanatory role’. This distinction between two functions of belief reports is well-known and 
it has been extensively documented in the seventies. In his classical paper on these issues, 
McGinn writes : 
 
Our concept of belief combines two separate elements, serving separate concerns : we 
view beliefs as causally explanatory states of the head whose semantic properties are, 
from that point of view, as may be ; and we view beliefs as relations to propositions 
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that can be assigned referential truth-conditions, and so point outward to the world. 
This bifurcation of content can be seen as stemming from the point that beliefs involve 
internal representations, and these inherently present a dual aspect. (McGinn 1982 : 
216) 
 
Since there is this duality in our notion of belief, it is not surprising that there is an 
ambiguity in a belief report like ‘Susan believes that Kate is pregnant’. This may ascribe to 
Susan either the internal state of believing Kate pregnant, a state one may be in at different 
times (‘relativist’ interpretation); or it may ascribe to her a belief with a certain truth-
conditional content, which content depends, as we have seen, upon external factors such as 
the time at which the belief is held (‘classical’ interpretation). On the classical interpretation, 
Susan’s belief can change from one occurrence of the internal state to the next, even though 
the internal state itself does not change. At t, Susan is in the state of believing Kate pregnant, 
and she thereby believes the classical proposition that Kate is pregnant at t ; at t’ Susan is in 
the same state, but the classical proposition she now believes is the (distinct) proposition that 
Kate is pregnant at t’. If, on the classical interpretation, we say that someone’s beliefs have 
not changed, it follows that she believes all the classical propositions she formerly believed ; 
but it does not follow that her internal doxastic state has not changed. On that interpretation 
the argument Richard presents as invalid is indeed invalid. From the fact that, at a certain time 
t, Mary was in the state of believing Nixon president, and thereby believed the classical 
proposition that Nixon is president at t, plus the fact that she still believes all the classical 
propositions she once believed, it does not follow that she still is in the state of believing 
Nixon president and thereby believes the classical proposition that Nixon is president now. 
So, on the classical interpretation of a belief report, the object of belief is indeed the 
complete content.
xxxviii
 But that is not the only possible reading of a belief report. There is 
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another reading, where the ascriber is interested in the intra-individual causal-explanatory role 
of the ascribed belief. In such cases what matters is the lekton, not the complete truth-
conditional content. 
 
The lekton as cognitive content 
 
That we need the lekton in such cases has been forcefully argued by Barwise, who gives the 
following example. Suppose Holmes and Watson face each other. In between stand the salt 
and the pepper. Holmes says 'The salt is left of the pepper', because the salt is left of the 
pepper from Holmes's perspective. From Watson's perspective, the pepper is left of the salt; 
however, Watson is mistaken as to which shaker is which, and he wrongly says 'The salt is 
left of the pepper'. Holmes and Watson apparently 'say the same thing' (so they express the 
same lekton) but Holmes is right and Watson wrong (so they believe different classical 
propositions, or different  Austinian propositions, because they each relativize the lekton to 
their own perspective). In the classical framework, Barwise points out, 
 
we have nothing in the theory that classifies the similarity in attitudes of Holmes and 
Watson in cases like these. And it is this similarity that leads them to make the same 
bodily movements, reaching in the same direction, though toward different objects, 
when they want the salt. (Barwise 1989a: 240). 
 
In other words, if what we are interested in is the state Holmes and Watson are both in, and 
the causal-explanatory role of that state, then we should accept that (in the relevant sense) 
they believe the same thing : they both have a belief with a certain lekton as content, which 
lekton determines different truth-conditions when evaluated with respect to their distinct 
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perspectives. So there is a sense in which Holmes and Watson believe the same thing in that 
situation, and there is also a sense in which they do not believe the same thing.  When arguing 
that the content of belief must be eternal (classical), Richard simply focusses upon the sense 
which is relevant to belief reports whose function is to assess (dis)agreement with the facts ; 
but everybody knows that that is not the sole function of belief reports. 
 
Back to Richard’s argument 
 
If I am right, shouldn’t there be an interpretation in which the argument Richard discusses is 
valid ? Let us reconsider that argument : 
 
[1] Mary believed that Nixon was president 
[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed 
Ergo 
[3] Mary believes that Nixon is president 
 
Since [3] does not follow, Richard argues that [1] cannot be understood as describing a certain 
relation between the believer and a temporally indefinite lekton ; for if it did, [3] would 
follow. Now I hold that [1] can indeed describe a relation between Mary and the temporally 
indefinite lekton. That is the ‘relativist’ interpretation of the belief report. On that 
interpretation, [3] ought to follow — but it does not. Does this not show that Richard is right, 
and the moderate relativist wrong ? 
I do not think so. The reason why [3] is hard to accept in this context may be due to 
the fact that the universal quantification over beliefs in premiss [2] has to be understood either 
as quantifying over complete contents or as quantifying over lekta, since those are different 
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sorts of things. Let us assume that a choice has indeed to be made from the outset when 
interpreting [2]. Then, arguably, the ‘classical proposition’ interpretation is more salient, for 
some reason, and that is why [3] does not follow from [1] and [2] even though [1] could be 
interpreted as describing a relation between the subject and a temporally indefinite lekton.
xxxix
 
To check that this is correct, we have only to rephrase [2] so as to make the lekton 
interpretation more salient. 
To show this, let us go back to the Susan/Kate example and run the Richard argument 
in that context. In order to secure the right interpretation for the second premiss, let us 
imagine a Rip van Winkle scenario in which, unbeknown to her, Susan has just awoken from 
a two-year sleep.
xl
 We get : 
 
[1’] (Before falling asleep) Susan believed that Kate was pregnant. 
[2’] (After waking up) she still believes everything she believed before. 
[3’] Ergo : (After waking up) she still believes that Kate is pregnant. 
 
In this special scenario, premiss [2’] can be interpreted, in the causal-explanatory way, as 
saying that Susan is in the same ‘doxastic state’ she was in before falling asleep. This is 
sufficient to make the argument intuitively valid. Premiss [1’] : At t, before falling asleep, 
Susan was in the state of believing Kate pregnant (hence she believed the classical proposition 
that Kate is pregnant at t). Premiss [2’] : At t’ (after waking up) she is in the same doxastic 
state she was in. Conclusion [3’] : at t’, Susan is still in the state of believing Kate pregnant 
(hence she believes the classical proposition that Kate is pregnant at t’). Despite the change in 
propositional object classically understood, the argument is intuitively valid, because in this 
scenario the ‘that’-clause in [1’] and [3’] can be interpreted as referring to the lekton, which 
remains constant across contexts. 
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Of course, alternative explanations of the intuitive validity of the argument can be 
imagined, and among them, some may be compatible with eternalism.
xli
 So I do not take this 
example to settle the issue. My point rather is this : Richard’s anti-temporalist argument is not 
conclusive, because it invokes the intuitive invalidity of a certain piece of reasoning, and that 
intuitive invalidity is context-dependent rather than absolute. Moderate Relativism is not 
threatened by that type of example, for it predicts the sort of context-dependence we actually 
find.
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Chapter 11 
Relativistic disagreement 
 
 
 
Shared circumstances 
 
So far, I have conceded that when the point of a belief report is to assess (dis)agreement with 
the facts or with other people or with oneself at different times, it is the complete content of 
the belief that matters, since the complete content is what determines possible-worlds truth-
conditions. But this too can be disputed. 
There are two types of example which cast doubt on the idea that agreement or 
disagreement can only be about complete contents. The first type of example involves cases 
in which all the parties to the conversation are in the same situation — for example, they 
share their location. In such cases, there is no objection to one of them asserting a place-
neutral proposition such as ‘Sidney is nearby’, true at any place l iff Sidney is near l. (I 
borrow the example, and the argument, from Egan forthcoming.) 
Let us assume the belief-transfer model of assertion, according to which the function 
of assertion is to transfer belief in the asserted proposition (Stalnaker 1978). In the present 
case the transfer can be described as follows : 
 
Speaker A, at place l, accepts the place-neutral proposition that Sidney is nearby, and 
thereby believes the classical proposition that Sidney is near l. 
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Speaker A asserts the place-neutral proposition that Sidney is nearby. 
 
As a result, audience B, also at place l, comes to accept the place-neutral proposition 
that Sidney is nearby, and thereby believes the classical proposition that Sidney is near 
l. 
 
Even though what is asserted, and what is transferred, is a place-neutral proposition, the 
audience comes to believe the same classical propositions as the speaker. Since their 
situations are the same, the lekta cannot determine different truth-conditions with respect to 
their respective situations. That is why the belief transfer can take place directly at the lekton 
level, in this type of case. So it is not true that the content of assertion can only be the 
complete content. In shared-situation cases, the lekta go proxy for the complete contents 
(Barwise 1989a : 253), and we can assert them (Egan forthcoming). 
Just as we can assert lekta in shared-situation cases, we can agree or disagree about 
them. The function of assertion is to transfer belief : the speaker says something, and the 
audience is supposed to accept what the speaker has said. Sometimes, however, the speaker 
says something and the audience does not accept what the speaker has said : they disagree.  
Like assertion, disagreement, in shared-situation cases, can be over lekta. I say ‘Sidney is 
nearby’, and you respond ‘No, it isn’t’. If our locations were different, there would be no 
point in so disagreeing about lekta : our respectively accepting and denying the place-relative 
proposition that Sidney is nearby would not entail any truth-conditional incompatibility 
between our beliefs. But genuine (dis)agreement over lekta is possible whenever the situation 
of evaluation is shared. 
This straightforwardly applies to the temporal case : there can be genuine agreement 
or disagreement over temporally neutral propositions whenever the time of evaluation is 
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shared. If it is not — as in cases of diachronic disagreement — then the content in dispute 
must be temporally specific. Here, Richard seems to be right : « diachronic agreement or 
disagreement seems to be, of necessity, a matter of agreement or disagreement about 
something temporally specific » (Richard 2003a : 40). 
 Even that has been disputed, however. This brings us to the second type of example 
which casts doubt on the view that, in matters of agreement or disagreement, only complete 
contents count. 
 
Faultless disagreement 
 
Sometimes, we genuinely disagree about a certain lekton, even though (it seems) we are not in 
the same situation. Thus, looking at a painting, I say : ‘This is beautiful’. You disagree : ‘No, 
it’s ugly’. In a sense, we are both right, since for me it is beautiful, while for you it is ugly ; 
but we disagree nonetheless. Or consider epistemic modals. I say ‘The treasure might be 
under the palm tree’. I am right since, for all I know, the treasure might be there — nothing in 
my epistemic state rules out the treasure’s being there. Later, however, I learn that the treasure 
is not on the island (where the palm tree is). This rules out the treasure’s being under the palm 
tree, and in my new epistemic situation, I assert : ‘The treasure cannot be under the palm 
tree’. Again, I am right since, in my new epistemic situation, there is something that rules out 
the treasure’s being under the palm tree. What is strange, however, is that I can now disagree 
with my former self. I can say : ‘I was wrong — the treasure cannot be under the palm tree’. 
How can that be ? If I was right, given my epistemic situation then, how can I later judge that 
I was wrong ? 
Such cases of faultless disagreement suggest that sometimes at least, agreement or 
disagreement is about the lekton, even though the disagreeing parties evaluate the lekton with 
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respect to distinct situations/perspectives. This makes sense if one is a radical relativist. For a 
radical relativist, the lekton is complete. It is the content – that which one asserts, believes, 
and over which one agrees or disagrees with others.
xlii
 The situation of evaluation is not an 
aspect of content (broadly understood) but something external to content. As Prior puts it, 
 
Aristotle… says that ‘statements and opinions’ vary in their truth and falsehood with 
the times at which they are made or held, just as concrete things have different 
qualities at different times ; though the cases are different, because the changes of 
truth-value of statements and opinions are not properly speaking changes in these 
statements and opinions themselves, but reflections of changes in the objects to which 
they refer (a statement being true when what it says is so, and ceasing to be true when 
that ceases to be so. (Prior 1967 : 16 ; emphasis mine) 
 
So a radical relativist has a story to tell about faultless disagreement, and that involves giving 
up the claim that agreement or disagreement in non-shared situations is of necessity a matter 
of agreement or disagreement about classical content. (Ironically, Mark Richard is among the 
recent advocates of Radical Relativism.) 
 
Faultless disagreement in a moderate relativist framework : 
The Kölbel-Lasersohn view 
 
Some authors (Kölbel 2002, 2003, forthcoming ; Lasersohn 2005) have claimed, or implied, 
that faultless disagreement merely calls for a distinction between the content over which we 
agree or disagree (the lekton) and the utterance’s possible-world truth-conditions. The latter 
depend upon, and covary with, the situation of evaluation. On this view the moderate 
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relativist framework, with its distinction between two levels of content, is sufficient to 
account for faultless disagreement.
xliii
 Indeed faultless disagreement is the best evidence we 
have for Moderate Relativism : the phenomenon demonstrates that we need one level of 
content as bearer of (unrelativized) truth-value, and another level of content as the object over 
which rational subjects (dis)agree. 
I think these authors are mistaken. There are plenty of cases in which we must 
distinguish between the lekton and the complete content, but in which there can be no genuine 
(dis)agreement about the lekton. Thus I call you on the phone, and commenting upon my 
situation I say ‘It is raining’. If you say ‘No, it isn’t’, meaning that there is no rain in your 
situation, there is misunderstanding rather than genuine disagreement. Or, adapting Barwise’s 
example, suppose that Watson says ‘The salt is left of the pepper’, and Holmes, speaking 
from his own perspective, replies ‘No it is not’. Clearly, there is no substantive disagreement 
here. If each of them is talking about his own perspective, there is misunderstanding rather 
than genuine disagreement. The same considerations apply to the temporal case. At time t, 
you say ‘It is raining’. Later, when the sun is shining again, you say ‘It is not raining’. You 
cannot conclude ‘so I was wrong’. Here, as Richard points out, genuine disagreement can 
only be about temporally specific contents. 
So Moderate Relativism by itself, with its two levels of content, does not give a 
solution to the problem of faultless disagreement, contrary to what Kölbel and Lasersohn 
believe. This does not mean that no solution is available within the moderate relativist 
framework, however. I think a solution is available, along the following lines.
xliv
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Faultless disagreement in a moderate relativist framework : 
A better view 
 
The statement that the painting is beautiful must be evaluated with respect to some esthetic 
standard, but that standard cannot be the speaker’s esthetic standard ; for if that were the case, 
then the speaker’s ‘It is beautiful’ and the audience’s reply ‘No, it is ugly’ would not 
contradict each other. When the speaker says ‘It is beautiful’, he means something stronger 
than merely ‘It is beautiful by my standards’ or ‘I find it beautiful’. To be sure, when realizing 
that the audience does not share his taste, the speaker may retreat to the weaker statement : ‘I 
find it beautiful’, and this gives us a hint as to what the proper analysis of the stronger, 
unqualified statement should be. I suggest the following : ‘It is beautiful’ means that it is 
beautiful ‘for us’, that is, for the community to which the speaker and his audience belong. 
When the audience says ‘No it isn’t’, the speaker realizes that the stronger statement is 
incorrect (since the audience does not actually find the painting beautiful), and he retreats to 
the weaker statement. 
Lasersohn has an objection to that analysis. Were it correct, he says, it would not be 
possible for the speaker to maintain the stronger statement and keep disagreeing with his 
audience. But this is clearly possible, as in the following exchange: 
 
— This painting is beautiful. 
— No, it’s ugly. 
— I tell you it is beautiful. 
 
To handle this type of counter-example, we must introduce a certain flexibility as to what 
counts as ‘the community’ from whose point of view the lekton is meant to be evaluated. I 
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may judge that my audience deviates, by her bad taste, from the esthetic standards of the 
community to which we both belong, those standards being fixed by e.g. the community’s 
experts. This enables me to disagree with my audience, even though what I claim is that the 
painting is beautiful for us, i.e., for our community. 
Whether, after the hearer has expressed disagreement, the speaker retreats to the 
weaker statement (‘I find it beautiful’) or not (‘I tell you it’s beautiful !’), the right conclusion 
to draw is that there is no genuine faultless disagreement in those cases. The speaker who 
retreats to the weaker statement realizes that he was mistaken when he assumed that the 
painting was beautiful for both him and his audience ; so he was at fault. And when the 
speaker refuses to retreat and maintains his position, because he « judges that his audience 
deviates, by her bad taste, from the esthetic standards of the community to which they both 
belong, those standards being fixed by e.g. the community’s experts », he finds her at fault. In 
both cases, there is genuine disagreement but it is not faultless (Stojanovic forthcoming). Nor 
are those cases cases in which the speaker and his audience evaluate the lekton with respect to 
different standards: they both appeal to the standards of the community to which they belong. 
Those, however, are the simple cases. More difficult to handle is the following case 
(inspired from an example by Lasersohn). Suppose the speaker finds the painting beautiful, 
and no one else (and in particular, no expert) does. Suppose, moreover, that the speaker 
knows that he alone finds the painting beautiful. Still, as the opinionated person he is, he 
maintains : ‘This is beautiful !’ Clearly, he does not mean simply that he finds the painting 
beautiful. He refuses to retreat, and maintains the stronger claim. Can we handle that example 
consistently with the view that ‘This is beautiful’ means This is beautiful for us ? Can we 
maintain that the speaker, even in such a case, appeals to the standards of the community ? 
I think we can. As Johan Brännmark writes (in connection with moral judgments), 
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When speaking for a collective, I cannot deviate from its present view without ceasing 
to speak for the collective. But communities are multi-generational and by their very 
nature they always have one foot in the future... So I think we can distinguish between 
two ways in which we can speak for the community : first, there is the purely 
representative one ; second, there is a progressive one. In passing progressive moral 
judgment I am deviating from the present community in the direction towards which I 
find that the community would move if the people in it thought things through really 
well. (Brännmark forthcoming : 18 ; emphasis mine). 
 
In this sort of case — when no appeal to experts is relevant and each of the two 
disputants is expressing his or her own taste and trying to impose it — it makes sense to say 
that they are ‘both right’, even though they disagree : for they are both entitled to interpret the 
community’s standards the way they want in passing progressive judgment. This freedom 
explains how they can disagree about the truth-value of ‘This is beautiful’ even though, in 
evaluating the statement, they both appeal to the standards of the community. This is possible 
because the standards in question are not fixed once for all — they are up to us. Each of us 
can contribute to shaping them, and this is what we do in this type of case when we say ‘It is 
beautiful’ or ‘It is ugly’. Austin would perhaps make this point by saying that there is a 
performative element in such statements.
xlv
 
If we accept this explanation of the phenomenon, we can maintain that agreement or 
disagreement is about complete contents,
xlvi
 except when the situation of evaluation is shared 
(in which case the lekton can go proxy for the complete content). Alleged ‘faultless 
disagreement’ cases such as those we have discussed are no exception. In such cases, the 
disagreement is about the Austinian proposition consisting of the lekton together with the 
standards of the community.
xlvii
 The speaker says that the painting is beautiful (for the 
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community), and the audience denies that it is beautiful (for the community). The 
disagreement ultimately bears upon what the community standards are, or should be. If the 
disagreement bears upon what the community standards are, it is not faultless. If, as in the last 
case we considered, it bears upon what the standards should be, then it is, arguably, faultless, 
but even in that case the disagreement is over the complete content. 
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Part Four 
 
 
Relativization and Indexicality 
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Chapter 12 
Index, context, and content 
 
 
 
Indexicality : broad and narrow 
 
There is one form of relativization I have not talked about so far. A sentence such as ‘I am 
French’ is true with respect to certain contexts (contexts in which it is uttered by a French 
person) and false with respect to other contexts. A sentence that has this property is said to be 
indexical. This is similar to contingency (the fact, for a sentence, of being true with respect to 
some possible worlds and false with respect to others) and to temporality (the fact of being 
true with respect to certain times and false with respect to others). But how similar ? 
 In the article which bears the same title as this chapter, Lewis claims that indexicality 
is a general phenomenon, of which the other forms of relativity are particular species. He 
writes : 
 
It is a feature of any context, actual or otherwise, that its world is one where matters of 
contingent fact are a certain way. Just as [because of indexicality] truth-in-English 
may depend on the time of the context, or the speaker, or the standards of precision, or 
the salience relations, so likewise may it depend on the world of the context. 
Contingency is a kind of indexicality. (Lewis 1980 : 82) 
 
The idea is that, when the truth-value of an utterance depends upon a circumstantial feature 
such as a world, a time, a place, or whatever, what fixes the relevant world, time, place or 
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whatever and makes evaluation possible is the context of utterance. The world, time, place 
etc. is the world, time, place, etc., of the context, that is, the world, time, place, etc. at which 
the sentence is uttered. 
 But is this true ? There are two types of counterexample we should consider. First, an 
utterance like ‘It is raining’ may well concern a place distinct from the place of utterance. If 
the speaker and the hearer are involved in a conversation about what is going on at a certain 
place l, distinct from the place of utterance, the sentence ‘It is raining’ uttered in that context 
will presumably be about l, not about the place of utterance. To be sure, in such a case, it is 
still the context that determines the place which is talked about, viz. l. But the place in 
question is not the place of the context.
xlviii
 Here we see a difference between the place-
relative sentence ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is raining here’. While the first sentence expresses a 
place-relative proposition, true at an arbitrary place iff it is raining at that place, ‘It is raining 
here’ can only be evaluated with respect to the place of utterance. This casts doubt on the idea 
that e.g. place-relativity is a form of indexicality. It would seem, rather, that indexicality is a 
(very) special form of relativity. 
 Be that as it may, I will temporary ignore this difference between circumstance-
relativity and indexicality. Going along with Lewis, I will pretend that an utterance of ‘It is 
raining’, just like an utterance of ‘It’s raining here’, is true iff it is raining at the place of 
utterance.
xlix
 On this view, circumstance-relativity is a form of indexicality. 
 Still, ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is raining here’ behave differently when embedded, and this 
provides the second type of counterexample to the claim that circumstance-relative sentences 
are evaluated with respect to the circumstance of the context. Even if we hold that an 
utterance of the sentence ‘It is hot’ is true iff it is hot at the place (and time) of utterance, we 
have to acknowledge that this is no longer true if we embed the sentence. When such a 
sentence falls in the scope of a temporal or locational operator it is evaluated with respect to 
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the time or place to which the operator takes us, not the time or place of utterance. Similarly, 
a sentence may be evaluated with respect to an arbitrary world, not necessarily the world of 
the context. That is what happens when the sentence falls within the scope of a modal 
operator : the sentence is then evaluated with respect to the world(s) to which the operator 
takes us. 
The possibility of shifting the point of evaluation through the use of operators forces 
us to introduce a distinction between sentences like ‘It is hot’, which are indexical in the 
broad sense talked about so far, and sentences like ‘It is hot here and now’, which are 
indexical in a stricter sense.
l
 The former can be evaluated with respect to an arbitrary time and 
place if we embed it under an operator such as ‘somewhere it will be the case that’ ; not so 
with the latter. Indexical adverbs like ‘here’ and ‘now’ keep the evaluation relative to the 
context of utterance, even when the sentence in which they occur is embedded. Similarly, an 
indexical sentence such as ‘Actually S’ can only be evaluated with respect to the world of the 
context because the indexical adverb ‘actually’, like the indexical adverb ‘now’, keeps the 
evaluation relative to the context of utterance. 
 Lewis was aware of all this. He took the dependence of truth-value on the context of 
utterance (indexicality in the broad sense) to be the basic phenomenon, and introduced 
another phenomenon — shiftiness — which accounts for the difference between sentences 
that are indexical in a strict sense and sentences that are not. 
 
Shifting and freezing 
 
Some features of context are ‘shiftable’, Lewis says. Modal and temporal operators shift the 
point of evaluation : they take us to a point of evaluation distinct from the initial or default 
point which is fixed by the context of utterance. Thus a sentence in the scope of a temporal 
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operator is evaluated with respect to a time distinct from the time of utterance. When the point 
of evaluation is distinct from the context of utterance because some feature of the context has 
been shifted by an operator, the sentence in the scope of the operator is evaluated with respect 
to an ‘index’ (a n-tuple of features) that is not the ‘index of the context’, Lewis says. 
 Not all features of the context can be shifted. There are temporal operators, locational 
operators, modal operators, and so on and so forth, which shift the time, location, and world 
feature of the context respectively; but there are many features of the context to which some 
expression may be sensitive but which no operator can shift. When a feature is not shiftable, a 
sentence which contains an expression sensitive to that feature of context will be indexical in 
the strict sense : its evaluation will depend upon the context of utterance, whether it is 
embedded or not. 
 In some cases a feature of context is shiftable (because there is an operator which can 
shift it), but it is possible to ‘freeze’ it so as to keep it unshifted, or rather, so as to ‘un-shift’ 
it. This is what indexical expressions — expressions such as ‘here’ or ‘now’ — typically do. 
With respect to the relevant feature, they constrain the evaluation index to be the index of the 
context. Even if a sentence is embedded under a temporal operator which shifts the time of 
evaluation (as e.g. ‘it will soon be the case that’), the presence of a temporal indexical in that 
sentence takes us back to the time of utterance. Kaplan gives the following example : 
 
Suppose I say, at t
0
, « It will soon be the case that all that is now beautiful is faded. » 
Consider what was said in the subsentence, 
 
All that is now beautiful is faded. 
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I wish to evaluate that content at some near future time t
1
. What is the relevant time 
associated with the indexical ‘now’ ? Is it the future time t
1
 ? No, it is t
0
, of course : the 
time of the context of use. (Kaplan 1989 : 498) 
 
Such is the freezing power of indexicals : in ‘It will soon be the case that all that is now 
beautiful is faded’, ‘now beautiful’ means beautiful at the time of utterance, even though the 
embedded sentence in which that expression occurs is evaluated with respect to a future time 
(the time to which ‘It will soon be the case that’ takes us). As Prior writes, 
 
The essential point about… ‘now’ is that however oblique the context in which it 
occurs, the time it indicates is the time of utterance of the whole sentence. (…) In ‘it 
will be the case that I am sitting now’, the word ‘now’ indicates the same time that it 
would indicate if it occurred in the principal clause — the time of utterance. (Prior 
1968b/2003 : 174 ; see also Kamp 1971 : 237) 
 
To sum up, if we follow Lewis and take indexicality (in the broad sense) to be the 
most general phenomenon, we will have to distinguish within the class of broadly indexical 
expressions — expressions whose evaluation is relative to some feature of context — two 
sub-classes : on the one hand, the expressions whose evaluation is relative to a feature of 
context that can be shifted ; and on the other hand, the expressions whose evaluation is 
relative to a feature of the context which, for one reason or another, cannot be shifted. (The 
latter are indexical in the strict sense.) Unshiftability itself will come in two varieties : some 
features of context are unshiftable because no operator exists in the language which has the 
power of shifting it, and others resist shifting because, although there are operators which can 
shift them, there are also freezing devices which prevent this from happening (or rather, 
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which take us back to the index of the context, when that happens). Indexical adverbs like 
‘here’ and ‘now’ have this freezing power, in contrast to merely time-relative expressions 
(e.g. the tenses) or merely location-relative expressions (e.g. ‘to the left’).li 
 
Two-dimensional semantics 
 
Lewis concludes that we must distinguish 
 
two different dependencies of truth on features of context : context-dependence and 
index-dependence. We need the relation : sentence s is true at context c at index i. We 
need both the case in which i is the index of the context c and the case in which i has 
been shifted away, in one or more coordinates, from the index of the context. (Lewis 
1980 : 88) 
 
In other words, because of the double dependence of truth-value on context and index, we 
need a two-dimensional semantics. As Lewis emphasized, there are two ways to achieve that 
goal. 
 The first approach consists in assigning to sentences, as their meanings, rather 
complicated functions from context-index pairs to truth-values. A sentence like ‘It is raining 
here’ will be true with respect to a context of utterance c and an index i if and only if it is 
raining at the place of c at the time of i in the world of i. In contrast, ‘It is raining’ will be true 
with respect to a context c and an index i if and only if it is raining at the place, time and 
world of i, and ‘It is actually raining’ will be true at a context c and an index i if and only if it 
is raining at the place and time of i in the world of c. 
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 In this framework, the evaluation process for a given utterance will start from the 
context of utterance and the index of that context. All index-relative elements will be assigned 
values relative to that index, until an index-shifting operator is met ; the current index will 
then shift (under the relevant feature — that which the operator concerns) and index-relative 
expressions processed thereafter will be evaluated with respect to the shifted index, until 
another shift occurs... As for indexicals (in the strict sense), they will always be evaluated 
with respect to the context of utterance and will therefore be indifferent to the current status of 
the index. 
 The other approach consists in assigning to each sentence two simple semantic values 
instead of a complicated one. The first semantic value is what Kaplan calls the sentence’s 
content, which depends upon the context. The content of a sentence results from evaluating 
the (strict) indexicals in it with respect to context. What we end up with, when that is done, is 
a simple function from indices to truth-values. So the sentence ‘It is hot in here’, when 
evaluated with respect to a context c, expresses the temporal but location-specific proposition 
that it is hot at the place of c. That proposition is the kaplanian ‘content’ of the utterance, and 
it is true at an arbitrary index i consisting of a world w and a time t iff it is hot at the place of c 
in w at t. The sentence ‘It is hot’ will have a different content : it will express a location-
indefinite proposition true at an index iff it is hot at the world, time and place of that index. 
 Kaplanian contents are what Lewis calls ‘variable but simple semantic values’. They 
are contextually variable, in contrast to the semantic values of the first approach (functions 
from context-index pairs to truth-values) ; and they are simpler since the argument of the 
function is simpler. But there is no overall gain in simplicity, for Kaplan must assign 
sentences another semantic value to deal with their constant linguistic meanings. That second 
semantic value is their character, which Kaplan models as functions from contexts to contents 
(i.e., functions from contexts to functions from indices to truth-values). 
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Which solution is better ? According to Lewis, neither is better than the other. The two 
solutions are simply equivalent : whatever one can do, the other can do too. Both incorporate 
the double dependence of truth-value on index and context, and that is all that matters.
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Chapter 13 
The two-stage picture : 
Lewis vs Kaplan and Stalnaker 
 
 
 
 
According to Lewis, we need a two-dimensional semantics, but there is no reason to opt for a 
two-stage picture such as Kaplan’s. It is sufficient to assign to sentences functions from 
context-index pairs to truth-values. Now I myself have opted for the two-stage framework in 
this book. Following Barwise, I have taken the lekton to be, not the meaning of the sentence-
type, but the relativized proposition that results from assigning contextual values to 
indexicals ; and I have emphasized how similar the lekton thus understood is to Kaplan’s 
‘content’. I must therefore embark upon a detailed examination of Lewis’s argument with 
Kaplan and Stalnaker over the two-stage picture. Can we, or can we not, provide a 
justification for that framework, and for the notion of lekton as it has been construed so far in 
this book ? 
 
Kaplan 
 
Kaplan claims that his notion of content captures the intuitive notion of ‘what is said’ by an 
utterance. If I say ‘I am bald’, and, expressing your agreement, you say to me, ‘Indeed, you 
are bald’, we both say the same thing ; and that corresponds to the ‘content’ in the two-stage 
picture. 
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 Lewis responds that there is no point in capturing ‘the’ everyday notion of ‘what is 
said’, since it is far from univocal : 
 
It can mean the propositional content in Stalnaker’s sense… It can mean the exact 
words. I suspect that it can mean almost anything in between. (Lewis 1980 : 97) 
 
We may interpret Kaplan differently, however. Maybe what he meant was simply that his 
notion of content (functions from indices to truth-values) captures the content of speech acts, 
and more specifically, the content of locutionary acts : what someone says (or states) when he 
or she utters a declarative sentence such as ‘You are bald’ or ‘I am bald’. Any theory of 
language has to show how locutionary content is derived from the conventional meaning of 
the sentence and the context. While Kaplan’s ‘characters’ correspond to the conventional 
meanings of sentences, his ‘contents’ arguably correspond to the contents of the locutionary 
acts performed by uttering those sentences. This role for contents would provide some kind of 
justification for the two-stage approach. 
 
Stalnaker 
 
However we interpret Kaplan, the type of justification I have just mentioned is quite explicit 
in Stalnaker’s early writings in defense of the two-stage picture. The following quotations are 
from his paper ‘Pragmatics’ (Stalnaker 1970 : 277-8) : 
 
The scheme I am proposing looks roughly like this : The syntactical and semantical 
rules for a language determine an interpreted sentence or clause ; this, together with 
some features of the context of use of the sentence or clause determines a proposition ; 
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this in turn, together with a possible world, determines a truth-value . An interpreted 
sentence, then, corresponds to a function from contexts into propositions, and a 
proposition is a function from possible worlds into truth-values. 
 According to this scheme, both contexts and possible words are partial 
determinants of the truth value of what is expressed by a given sentence. One might 
merge them together, considering a proposition to be a function from context-possible 
worlds (call them points of reference) into truth values… [This] is a simpler analysis 
than the one I am sketching ; I need some argument for the necessity or desirability of 
the extra step on the road from sentences to truth values. The step is justified only if 
the middlemen — the propositions — are of some independent interest. 
 
Stalnaker then proceeds to give the following argument for the desirability of the extra step : 
 
The independent interest in propositions comes from the fact that they are the objects 
of illocutionary acts and propositional attitudes. A proposition is supposed to be the 
common content of statements, judgments, promises, wishes and wants, questions and 
answers, things that are possible or probable. The meanings of sentences, or rules 
determining truth values directly from contexts, cannot plausibly represent these 
objects. 
 If O’Leary says « Are you going to the party ? » and you answer, « Yes, I’m 
going », your answer is appropriate because the proposition you affirm is the one 
expressed in his question. On the simpler analysis, there is nothing to be the common 
content of question and answer except a truth value. The propositions are expressed 
from different points of reference, and according to the simpler analysis, they are 
different propositions. A truth value, of course, is not enough to be the common 
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content. If O’Leary asks « Are you going to the party ? » it would be inappropriate for 
you to answer, « Yes, snow is white. »  
 
So, for Stalnaker, propositions are needed as semantic values intermediate between constant 
meanings and truth-values because they serve as contents of illocutionary acts and 
propositional attitudes. What are we to think of this argument ? 
 
A dilemma for the two-stage theorist 
 
According to Lewis, Stalnaker’s argument is no good, for two reasons : 
 
(1) Within the framework of the single-stage approach, we can easily define the proposition 
expressed by an utterance with respect to a given context c. (It is the proposition that is true at 
any world w iff the sentence is true at c and the index of c when the world of that index has 
been replaced by w.) So it is not true that if we opt for the single-stage approach, there will be 
‘nothing to be the common content of question and answer except a truth value’. The relevant 
notion of content will be extractable, even if it is not as immediately available as it is in the 
two-stage picture. 
 
(2) In any case, Stalnaker’s propositions cannot be assigned to sentences as their semantic 
values (or one of their semantic values), because they do not satisfy the principle of 
compositionality. That they are not compositional is easy to see on an example : 
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The propositional content of ‘Somewhere the sun is shining.’ in context c is not 
determined by the content in c of the constituent sentence ‘The sun is shining’. (Lewis 
1980 : 95) 
 
That is so because, for Stalnaker, the propositional content of ‘The sun is shining’ in context c 
is the (classical) proposition that the sun is shining at the time and place of c. But the 
proposition expressed by ‘Somewhere the sun is shining’ is not a function of that proposition. 
‘Somewhere the sun is shining’ does not present that proposition (the proposition that it is 
raining at the place of c) as true somewhere ; what it presents as true somewhere is the place-
relative proposition that the sun is shining, punkt. 
 
 Lewis concludes that there is no particular reason for preferring the two-stage picture 
over the other approach. The only potentially convincing justification that has been offered 
for singling out ‘contents’ as a separate level of semantic value for sentences is that they can 
serve as the objects of propositional attitudes and locutionary acts. But that is a mistake : the 
contents which the two-step procedure assigns to sentences as semantic values must be 
compositional, and that means that they must be relativized propositions : functions from rich 
indices to truth-values. But the contents of propositional attitudes and locutionary acts are, 
according to Stalnaker, classical propositions : functions from possible worlds to truth-values. 
This raises a dilemma for the two-stage theorists. Either, like Kaplan, he construes contents as 
relativized propositions, in which case they can be the semantic values of sentences but they 
cannot be equated with the objects of attitudes and locutionary acts ; or, like Stalnaker, he 
construes contents as classical propositions, but then they can no longer serve as semantic 
values because they are not compositional. 
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Chapter 14 
Rescuing the two-stage picture 
 
 
 
Relativizing Stalnaker’s propositions 
 
In contrast to Stalnaker’s propositions, which are classical, Kaplan’s contents are relativized 
propositions, true with respect to rich indices consisting not only of a possible world (as in 
Stalnaker’s theory) but also of a time and possibly a location. Such relativized propositions 
could be the semantic values of sentences, by Lewis’s standards, since they are 
compositional : the proposition expressed by ‘Somewhere the sun is shining’ is a function of 
the place-relative proposition expressed by ‘The sun is shining’. 
 Stalnaker himself considers the possibility of relativizing his propositions.
lii
 Lewis 
acknowledges that this would make them compositional, hence a suitable candidate for the 
status of semantic value, but he has an objection to this potential move : 
 
Stalnaker does suggest, at one point, that he might put world-time pairs in place of 
worlds. (…) But this does not go far enough. World and time are not the only shiftable 
features of context. And also perhaps it goes too far. If propositions are reconstrued so 
that they may vary in truth from one time to another, are they still suitable objects for 
propositional attitudes ? (Lewis 1980 : 95 ; emphasis mine) 
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This last objection has a Richardian flavour, and we should be suspicious of it. It presupposes 
that the object of the attitudes must be classical propositions. But in discussing Richard’s 
argument (chapter 10), we saw that relativized propositions can be the objects of the attitudes 
(alongside Austinian propositions). 
 Lewis himself, in ‘Attitudes de dicto and de se’, has argued that the content of the 
attitudes are relativized propositions — functions from centered worlds (i.e. world-time-
individual triples) to truth-values. He has taken on board, and generalized, Loar’s suggestion 
that what we believe may be ‘propositional functions’ (Loar 1976), or ‘properties’ which the 
believer self-ascribes. In this way Lewis is able to account for the vexing phenomenon of 
indexical belief. 
 Lewis’s objection to the suggested fix (relativizing Stalnaker’s propositions in order to 
make them compositional) is incompatible with his own theory of indexical belief ; or so I 
will argue. First, however, I must expound that theory.  
 
Indexical belief 
 
Prior had suggested that, without temporal propositions as possible objects for the attitudes, 
we cannot account for the attitude of relief expressed by an utterance such as ‘Thank 
goodness that’s over’ : 
 
[This utterance] says something which it is impossible that any use of a tenseless 
copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn’t mean the same as, e.g. ‘Thank 
goodness the date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954’, even if it is 
said then. (Nor, for that matter, does it mean ‘Thank goodness the conclusion of that 
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thing is contemporaneous with this utterance’. Why should anyone thank goodness for 
that ?) (Prior 1959/1976 : 84)
liii
 
 
Castañeda and Perry provided a number of similar examples, in which it seems that the object 
of belief cannot be a classical proposition. Lewis discusses one of Perry’s well-known 
examples : the case of Heimson, the madman who believed he was Hume. 
 Heimson and Hume both believed to be Hume, but Hume was right and Heimson was 
wrong. We need something to be the common content of their beliefs. At the same time, the 
complete content of their beliefs cannot be the same, since one belief is true and the other is 
false. This is one of the cases in which we need to relativize, and to distinguish two levels of 
content. That is what Lewis does, and his view fits Moderate Relativism perfectly. 
 Lewis first establishes that the common content of Hume’s and Heimson’s beliefs 
cannot be a classical proposition. If it was a classical proposition, it would not be possible for 
their beliefs to differ in truth-value : 
 
[Heimson] believes he is Hume. Hume believed that too. Hume was right. If Hume 
believed he was Hume by believing a [classical] proposition, that proposition was true. 
Heimson believes just what Hume did. But Hume and Heimson are worldmates. Any 
proposition true for Hume is likewise true for Heimson. So Heimson, like Hume, 
believes he is Hume by believing a true proposition. So he’s right. But he’s not right. 
He’s wrong, because he believes he’s Hume and he isn’t. (Lewis 1979a/1983 : 142) 
 
Lewis concludes by rejecting the assumption that occurs in the antecedent of the conditional : 
that Hume believed he was Hume by believing a classical proposition. Instead, he suggests, 
Hume believed he was Hume by believing a relativized proposition, true at himself (but false 
 129 
at Heimson), that is, by self-ascribing a property : the property of being Hume. Hume was 
right, since he actually had the property. Heimson self-ascribed the same property — 
wrongly, since he did not have that property. 
 There is another option, however : one may reject the assumption that Hume and 
Heimson believed the same thing. This is the option pursued by John Perry, who maintains 
that the objects of belief are classical propositions.
liv
 Since classical propositions must be true 
or false, tertium non datur, if Heimson is wrong and Hume right it follows that they believe 
distinct propositions, hence it is not true that they believe the same thing.
lv
 But Lewis has an 
objection to that move : 
 
Doubtless it is true in some sense that Heimson does not believe what Hume did. But 
there had better also be a central and important sense in which Heimson and Hume 
believe alike. (…) Heimson may have got his head into perfect match with Hume’s in 
every way that is at all relevant to what he believes. If nevertheless Heimson and 
Hume do not believe alike, then beliefs ain’t in the head ! They depend partly on 
something else, so that if your head is in a certain state and you’re Hume you believe 
one thing, but if your head is in that same state and you’re Heimson you believe 
something else. Not good. The main purpose of assigning objects of attitude is, I take 
it, to characterize states of the head ; to specify their causal roles with respect to 
behavior, stimuli, and one another. If the assignment of objects depends partly on 
something besides the state of the head, it will not serve this purpose. The states it 
characterizes will not be occupants of the causal roles. (Lewis 1979a/1983 : 142-3) 
 
In other words, there is a sense in which Hume and Heimson believe the same thing — this is 
the ‘causal-explanatory’ sense, in McGinn’s terminology — and there is another sense in 
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which they do not believe the same thing — this is the ‘truth-conditional’ sense. This 
distinction corresponds to the duality of belief we talked about in discussing Richard’s view. 
In the causal-explanatory sense, the object of belief must be ‘in the head’ : it must be purely 
psychological. In the truth-conditional sense, the object of belief depends upon the context in 
which the belief is entertained : so it makes a difference to what is believed (in that sense) 
whether the believer is Heimson or Hume. 
 For Lewis, the psychological sense is more fundamental : 
 
Mean what you will by « object of an attitude. » But if you mean something that is not 
determined by the state of the head, and that cannot do the job of characterizing states 
of the head by their causal roles, then I think you had better introduce something else 
that can do that job. I would prefer to reserve the term « object of an attitude » for that 
something else. (Lewis 1979a/83 : 143) 
 
Be that as it may, Lewis’s claim is that the object of belief, in the psychological sense, is not a 
classical proposition but a relativized proposition, at least when the belief is indexical (as in 
the Hume/Heimson case). 
 As for the object of belief in the other, truth-conditional sense, it can easily be 
captured once we have identified the psychological content of the belief. This is where 
Moderate Relativism comes in handy. In the truth-conditional sense, the (complete) content of 
Hume’s or Heimson’s belief is the Austinian proposition, consisting of the self-ascribed 
property and the situation it concerns, viz. the subject who self-ascribes the property. So 
Hume’s belief and Heimson’s belief share the same explicit content (the same lekton), but 
they differ since the other component of the Austinian proposition (the situation component) 
is Hume in one case, and Heimson in the other. The resulting Austinian propositions have 
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different truth-conditions : one is true iff Hume is Hume, and the other is true iff Heimson is 
Hume. 
 
Lewis’s retractation 
 
If we take Lewis’s own theory of de se belief seriously, we must acknowledge that his 
objection to the two-stage picture cannot be maintained. To make Stalnaker’s ‘middlemen’ 
compositional, hence suitable candidates for the status of semantic value, we may follow 
Kaplan and construe them as relativized propositions. Contrary to what Lewis suggests, if we 
do that, we do not lose the Stalnakerian justification that propositions, thus understood, can 
serve as objects for the attitudes. For it is not true that only classical propositions can be the 
object of the attitudes. If Lewis (1979a) is right, classical propositions are never the object of 
the attitudes ; or rather, the cases in which they are (or seem to be) can be re-analysed as cases 
in which the subject self-ascribes the property of inhabiting a world in which the proposition 
holds.
lvi
 Either way, the propositional attitudes turn out to have relativized propositions as 
their contents. 
  Lewis himself noticed that his objection to the two-stage picture collapses, given his 
own theory of de se belief. In preparing for the reprinting of his 1980 article in his Papers in 
Philosophical Logic (Lewis 1998), he added a footnote after the passage I quoted above (p. 
00). The passage ends with a rhetorical question : 
 
If propositions are reconstrued so that they may vary in truth from one time to another, 
are they still suitable objects for propositional attitudes ? (Lewis 1980 : 95 ; 1998 : 39) 
 
The new footnote contains Lewis’s retrospective answer, which sounds like a retractation : 
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Yes indeed. For discussion, see my ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De se’. (Lewis 1998 : 39) 
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Chapter 15 
Content, character, and cognitive significance 
 
 
 
Three levels, or two ? 
 
Let us take stock. We have seen that beliefs can be individuated in two ways : by their truth-
conditions, which often depend upon the context in which they are entertained, or by their 
intra-individual psychological role. In this role, beliefs must be ascribed relativized 
propositions (properties) as their contents, rather than classical propositions. Since Kaplanian 
contents are relativized propositions, they can serve as the objects of the attitudes in the 
psychological sense. This is the epistemic justification for the two-stage picture. 
 Moderate Relativism as I have spelled it out so far relies on the two-stage picture — 
that is why it was important to check the acceptability of the epistemic justification. As we 
have seen, the lekton is very similar to Kaplan’s ‘content’. Both are relativized propositions, 
and both result from evaluating the indexical expressions with respect to context. So both the 
lekton and the kaplanian content of an utterance are context-dependent ; but they fall short of 
determining a complete, classical proposition. To get a complete proposition, we need to 
appeal to context a second time, to fix the relevant index/circumstance with respect to which 
the lekton must be evaluated. 
 In this framework, which is the kaplanian version of the two-stage picture, three levels 
are distinguished : 
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• The (context-independent) meaning of the sentence (a.k.a. Kaplan’s ‘character’) is a 
function whose argument is the context of utterance and whose value is the contextually 
variable lekton (a.k.a. Kaplan’s ‘content’). 
 
• The lekton is a relativized proposition, i.e. a function whose argument is a 
circumstance/index/situation and whose value is a truth-value. 
 
• The complete content of the utterance is the Austinian proposition consisting of the lekton 
and the contextually relevant situation. It determines a classical proposition, true iff the lekton 
is true at the relevant index. 
 
There is another version of the two-stage picture, however. In contrast to Kaplan, other 
two-stage theorists do not posit a third, intermediate level of content between the meaning of 
the sentence and the classical proposition it expresses. Thus Stalnaker’s ‘middlemen’ are 
classical propositions — functions from possible worlds to truth-values. These classical 
propositions are the objects of the attitude, according to Stalnaker. The same thing holds for 
Perry : like Kaplan, he distinguishes two semantic values for utterances, viz. character and 
content, but he construes contents as classical propositions, and he takes the classical 
propositions in question to be the object of the attitudes. Perry accounts for indexical belief, 
not by positing relativized propositions as semantic objects intermediate between characters 
and classical propositions, but by appealing to characters themselves as the modes of 
presentation under which classical propositions are believed or disbelieved. So Stalnaker and 
Perry are both classical two-stage theorists : they posit two levels, namely character (sentence 
meaning) and classical proposition, and eschew the need for an intermediate level of 
relativized content. In contrast, Moderate Relativism as I have elaborated it so far follows 
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Kaplan in positing such an intermediate level : the lekton, distinct both from the context-
independent meaning of the sentence and from the classical proposition it expresses in 
context. 
 
An objection to the three-level version 
 
In terms of this distinction between two versions of the two-stage picture, a devastating 
objection can be raised against the three-level version endorsed by Moderate Relativism as I 
have elaborated it. The objection runs as follows : the justification that has been offered for 
the intermediate level (the lekton) is that it can serve as the object of the attitudes in the 
narrow, psychological sense. But the lekton as I have construed it is demonstrably not an 
appropriate entity for that role, precisely because it is context-dependent. The object of the 
attitudes, in the narrow psychological sense, must be entirely ‘in the head’ ; that is the 
argument that was used to show that the object of the attitudes must be the lekton rather than 
the classical proposition. But the lekton itself does not fit that bill, for it incorporates the 
contextual values of the indexicals and therefore depends in part upon the context. So if we 
take the psychological constraint seriously, it is the (context-independent) character, not the 
lekton, which must play the role of object of the attitudes in the narrow sense. Indeed, it is 
Kaplan’s characters, not his contents, that are supposed to play the intra-individual, 
psychological role of accounting for one’s behaviour.lvii As Kaplan himself writes, 
paraphrasing Perry (1977), 
 
We use the manner of presentation, the character, to individuate psychological states, 
in explaining and predicting action. It is the manner of presentation, the character and 
not the thought apprehended, that is tied to human action. When you and I have beliefs 
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under the common character of ‘A bear is about to attack me’, we behave similarly. 
We both roll up in a ball and try to be as still as possible. Different thoughts 
apprehended, same character, same behavior. When you and I both apprehend that I 
am about to be attacked by a bear, we behave differently. I roll up in a ball, you run to 
get help. Same thought apprehended, different characters, different behaviors. (Kaplan 
1989 : 532, adapted from Perry 1977/1993b : 23) 
 
 To recapitulate the objection : If relativized propositions are to be the objects of the 
attitudes, it is in the psychological sense ; but in that sense there is a much better candidate for 
the status of psychological content, namely the meaning of the sentence-type. Thus Perry 
distinguishes two distinct objects for the attitudes, corresponding roughly to the distinction 
between content and character. We believe a (classical) proposition, he says, by ‘accepting’ 
an interpreted sentence. Sentence meanings are the objects of acceptance, and acceptance, in 
contrast to belief, is purely psychological : it is ‘the mind’s contribution to belief’. 
 
Belief and acceptance 
 
Remember Watson and Holmes. Holmes says 'The salt is left of the pepper', because the salt 
is left of the pepper from Holmes's perspective. From Watson's perspective, the pepper is left 
of the salt; however, Watson is mistaken and he wrongly says 'The salt is left of the pepper'. 
Holmes and Watson apparently 'say the same thing' but Holmes is right and Watson wrong. 
This is like Heimson and Hume ! From the standpoint of Moderate Relativism, one and the 
same lekton (viz. the perspective-relative proposition that the salt is left of the pepper) is 
expressed, but Holmes and Watson believe different classical propositions, or different 
Austinian propositions, because they each relativize the lekton to their own perspective. 
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 In the classical framework, Barwise claims, 
 
we have nothing in the theory that classifies the similarity in attitudes of Holmes and 
Watson in cases like these. And it is this similarity that leads them to make the same 
bodily movements, reaching in the same direction, though toward different objects, 
when they want the salt. (Barwise 1989a: 240). 
 
But is this true ? Isn’t there something, in the classical two-stage theory, which accounts for 
the similarity in attitudes, i.e. for the narrow psychological content of the common belief 
Holmes and Watson express ? Of course there is : Holmes and Watson both utter the sentence 
‘The salt is left of the pepper’, and that sentence corresponds to something they both accept. 
What they have in common, according to Perry, is a certain belief state they are both in, and 
which leads them e.g. to utter ‘The salt is left of the pepper’ and to reach in a certain direction 
when they want the salt. 
 Perry distinguishes the belief relation which we bear to classical propositions, from the 
acceptance relation which we bear to interpreted sentences when we are in a belief state that 
would lead a competent user of the language to think or utter that sentence assertively : 
 
Acceptance is not belief ; rather it is an important component of belief. It is the 
contribution the subject’s mind makes to belief. One has a belief by accepting a 
sentence. Which belief one thereby has also depends upon who the believer is and 
when the believing takes place — factors that need have no representation in the mind. 
(…) 
In saying that acceptance is the contribution the subject’s mind makes to belief, I mean 
this. When we believe, we do so by being in belief states. These states have typical 
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effects, which we use to classify them. In particular, we classify them by the sentences 
a competent speaker of the language in question would be apt to think or utter in 
certain circumstances when in that state. (Perry 1980/1993b : 53) 
 
So Holmes and Watson share a certain state with a certain causal-explanatory role, and that 
state corresponds to, and can be classified by, the character of the sentence the state prompts 
them to utter. Holmes and Watson both ‘accept’ the interpreted sentence ‘The salt is left of 
the pepper’ ; this accounts for the similarity in their behaviour. By accepting this sentence, 
they believe distinct classical propositions : Holmes believes the proposition that the salt is 
left of the pepper from Holmes’s perspective, while Watson believes the proposition that the 
salt is left of the pepper from Watson’s perspective. Holmes is right, Watson is wrong. 
Similarly, Hume and Heimson both accept the sentence ‘I am David Hume’, so they are both 
in the same belief state, which leads them to act and speak in a certain way. By being in that 
state, they believe distinct propositions : Hume correctly believes that he, Hume, is Hume, 
while Heimson incorrectly believes that he, Heimson, is Hume. 
 
Back to the single-stage picture 
 
The objection I have raised is very serious, but it does not force us to give up Moderate 
Relativism. Rather than give up Moderate Relativism, we might simply give up the Barwise-
Kaplan interpretation (i.e. the idea that the lekton is context-dependent and incorporates the 
contextual values of indexicals) and go back to Dummett’s suggestion that the lekton is the 
meaning of the sentence-type. 
 Interestingly, this option takes us back to Lewis’s single-stage picture. That is so 
because the objection to the three-level version of the two-stage picture backfires against the 
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classical two-stage theorist who might be tempted to take advantage of it. If the narrow 
psychological object of the belief expressed by an utterance — that which enables us to 
capture the causal-explanatory role of the belief —  is the meaning of the sentence-type, as 
Perry suggests, why do we need the two-stage picture in the first place ? We only need to 
assign to the sentence a certain meaning, which, in context, will determine a truth-value. That 
meaning may be equated with a complicated function from context-index pairs to truth-
values, following Lewis’s suggestion. As has already been noticed, the proposition expressed 
(in the sense of the classical two-stage theorist) can be defined in that framework, so there is 
no need for the two-stage picture. The single-stage framework will do as well. 
In the single-stage framework, Moderate Relativism still makes sense ; indeed it 
corresponds to Lewis’s own position if I understand him correctly. The Austinian proposition 
expressed by an utterance consists of (i) a context (which Lewis construes as a world-time-
individual triple) and (ii) the context-independent lekton equated with a function from 
context-index pairs to truth-values. The utterance is true if and only if the lekton is true with 
respect to the context and the index it determines (the ‘index of the context’, for Lewis). The 
lekton thus understood is a property of contexts : it is the property a context has iff the 
relevant function yields truth when evaluated with respect to the context and the index it 
determines. 
 In the postscript to ‘General Semantics’ (Lewis 1983 : 230), Lewis notes that « these 
‘contexts’ are the same as the ‘subjects’ that self-ascribe properties » in Lewis’s article 
‘Attitudes De Dicto and De se’. In the Holmes/Watson case, the contexts are world-bound 
time-slices of Watson and Holmes, who each self-ascribes the property expressed by ‘The salt 
is left of the pepper’, namely the property of being a context from the perspective of which 
the salt is left of the pepper. In the Hume-Heimson case, the contexts are world-bound time-
slices of Heimson and Hume, who each self-ascribes the property expressed by ‘I am Hume’, 
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namely the property of being Hume (or, in the new terminology, the property of being a 
context whose ‘agent’ or ‘subject’ is Hume). 
 
Summing up 
 
The objection I have raised in this chapter establishes that the lekton, qua level of content 
intermediate between context-independent meaning and classical truth-conditions, is not the 
object of the attitudes in the narrow psychological sense, contrary to what Barwise suggests. 
So the epistemic justification of the two-stage picture fails when the picture is fleshed out à la 
Kaplan-Barwise. 
At this point there are two options for (Strong) Moderate Relativism. The first option 
has just been presented: we may give up the Kaplan-Barwise construal in favor of the 
Dummett-Lewis construal. That is, we may equate the lekton with the context-independent 
meaning of the sentence-type, and the situation with the context of utterance. On this view, all 
forms of relativity reduce to indexicality, as Lewis pointed out. 
Second option : we may give up the epistemic justification and try to find another 
justification for the Kaplanian, three-level version of the two-stage picture which, following 
Barwise, I have opted for so far. That is the option I will pursue in the remainder of this book. 
I will do so by introducing a quite fundamental distinction between content and mode and 
showing how it can be dealt with in the SMR framework (book II). As we shall see in due 
course (chapter 30), the mode/content distinction is what ultimately justifies construing the 
lekton as context-dependent. 
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Book II 
 
EXPERIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY 
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Part Five 
 
 
Content and Mode 
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Chapter 16 
Duality and the fallacy of misplaced information 
 
 
 
 
Sense and force 
 
In chapter 2, I said that, appearances notwithstanding, Frege accepted Duality (the need for a 
circumstance of evaluation over and above the content to be evaluated). That is because he 
drew a distinction between the sense or content of an utterance and its force. An utterance 
pictures things as being a certain way ; how it pictures things is its sense. But whether the 
picture is intended as a picture of reality, or as a picture of a fictional state of affairs, is 
something that cannot be read off the picture itself. This is a pragmatic matter — a matter of 
how the picture is used. 
The assertive force which characterizes serious use (as opposed to fictional or ironical 
use) can be cashed out in terms of a certain relation of the utterance to the actual world. The 
speaker who makes an assertion describes the actual world as being thus and so. The speaker 
who, in Grice’s terms, ‘makes as if to say’ does not stand in that relation to the actual world. 
Frege, of course, would not say that in such a case the speaker stands in that relation to some 
other, unactualized world (or worlds). He claims that the author of a fiction offers a picture 
which may be beautiful or interesting but which is not a picture of anything. No relation is 
established to something against which the picture could be evaluated. Fiction, Frege says, is 
sense without reference ; and without reference, there is no possibility of truth. (Truth is a 
special case of reference, for Frege.) 
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 Assertive force is thus a matter of the utterance’s standing in an appropriate relation to 
the world, a relation in virtue of which the sense of the utterance can be evaluated as 
incorrectly or correctly describing the world. Besides this distinction between sense and force, 
Frege also drew a distinction between the complete sense of an indexical utterance and the 
partial sense which the uttered sentence, by itself, carries. The sense of an indexical sentence 
is incomplete, Frege says : it must be completed by the circumstances of the utterance. Only 
the resulting ‘hybrid symbol’ (sentence + context) carries a complete sense. The important 
point is that the force of the utterance comes in addition to that complete sense, and it cannot 
be made an aspect of it — not even through the addition of a prefix like ‘I assert that’, or ‘it is 
true that’. If the speaker is not serious, adding extra words and making the sense more 
complex will not change the situation. 
 On this admittedly unconventional interpretation, Frege’s view is compatible with 
Moderate Relativism. The complete import of an utterance involves a situation (the actual 
world) and a content to be evaluated with respect to that situation (the complete sense). That 
content is context-dependent, and it is classical (i.e. fully propositional, by Fregean 
standards). This corresponds to one of the versions of Moderate Relativism we have to 
adjudicate between. In order to adjudicate beween them, the crucial issue we have to address 
is that of the status of the lekton : is it context-dependent, and if it is, is it classical or 
relativized ? However, I will postpone discussion of that issue until book III. For the time 
being, I want to investigate the force/content distinction, and its counterpart in the mental 
realm, in some detail since it can be seen as a special case of the ‘Austinian’ duality we are 
concerned with in this book. 
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Misplaced information 
 
Illocutionary force, in the SMR framework, is handled through the specification of the 
situation against which the utterance is meant to be evaluated. Just as an assertion that p 
presents the fact that p as holding in the actual world, a command that p presents the fact that 
p as holding in a situation the addressee is asked to actualize, that is, to bring about. A 
promise that p is similar, with one difference : the actualizer is supposed to be the speaker, not 
the addressee.
lviii
 
 Commands and promises provide a useful illustration of a common mistake, which 
consists in ascribing to the propositional content of a speech act a property that is actually a 
feature of its illocutionary force. Thus Searle famously claimed that speech act types are 
characterized by a number of properties, including properties of their propositional contents. 
The content of an order must be a future act of the addressee, he said. If I order John to wash 
the dishes, the content of the order is the proposition that John will wash the dishes — the 
same proposition that would be the content of an assertion if I said that John will wash the 
dishes, or of a question if I asked whether John will wash the dishes. While assertions or 
questions can have any proposition as their contents, order and directive speech acts more 
generally are supposed to be more constrained : their content can only be a proposition 
featuring a future act of the hearer, as in this particular case. Likewise, promises are such that 
their contents can only be a future act of the speaker (Searle 1969 : 57-58). Now Searle’s 
arguably claim rests on what Barwise and Perry call the ‘fallacy of misplaced information’.  
As I wrote in Meaning and Force, 
 
The notion of the hearer’s (or speaker’s) future behavior does have a role to play in the 
analysis of commissives and directives, but… the proper place for this notion is in the 
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analysis of the illocutionary force of directives and commissives, not in the analysis of 
their propositional content. Any proposition whatever can be the content of a directive 
or a commissive ; it suffices that the speaker’s utterance express his intention that the 
hearer (or the speaker), by virtue of this utterance expressing this intention, behave in 
such a way as to make the proposition true. The ‘hearer’s (or speaker’s) future 
behavior’ consists in bringing about the state of affairs that is the content of the speech 
act. It is not an intrinsic aspect of that state of affairs. (Recanati 1987 : 163, originally 
in Recanati 1981: 189 ; see also Sperber 1982 : 47) 
 
As I pointed out in the same book, Searle’s view has unfortunate consequences : it forces the 
theorist to treat as indirect the illocutionary act of promise performed by means of a sentence 
such as ‘You will win’ (said by a tennis player to his opponent), while the same act would be 
performed directly if the speaker had uttered ‘I will lose’ instead. This sounds arbitrary. 
Again, any future state of affairs can be the content of an order (or a promise) if the utterance 
manifests the speaker’s intention that, because of this utterance, the addressee (or the speaker) 
will bring about that state of affairs. Even the futurity of the state of affairs is not a genuine 
constraint on the propositional content of commissives or directives. To be sure, it is a natural 
constraint that humans can only actualize the future, since the past is beyond their control ; 
but that is not a conventional, linguistic constraint. 
In the SMR framework the content of the illocutionary act corresponds to the lekton, 
and its force corresponds to the type of situation with respect to which the lekton is meant to 
be evaluated. Thus an order that p represents the fact that p (content) and it represents it as 
holding in a situation brought about by the hearer as a causal result of the speech act (via a 
causal chain involving the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s illocutionary intention to issue 
an order). A promise that p similarly represents the fact that p as holding in a situation 
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brought about by the speaker as a causal result of the speech act. In both cases, the notion of a 
future act of the speaker or the hearer comes into the picture through the situation component 
of the Austinian proposition which is the complete content of the speech act. 
 
From illocutionary force to psychological mode 
 
In his later work, Searle emphasized the similarity between speech acts and mental states. 
Both have a propositional content, and both have a dual structure, with the ‘psychological 
mode’ corresponding, on the side of mental states, to the illocutionary force on the side of 
speech acts. To assert that p is to perform a speech act whose content is the proposition that p 
and whose force is that of an assertion. Likewise, to believe that p is to be in an intentional 
state whose content is the proposition that p and whose psychological mode is that of belief. 
Now, because of that dual aspect, it is all too easy to ‘misplace’ some of the information 
carried by a mental state, by ascribing to the content of the state a piece of information that is 
actually carried by its mode — just as Searle ascribed to the propositional content of directive 
and commissive speech acts what was actually a feature of their illocutionary force. 
As we shall see in chapter 17, Searle himself has been guilty of such misplacement in 
his insightful analysis of perceptual experiences (a sub-class of Intentional states). Besides the 
distinction I have just introduced, between the content of the state and its mode, Searle draws 
a second distinction, between two components in the overall truth-conditions of perceptual 
experiences. He distinguishes two conditions such that the experience counts as satisfied 
(veridical) if and only if they are both met : the primary condition and the self-referential 
condition. (Those are my terms, not Searle’s ; they will be defined in chapter 17.) For him, 
both conditions are determined by the propositional content of the experience. In chapter 17, 
however, I will argue that the propositional content of the experience only determines the first 
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component of its overall truth-conditions — what I call the primary condition. The self-
referential condition is not determined by the propositional content of the state, but by its 
mode. It follows that the propositional content of a perceptual state is not self-referential, even 
if its overall truth-conditions are. 
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Chapter 17 
The content of perceptual judgments 
 
 
 
Searle’s analysis 
 
Visual experiences have propositional content, Searle claims. The subject does not merely see 
a flower, he sees a flower there, and this, fully spelled out, means that he sees that there is a 
flower there. I understand Searle’s contention as follows : the subject, as part of his visual 
experience, makes certain perceptual judgments, which determine the (conceptual) content of 
the experience. So the propositional content of the experience is the content of the judgments 
that are immediately (i.e. noninferentially) based on it.
lix
 
Let us ask what the truth-conditions of the perceptual judgement are. For the 
perceptual experience to be veridical, Searle says, there must actually be a flower there, but 
that is not sufficient. In addition to the primary condition that there be a flower there, an extra 
condition must be met : it must be the case that the presence of a flower there causes the 
visual experience (including the judgment that is part and parcel of the experience). Insofar as 
the propositional content of the state is what determines its truth-conditions, the content of the 
visual experience turns out to be more complex than one might have thought. The content of 
the visual experience is not the simple proposition that there is a flower there, but the 
conjunctive proposition that there is a flower there and there being a flower there causes this 
visual experience (where ‘this visual experience’ reflexively refers to the experience of which 
this is the propositional content). Searle therefore provides the following analysis of the 
perceptual experience of seeing a flower there. As in the analysis of speech acts, the material 
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in capital letters indicates the mode, while the words within the parentheses specify the 
content. 
 
VIS EXP (that there is a flower there and that there is a flower there is causing this 
visual experience) 
 
According to this analysis, the intentional state is a visual experience (mode) and its content is 
a conjunctive proposition whose second conjunct refers to the very experience of which this is 
the content, while the first conjunct specifies ‘the state of affairs perceived’ (Searle 1983 : 
48 ; I suppose this means something like : the state of affairs which the speaker takes himself 
to be perceiving). The first conjunct determines a proper part of the judgment’s truth-
conditions, namely the primary condition : that there be a flower there. But there is another 
truth-condition, determined by the second conjunct. That is the self-referential condition : 
that the perceptual experience be caused by ‘the rest of its truth-conditions’, that is, by the 
state of affairs whose existence is the primary condition for the judgment to be veridical. 
Because of the second condition, the overall truth-conditions of the perceptual judgment are 
self-referential : for the perceptual judgment to be veridical, the state of affairs which the 
speaker takes himself to be perceiving must actually exist (primary condition), and it must be 
what causes the speaker’s perceptual judgement that that state of affairs exists (self-referential 
condition). 
 
Introducing the mode/content distinction 
 
I fully agree with Searle that there are these two components in the truth-conditions of 
perceptual judgements. But I deplore Searle’s claim that the overall truth-conditional content 
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of the judgment, with its two components, is the propositional content of the visual experience 
(as distinguished from its mode). Insofar as I can tell, this is the fallacy of misplaced 
information once again. 
That the state of affairs represented (there being a flower there) causes the 
representation of that state of affairs is a condition that has to be met for the representation in 
question to count as a perception (rather than, say, an expectation). It follows that the self-
referential condition is determined by the perceptual mode of the state, not by its content.
lx
 
For a representation that p to count as a perception that p, it must be the case that the 
representation is caused by the fact that p ; but what is represented is only the fact that p. In 
other words : the content of the state (viz. the proposition that p) only determines the primary 
condition ; the perceptual nature of the state is what determines the self-referential condition. 
Together, the content and the mode determine the overall truth-conditions of the state. 
Searle might insist that, for him, the propositional content of a state just is what 
determines its truth-conditions. Consider the following passage, where he introduces the idea 
of propositional content : 
 
Every Intentional state consists of an Intentional content in a psychological mode. 
Where that content is a whole proposition and where there is a direction of fit, the 
Intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction. Conditions of satisfaction 
are those conditions which, as determined by the Intentional content, must obtain if the 
state is to be satisfied. For this reason the specification of the content already is a 
specification of the conditions of satisfaction. Thus, if I have a belief that it is raining, 
the content of my belief is : that it is raining. And the conditions of satisfaction are : 
that it is raining. (Searle 1983 : 12-13) 
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Given this characterization of content, it is legitimate to use the overall truth-conditions of 
perceptual experiences as evidence to determine what their content is. Following this 
procedure, we end up with Searle’s conclusion : the propositional content of a visual 
experience is self-referential. 
But I do not think we can accept this defense. Searle cannot simply ‘define’ the 
propositional content of a state as that which determines its truth-conditions. Or rather, he 
can, but then the claim that the content so defined is (to some extent) independent of the mode 
becomes an empirical claim, and it is that claim which I reject. There is a sense of ‘content’ in 
which the content of perceptual judgments is self-referential ; but the ‘content’, in that sense, 
is determined in part by the mode, and in part by… the content of the state in a different 
sense, namely, the sense in which ‘content’ and ‘mode’ are two independent dimensions 
which together constitute the state. My point, therefore, is that Searle cannot simultaneously 
maintain that the content is what determines the conditions of satisfaction, and that the 
content is independent of the mode. There are two distinct notions of content : one that is 
involved in the mode/content distinction inspired from speech act theory, and another one that 
is involved in the claim that the content of a state is what determines its (overall) truth-
conditions. 
In response, Searle might point out that he never claimed that the content was 
independent of the other component (mode or force) : the very idea of a ‘propositional content 
condition’ argues against such independence. This point is well-taken, but I reply that the 
distinction between ‘content’ and ‘mode’ (or ‘force’), by itself, suggests that these are 
relatively independent dimensions. However lightly we construe this ‘independence’ 
condition, it will not be satisfied (I claim) if we follow Searle and define content as that which 
determines satisfaction conditions. Note that Searle himself concurrently uses a distinct notion 
of content, namely (for any type of speech act or Intentional state F) what the subject Fs : 
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what she believes, what she asserts, what she promises, what she perceives, etc. The content 
of the act/state, in this sense, satisfies the independence condition, and it is not self-
referential.
lxi
  
Another line of defense is available to Searle. He may insist that it is part of the 
subject’s perceptual experience that that experience is caused by its object. The ‘causation’ 
component is not external to the content of the experience, but an integral part of it. With this 
I agree — but I do not think Searle’s position is thereby justified. The subject is aware of the 
perceptual nature of his experience : he knows he is perceiving rather than, say, expecting or 
imagining. So there is a sense in which the complete content of his experience is self-
referential : but the ‘complete content’ of the experience involves more than the propositional 
content — it also involves the psychological mode, of which the subject is aware and which 
determines the additional, self-referential condition. 
 
The proper analysis 
 
Once again, the analogy with speech acts can be illuminating. There is a self-referential 
element in speech acts too, as several authors have pointed out. For example, an order 
represents a certain state of affairs as a state of affairs such that the addressee complies with 
the order only if he brings it about. But bringing about the state of affairs in question is not 
sufficient for compliance : it must be the case that the addressee brings about the state of 
affairs as a result of being ordered to do so.
lxii
 An order, therefore, presents a state of affairs 
as something which the hearer is to bring about as a result of this order. So there are two 
components in the obedience conditions of an order : the hearer must do something (primary 
condition), and the order must be what causes the hearer to do that thing (self-referential 
condition). But it would be a mistake to consider the second, self-referential condition (that 
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the order is what causes the hearer to do x) as determined by the content of the order (i.e. what 
is ordered), as opposed to its force. The speaker orders the hearer to do x, period ; he does not 
order her to do x because of this order. Yet the fact that the utterance is an order (rather than 
an assertion) means that the hearer’s doing x will count as satisfying the speech act only if the 
hearer’s doing x is caused by the speech act in the proper way. This is a feature of the 
illocutionary force of ordering. So the correct representation of the speech act of, say, 
ordering the hearer to wash the dishes is not 
 
ORDER (that the addressee washes the dishes and that the addressee washes the 
dishes is caused by this order) 
 
but simply 
 
ORDER (that the addressee washes the dishes)
lxiii
 
 
I think exactly the same considerations apply in the perception case. The proper 
representation of the perceptual experience of the subject who sees a flower there is not 
 
VIS EXP (that there is a flower there and that there is a flower there is causing this 
visual experience) 
 
but simply 
 
VIS EXP (that there is a flower there) 
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In other words, the content of the perception of a flower is the fact that there is a flower there. 
That fact can be represented in all sorts of modes ; for it to be represented in the perceptual 
mode, it must be the case that the fact itself causes the representation. But this feature, hence 
the self-referential component whose importance Searle rightly emphasizes, is a property of 
the perceptual mode of representation, not a property of the content of perceptual 
representations. (Or, if it is a property of their content, it is not in the sense in which ‘content’ 
contrasts with ‘mode’, but in the sense of ‘overall’ or ‘complete’ content discussed in chapter 
3.) 
It is one of the advantages of the SMR framework that the distinction between content 
and force, or between content and mode, can be clearly articulated. The speaker who orders 
the addressee to wash the dishes represents the fact that the hearer is going to wash the dishes, 
and represents it as holding in a very specific situation, namely a situation resulting causally 
from the speech act (via a causal chain involving the addressee’s recognizing the speaker’s 
intention, etc.). Similarly, the speaker who sees a flower there entertains a representation 
whose content is the proposition that there is a flower there ; but that proposition, being 
entertained in the perceptual mode, is meant to be evaluated with respect to a very specific 
situation, namely the subject’s perceptual situation : a situation which the subject is causally 
affected by through his senses and which, in particular, causes the occurrence of the mental 
representation in question. 
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Chapter 18 
Episodic memory 
 
 
 
What has been said about the content of perceptual judgments naturally extends to the content 
of (episodic) memory. But memory raises special difficulties, and even though the conclusion 
we will reach is very much the same as that we reached in the analysis of perception, it is 
worth taking a fresh start and considering what is specific (and specifically problematic) 
about memory. 
 
The conjunctive analysis 
 
Episodic memories are mental states which presuppose other mental states, namely perceptual 
experiences, to which they are related both causally (the memory derives from the perceptual 
experience, which leaves it as a ‘trace’) and semantically (the memory inherits the content of 
the perceptual experience). As Evans puts it, we need to be able to use information gathered 
through perception at a later time, and for that we need a mechanism for retaining 
information. Memory is that mechanism. Or rather, it is a family of mechanisms, 
corresponding to distinct ways of retaining information. In semantic memory, we retain the 
beliefs once formed on the basis of perception (or on any other basis — what is retained is 
only the output of the belief-fixation mechanism, so the etiology of the belief is irrelevant). In 
episodic memory, we retain the perceptual experiences themselves.
lxiv
 I will be concerned 
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only with the second type of memory, where a memory state is an experience similar to the 
perceptual experience from which it derives. 
The crucial feature of episodic memories, besides their being experiential states, is that 
they share their content with the perceptual experiences from which they derive : they 
represent the same event or scene as the perceptual experience which is their ancestor. That is 
what episodic memory is for — it is supposed to replicate the perceptual experience. 
However, that is not all there is to say about memory. Even though the function of memory is 
to replicate the perceptual experience and, in particular, to carry the same content as that of 
the perceptual experience, still there is a fundamental difference in content between memory 
and the perception on which it is based. 
I see that there is a large tree standing in front of me. Later, I remember that there was 
a large tree standing in front of me. This way of putting things reveals the essential 
difference : perception and memory relate to the same scene or event, but in memory the 
scene or event is presented as past. I remember that there was a large tree standing in front of 
me. 
There is an obvious tension between the two elements I have just mentioned. Does a 
memory state have the same content as the perceptual state from which it derives, or does it 
have a different content ? The answer seems to be : both ! The scene or event the memory is 
about is clearly the same as the scene or event the initiating perception is about (that is what 
makes memory memory), but it is not the same since perception represents a present event 
(and represents it as present) while memory represents a past event (and represents it as past). 
Faced with this tension, the obvious move is to distinguish two components in the 
content of a memory. One component is common to the memory and the perception from 
which it derives. Since that component is shared, the memory ‘has the same content as’ the 
perception. But the content of the memory involves an additional element, which is 
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responsible for the difference between the memory and the perceptual state. Thus William 
James defines memory as ‘the knowledge of an event…, of which in the meantime we have 
not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it 
before’ (James 1890 : 648, cited in Hoerl 2001 : 326 ; my emphasis). Here the ‘knowledge of 
the event’ is what is common to the perceptual state and the memory state ;lxv the additional 
component is responsible for the ‘feeling of pastness’ which differentiates memory from 
perception.
lxvi
 
 On this view the content of memory is conjunctive. The first conjunct is what is shared 
with perception ; the second conjunct differentiates memory from perception. The first 
conjunct represents a scene or event in the world ; the second conjunct represents the 
subject’s past perceptual experience of that scene or event — hence the second conjunct is 
meta-representational. This is similar to Searle’s analysis of the content of perceptual 
experiences. According to Searle, the visual experience of a flower has conjunctive content : 
there is a flower there and that there is a flower there is causing this visual experience. The 
first conjunct is about the flower, the second conjunct is about the subject’s experience of the 
flower. Since the experience mentioned in the second conjunct is the very experience whose 
content is being analysed, the second conjunct makes the content of perception self-
referential. Now, the same idea applies to memory, according to Searle, with one additional 
level : 
  
The memory of seeing the flower represents both the visual experience and the flower 
and is self-referential in the sense that, unless the memory was caused by the visual 
experience which in turn was caused by the presence of (and features of) the flower, I 
didn’t really remember seeing the flower. (Searle 1983 : 95) 
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The memory, for Searle, represents the flower, the past visual experience as caused by the 
flower, and the present memory as caused by the past visual experience of the flower. In the 
conjunctive framework, this could be spelled out as follows : the flower is represented, and at 
the same time the representation itself is represented as a memory, that is, as causally deriving 
from an earlier, perceptual representation of the flower. 
 
The metarepresentational analysis 
 
There is a problem with the conjunctive analysis. It takes the content of the memory 
experience to consist of the content of the perceptual experience together with an additional 
element. But in what sense does the content of the memory experience contain that of the 
perceptual experience ? In perceiving the flower, I judge that there is a flower there. In 
remembering the flower, I do not judge that there is a flower there — only that there was one. 
So it does not seem that one can get to the content of memory by simply adding something to 
the content of perception. 
 In response to this objection, we may revise the analysis and interpret differently the 
idea that the content of memory includes the content of perception as a proper part.
lxvii
 We 
may give up the conjunctive analysis and consider the content of the perceptual experience as 
occurring in the content of the memory not as an independent conjunct, but as a subordinate, 
embedded part. Instead of ‘p and I once perceived that p’ the content would be simply ‘I once 
perceived that p’. (To this, following Searle, we may add the further idea that the present 
memory state is caused by that earlier perception : ‘I once perceived that p and that perception 
is causally responsible for this memory experience’.) The content of the perception occurs 
here as mentioned in the metarepresentational component, which now exhausts the content of 
the memory instead of being only a part of it. This I call the metarepresentational analysis. On 
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this view, « although an episode of recall has as its object the initial experience which was the 
apprehending of the event, if has thereby as a proper part of its content what was then 
apprehended » (Martin 2001 : 278). As Fernandez puts it, the proposition that the subject once 
perceived that p ‘syntactically includes’ the proposition that p. 
 For this analysis to work, a few adjustments are necessary. First, the paraphrase ‘I 
once perceived that p’ is misleading. It does not capture the experiential component of 
memory — the fact that in memory, the nonconceptual content of the perceptual experience is 
retained (to some extent at least). A better paraphrase would be : ‘I had perceptual experience 
XXX’, where ‘XXX’ does not merely specify the conceptual content of the perceptual 
judgment, but, as it were, ‘quotes’ the perceptual experience directly. Another adjustment is 
needed to capture the epistemic value of memory, namely the fact that, if I remember that p, I 
am thereby justified in judging that it was the case that p. That would not be the case if the 
content of memory was simply a representation of a (possibly non veridical) past perceptual 
experience. For that reason, Jordi Fernandez has suggested adding the condition that the past 
perceptual experience which memory represents is represented as veridical (Fernandez 2006 : 
53-55). 
 
Episodic memory in the SMR framework 
 
The problem with the metarepresentational theory is that it presents memory as primarily 
about our perceptual experience, and only indirectly about the world. I share Evans’s protest 
that 
 
We no more have, in memory, information that is primarily about our past experiences 
than we have, in perception, information which is primarily about our present 
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experiences. Just as perception must be regarded as a capacity for gaining information 
about the world, so memory must be regarded as a capacity for retaining information 
about the world. (Evans 1982 : 240 ; see also Rundle 1986 : 306-307) 
 
In this respect the conjunctive theory fares better than the metarepresentational theory. The 
conjunctive theory integrates a metarepresentational component (corresponding to the 
subject’s consciousness of being in a state which causally derives from a previous 
perception), but it also incorporates the direct representation of a state of affairs in the world, 
and straightforwardly captures the idea that the memory state retains the content of the 
perceptual state. 
 The problem we have raised for the conjunctive theory was that memory does not 
preserve the content of perception but transforms it by putting it, as it were, in the past tense. 
That is why it does not seem that one can get to the content of memory by simply adding 
something to the content of perception. Adding is not enough ; one needs to subtract 
something as well — namely the present tense or, less metaphorically, the feeling of 
presentness which colors the perception of the scene. In shifting from perception to memory, 
this feeling is removed, and it is replaced by the feeling of pastness which colors the 
representation of the scene in memory.  
In the moderate relativist framework, this problem simply does not arise. As in the 
conjunctive analysis, there are two components, one of which represents a state of affairs in 
the world. But in the SMR framework, that component is temporally neutral, so there is no 
objection to saying that it is common to perception and the resulting memory. 
The complete content of a perceptual state is analysed into (i) the explicit content of 
the state (the lekton) and (ii) a situation with respect to which that content is supposed to be 
evaluated. The complete content is distributed, and that means that what the situation 
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component supplies need not be replicated in the lekton. Now the content of a perceptual 
experience is relative to the situation of perception. This relativity extends to time : the 
content of perception is temporally neutral, but it is evaluated with respect to the time of the 
perceptual experience. So the subject has, at t, a perceptual experience the content of which is 
the temporal proposition that there is a flower there, and that proposition is presented as true 
at t, the time of the present perceptual experience. 
Since the explicit content of the perception is temporally neutral, there is no objection 
to saying that it is preserved in memory. In memory, the same temporally-neutral proposition 
that there is a flower there is presented as true with respect to the situation (and the time) of 
the earlier perceptual experience rather than the situation (and the time) of the present 
memory experience. In the analysis of memory just as in the analysis of perception, the 
temporal element is carried by the situation of evaluation. 
 
Phenomenology and the mode/content distinction 
 
At this point the metarepresentational theorist can make the same inadequate response which, 
in chapter 17, I said Searle could make. It runs as follows : the feeling of pastness, just like 
the feeling of presentness that accompanies perception, is an aspect of the content of memory. 
There is a clear phenomenological difference between memory and perception, having to do 
with their respective temporal orientations. This cannot be expelled out of the content, 
however narrowly we construe that notion of content. So, for example, Mike Martin writes: 
 
The mere possibility that recall and experience might coincide in content raise[s] the 
worry that the phenomenology of recall might then have to be identified with that of 
sensory experience. (Martin 2001 : 278 ; emphasis mine) 
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 But there is absolutely no reason to consider that phenomenology supervenes on 
explicit content. The mode also contributes to the phenomenology, since the mode is 
something the subject is aware of. In the memory mode, the content is presented as true with 
respect to a past perceptual situation, hence the scene represented is felt as past. In the 
perception mode, the content is presented as true with respect to the current perceptual 
situation, hence the scene represented is felt as present. This introduces a difference in the 
complete content of the respective states, a difference which the phenomenology reflects.
lxviii
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Part Six 
 
 
Immunity to error through misidentification 
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Chapter 19 
Implicit self-reference 
 
 
 
The egocentricity of perceptual judgments 
 
I see that there are clouds. The content of my visual experience is very simple : it is the fact 
(if it is a fact) that there are clouds. But of course the complete content of my perception is 
richer than that. As Searle points out, my perception is not veridical if and only if there are 
clouds ; it is veridical if and only if there are clouds at the place and time of perception, and 
there being clouds at the place and time of perception is what causes (in the right way) my 
perceptual judgment that there are clouds. To get the complete content of the perceptual 
judgment, therefore, we need to add something to its explicit content, namely some kind of 
reference to the place and time of perception and to the causal relation between the perception 
and the fact perceived. 
To say that those extra pieces of information are not part of the explicit content of the 
representation is to say that they are not represented in the way in which the clouds are 
represented. They find their way into the complete content of the representation because of 
the functional role of that representation, determined by its mode. Qua perception, the 
representation is caused by the situation around the subject, and it serves to guide the 
subject’s action in that situation. The representation, therefore, is relative to the subject’s 
situation, and it is true if and only if the fact represented (viz. that there are clouds) holds in 
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that situation. But the subject and his situation are not themselves elements of the fact 
represented ; they are not constituents of the lekton. 
In ‘Perception, Action, and the Structure of Believing’, John Perry writes : 
 
The information that we get at a certain spot in the world is information about objects 
in the neighborhood of that spot in a form suitable for the person in that spot. As long 
as this is the only source of information we have about ourselves, we need no way of 
designating ourselves, indexical or insensitive. Our entire perceptual and doxastic 
structure provides us with a way of believing about ourselves, without any expression 
for ourselves. (Perry 1986a/1993b : 148-149) 
 
Perry often expresses the same idea by saying that the subject is an ‘unarticulated constituent’ 
of the perceptual judgment. The subject’s perceptual judgment is about his perceptual 
situation, but this fact is guaranteed by the role of his representation, qua perceptual 
judgment. The subject himself does not need to be explicitly represented, since the 
representation can only be about him and his situation. 
 
The internal mode 
 
An obvious area of application for Perry’s idea of the self as unarticulated constituent of 
certain judgments is the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification, 
discussed by Wittgenstein (1958), Shoemaker (1968), and Evans (1982), inter alia.
lxix
 If, on 
the basis of proprioceptive/kinaesthetic experience, I judge that my legs are crossed, I cannot 
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be mistaken as to the person to whom I ascribe the property of having one’s legs crossed. It is 
not possible that I correctly judge that someone’s legs are crossed, and misidentify the person 
whose legs are crossed — thinking that it is myself, while in fact it is someone else. Note that 
this sort of mistake can easily occur if the judgment is not made ‘from inside’ but is, say, 
based upon the perception of my body in the mirror. If I see that my legs are crossed, I may 
well misidentify the person whose legs are crossed : what I take to be my legs in the mirror 
may be someone else’s. When the belief that my legs are crossed is gained through 
experiencing my own body from inside, no such mistake is possible. 
 The explanation of this phenomenon is straightforward, and it involves the distinction 
between mode and content once again. Information gained on the proprioceptive/kinaesthetic 
mode  — henceforth to be called the internal mode — can only be about one’s own body. 
This is a contingent fact, but it is a fact nonetheless. So the (explicit) content of the bodily 
experience is not a complete subject-predicate proposition involving a certain person (myself) 
and a property (being cross-legged or having one’s legs crossed). The content is a relativized 
proposition, true at a person, and the internal mode determines the person relative to which 
that relativized content is evaluated : myself. In Perry’s terms, the self is an unarticulated 
constituent of the judgment. The content of the judgment, therefore, is not the proposition that 
my legs are crossed, strictly speaking. What is articulated is only the person-relative 
proposition that one’s legs are crossed. Since I am not explicitly ‘identified’ as the person 
whose legs are crossed, I cannot be mis-identified. The judgment, Evans says, is 
‘identification-free’ (Evans 1982 : 180-81). The identity of the person of whom the property 
holds is secured by the architecture of the system, which guarantees that ‘internal’ 
information can only concern the subject’s own body. 
 
 168 
Implicit and explicit self-ascriptions 
 
I contrasted the case in which I know ‘from inside’ that my legs are crossed, and the case in 
which I see that in the mirror. In the latter case, the person to whom the property of having 
one’s legs crossed is attributed is explicitly represented : it is ‘articulated’ or ‘identified’ in 
the content of the representation, which is conjunctive (Someone’s legs are crossed, and I am 
that person — the second conjunct is what Evans calls the ‘identification component’). In the 
former case, that person is implicitly determined by the mode, but it is not represented, hence 
the statement is ‘identification-free’ : no mistake can be made regarding specifically the 
person to whom the property is applied. There is no identification component in the content of 
the judgment. (See Millikan 2004 : 179 for an analogous distinction between ‘ego-implicit’ 
and ‘ego-explicit’ representations.) 
 Despite this difference, it is important to realize that the self is an unarticulated 
constituent in the mirror case also.  When, looking at the mirror, I see my legs crossed and 
judge that they are, the perception is about myself in two senses. In a first sense, the 
perception is (explicitly) about myself because it is my legs which, on the basis of my visual 
experience, I judge to be crossed. Since I am explicitly identified as the person whose legs are 
crossed, the judgment is susceptible to errors through misidentification. But the perception is 
(implicitly) about myself also in the sense that I am the one who sees the mirror and what it 
shows. That the perception is mine and concerns my surroundings rather than someone else’s, 
is something which is guaranteed by the architecture of the system hence gives rise to 
immunity. So, in the mirror case, the perceptual representation I entertain is such that one 
property (the property of seeing in the mirror that my legs are crossed) is ascribed to myself 
implicitly, in virtue of the perceptual mode of representation, while another property (the 
property of having one’s legs crossed) is ascribed to myself explicitly, in virtue of the content 
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of the perceptual judgment. In the internal case, I self-ascribe both properties implicitly, in 
virtue of the internal mode of representation. What is represented is only the property of 
having one’s legs crossed : its ascription to myself is not an aspect of the (explicit) content of 
the representation, but something that follows from the mode of representation.
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Chapter 20 
Weak and strong immunity 
 
 
 
Shoemaker on circumstantial vs absolute immunity 
 
In ‘Self-Reference and Self-Awareness’, Shoemaker draws a distinction between two forms 
of immunity to error through misidentification, one of which is stronger than the other. A first 
person statement like ‘I see a canary’ has absolute immunity, Shoemaker claims, because the 
subject cannot be mistaken as to who is seeing : 
 
I can be mistaken in saying ‘I see a canary’, since I can be mistaken in thinking that 
what I see is a canary or (in the case of hallucination) that there is anything at all that I 
see, but it cannot happen that I am mistaken in saying this because I have misidentified 
as myself the person I know to see a canary. (Shoemaker 1968/2003 : 8) 
 
The situation is different, he says, with first person statements like ‘I am facing a table’, 
which only have circumstantial immunity : 
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A statement like ‘I am facing a table’ does not have this sort of immunity, for we can 
imagine circumstances in which someone might make this statement on the basis of 
having misidentified someone else (e.g., the person he sees in a mirror) as himself. But 
there will be no possibility of such misidentification if one makes this statement on the 
basis of seeing a table in front of one in the ordinary way (without mirrors, etc.) ; let us 
say that when made in this way the statement has ‘circumstantial immunity’ to error 
through misidentification relative to ‘I’. (Shoemaker 1968/2003 : 8) 
 
 I think Shoemaker is confused here. Immunity is always circumstantial, that is, always 
relative to a ‘way of gaining information’ (Evans). Just as I can acquire the information that I 
am facing a table in a way that does not give rise to immunity, I can acquire the information 
that I see a canary in such a way too. For example, imagine I am a world-famous 
neuroscientist suffering from blindsight and undergoing a typical blindsight experiment. 
Images are shown to me, which I am supposed to identify. Presently an image of a canary is 
displayed but, being a blindsight patient, I am not aware of seeing a canary (even though I can 
be shown to have — subpersonally — identified the canary). At the same time, however, the 
electric activity of some of my neurons involved in visual identification is being recorded and 
amplified online in the form of a crackling sound, which I can hear. Thanks to an elaborate 
theory of mine, I am able (or think I am able) to identify what I see from the sound the 
neurons make. In such a situation I may assert ‘I see a canary’ because I hear what I take to be 
the typical sound of canary-neurons. My assertion is clearly not immune to misidentification : 
for, unbeknown to me, I might well be listening to the neurons of some other patient 
undergoing experiment in the next room. 
 I conclude that the statement ‘I see a canary’ is immune to error through 
misidentification only if the information that I see a canary is gained in the normal way — 
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through ordinary perceptual awareness. In such a case, the content of the perceptual 
experience is the proposition that there is a canary there, and the subject’s involvement — his 
or her relation to the scene perceived — is implied by the perceptual mode. In the blindsight 
case, in contrast, the subject’s judgment that he sees a canary has a complex, conjunctive 
content : the subject judges that someone is seeing a canary (as indicated by the sounds he 
hears) and that he is that person (since he takes himself to be the person whose neurons he is 
listening to). Because of the second conjunct, the statement is identification-dependent, hence 
not immune to error through misidentification.
lxx
 
 
Two types of (implicit) self-ascription 
 
Even though the distinction between absolute and circumstantial immunity is mistaken, there 
is a legitimate distinction between two kinds of immunity to error through misidentification, 
which I call ‘grade-1’ and ‘grade-2’ immunity.lxxi They correspond to two types of implicit 
self-ascription which are not usually distinguished, but should be. 
 Consider a well-known passage from The Bounds of Sense, cited by Shoemaker and 
Evans, where Peter Strawson discusses the phenomenon of immunity : 
  
When a man (a subject of experience) ascribes a current or directly remembered state 
of consciousness to himself, no use whatever of any criteria of personal identity is 
required to justify his use of the pronoun ‘I’ to refer to the suject of that experience. It 
would make no sense to think or say : This inner experience is occurring, but is it 
occurring to me ? (This feeling is anger ; but is it I who am feeling it ?) Again, it 
would make no sense to think or say : I distinctively remember that inner experience 
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occurring, but did it occur to me ? (I remember that terrible feeling of loss ; but was it 
I who felt it ?) There is nothing that one can thus encounter or recall in the field of 
inner experience such that there can be any question of one’s applying criteria of 
subject-identity to determine whether the encountered or recalled experience belongs 
to oneself — or to someone else. (Strawson 1966 : 165) 
 
 Strawson speaks of « ascribing a current or remembered state of consciousness to 
oneself ». This is potentially misleading, I think, for when one remembers, one is in a state of 
consciousness (a memory state) distinct from the state of consciousness one was in when one 
perceived the scene one presently remembers. So there are two types of self-ascription at 
stake in memory : one ascribes to oneself the earlier perceptual state, but one also ascribes to 
oneself the current memory state. Nor is this distinction limited to the case of memory : we 
find it also in the case of perception. 
 In perception, one attributes to oneself the conscious state one is in ; but there is 
another form of implicit self-ascription, corresponding to that which we have discussed so far. 
The perceiving subject does not merely ascribe to himself or herself the property of being in a 
certain inner state when she, for example, sees a flower in front of her. She also ascribes to 
herself the world-involving property of standing in a certain relation to the flower — a 
relation which makes it possible for the flower to cause the current conscious experience 
which the subject implicitly self-ascribes. The two types of implicit self-ascription are hard to 
distinguish in the perception case, because the inner state we are aware of reveals the world to 
us and our situation in it. The state is, as it were, ‘transparent’, and our awareness of it is also, 
simultaneously, awareness of what it reveals to us. In the case of memory the distinction is 
made easier due to the temporal distance between the inner memory state and what it reveals. 
What the inner state reveals is how the world was and how we experienced it in the past. 
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Two grades of immunity 
 
Both types of implicit self-ascription are immune to error through misidentification (Table 1). 
Consider memory first. If I remember something, I cannot be mistaken as to who is 
remembering, that is, as to who is undergoing the current memory experience. Nor can I be 
mistaken as to who experienced the remembered scene in the past. As Strawson says, 
 
It would make no sense to think or say : I distinctively remember that inner experience 
occurring, but did it occur to me ? (Strawson 1966 : 165). 
 
So, corresponding to the distinction between the current memory experience, and the past 
perceptual experience which is remembered, there is a distinction between two forms of 
immunity to error through misidentification. Grade-1 immunity characterizes the subject’s 
implicit self-ascription of the conscious state she is in, while grade-2 immunity characterizes 
her implicit self-ascription of the relevant relation to that which her conscious state represents. 
In the case of memory, the relevant relation to the scene remembered is the relation of having 
experienced that scene.
lxxii
 So grade-1 immunity characterizes the subject’s self-ascription of 
the memory state she is currently enjoying, while grade-2 immunity characterizes the 
subject’s self -ascription of the property of having experienced the scene she remembers. 
[Table 1 near here] 
The subject’s relation to the remembered scene, viz. the relation of having experienced 
it, corresponds, in the memory domain, to the subject’s relation to the scene perceived in the 
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perception domain. Just as the subject who remembers a flower implicitly ascribes to herself 
the property of having seen the flower she remembers, the subject who sees a flower 
implicitly ascribes to herself the property of standing in a certain causal-epistemic relation to 
the flower in front of her (the relation of seeing the flower). In the two cases the self-
ascription is immune to error through misdentification (grade-2 immunity). The remembering 
subject cannot be mistaken as to who experienced the remembered scene in the past ; nor can 
the perceiving subject be mistaken when she ascribes to herself the property of standing in a 
certain relation to the flower in front of her. To be sure, she may not stand in that relation to 
anything if, for example, she is hallucinating and there is no flower there. But it cannot 
happen that she mistaken because she has misidentified as herself the person she knows to see 
a flower. 
As I said, grade-1 immunity characterizes the other kind of implicit self-ascription. 
Both in the perception case and in the memory case, the subject self-ascribes the property of 
being in a certain conscious state : a perceptual state and a memory state respectively. The 
subject can no more be mistaken as to who is remembering, than she can be mistaken as to 
who experienced the remembered scene in the past. Similarly, the perceiving subject can no 
more be mistaken when she ascribes the current conscious state to herself than she can be 
mistaken when she ascribes to herself the relevant relation to the perceived flower. 
I do not wish to imply that the two types of self-ascription are separable ; for they are 
not. The self-ascription of the current perceptual/mnesic state and the self-ascription of the 
relevant relation to the perceived/remembered scene are two sides of the same coin. Yet they 
are conceptually distinct. As we shall see in chapter 21, we can imagine fantastic situations in 
which one is legitimate while the other is not. In the light of such situations, one may argue 
that grade-1 immunity is stronger than grade-2 immunity. For the situations in question are 
situations in which the type of self-ascription which is grade-2 immune turns out to be false. 
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Cases of quasi-memory and quasi-perception, to be discussed in the next chapter, are like that. 
The conceivability of such cases shows that grade-2 immunity is contingent or ‘de facto’. It is 
much harder, if not downright impossible, to conceive of cases which falsify self-ascriptions 
displaying grade-1 immunity.
lxxiii
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Chapter 21 
Quasi-perception and quasi-memory 
 
 
 
Wrong connections 
 
I said that it is a contingent fact that information gained in the internal mode can only be 
about our own body. Indeed, we can certainly imagine a fantastic situation in which we would 
be connected to someone else’s body and feel the condition of that body.lxxiv Similarly, it is a 
contingent fact that what we perceive is the world around us. We can imagine a fantastic 
situation in which we would perceive the world around somebody else. Evans describes a not-
so-fantastic situation in which one hears sounds that are actually occurring in a remote place : 
 
It is possible that the subject is wearing a pair of ultra-lightweight and undetectable 
earphones, operating in such a way that the sounds he hears are not sounds at the place 
he occupies at all — they may be sounds occurring in some other place. (Evans 1982 : 
184) 
 
It is easy to imagine an analogous situation in which (perhaps because of undetectable 
glasses) what we see is not what is before our eyes, but what is before someone else’s eyes. 
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 All such cases are cases of ‘quasi-perception’. In quasi-perception, the subject is in a 
certain state, characterized by a content and a mode. The mode normally justifies the subject 
in implicitly self-ascribing a certain relation to the worldly condition that is the content of the 
state ; but what distinguishes quasi-perception from perception is the fact that the self-
ascription may turn out to be false : it may be that, because a wrong connection is in place, it 
is not the subject, but someone else, who stands in the right relation to the worldly condition 
that is the content of the state. 
 The label ‘quasi-perception’ is formed after the celebrated expression ‘quasi-memory’ 
coined by Shoemaker to refer to an analogous predicament in the memory domain. In quasi-
memory, as in memory, the subject is in a state M(p), where ‘M’ is the memory mode and ‘p’ 
is the propositional content of the state. In the actual world, a subject in such a state is thereby 
entitled to believe that he had a past perception that p, which perception left the memory as a 
trace. But in a world in which humans have quasi-memory, it may be that a wrong connection 
is in place : the subject who remembers may not be the subject who enjoyed the perception in 
the past. The memory is a trace of an earlier perception, yet the perception in question may 
have been experienced not by the subject himself, but by some other person. 
 What happens in quasi-perception and quasi-memory can be described by saying that 
there is a failure of grade-2 immunity. Grade-1 immunity is retained : the subject is entitled to 
automatically self-ascribe the property of being in a certain perceptual/mnesic state, without 
any possibility of error. What the subject cannot rightly do, however, is automatically self-
ascribe the property of standing in the right relation to the content of the state : for it may be 
that he does not possess the property of seeing a flower in front of him, or of having seen the 
remembered scene in the past. Someone else may be seeing, or someone else may have seen. 
The subject entertains the state, yet what the state reveals need not concern the subject, but 
may concern someone else. 
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Failure of immunity ? 
 
The situations I have described do not happen, but they could happen ; by which I mean that 
they are conceivable. Now that very possibility raises a problem. What is to prevent us from 
construing perception as a particular form of quasi-perception, and memory as a particular 
form of quasi-memory ? In quasi-memory, the rememberer may or may not be the original 
experiencer. What Shoemaker calls the ‘previous awareness condition’ may or may not be 
satisfied. Now, in a normal case of memory, the rememberer is the original experiencer, but 
we have just conceded that things might go otherwise : the rememberer might not be the 
experiencer. Is this not sufficient to show that memory is a special case of quasi-memory, 
namely the case in which the original experiencer turns out to be the rememberer (but might 
not be) ? 
 If, following Shoemaker (1970), we accepted the conclusion that ordinary memory is 
(a special case of) quasi-memory, we would be faced with a serious problem. We would have 
to give up the claim that memory is immune to error through misidentification. As Shoemaker 
writes, 
 
The immunity of first person memory claims to error through misidentification exists 
only because remembering requires the satisfaction of the previous awareness 
condition … This feature disappears once we imagine this requirement dropped. 
Quasi-memory, unlike memory, does not preserve immunity to error through 
misidentification. (Shoemaker 1970/2003 : 28) 
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But if immunity disappears, then it can no longer be maintained that in perception and 
memory, the subject’s self-ascription of the relevant relation to what his experience represents 
is identification-free. We will have to include an identification component in the content of 
the representation, thereby contradicting our claim that what is conveyed by the experiential 
mode need not be explicitly represented in the content. 
 There are more than one way of resisting this argument, however. First, as Evans 
pointed out, an error may arise (as in the wrong connection cases) without the erroneous 
judgment resting on an identification. I will argue this point below. Second and more 
important, we must understand the modality correctly. Cases of wrong connection are 
‘possible’ only in the sense that, in some possible world w, they would happen. We should 
clearly distinguish that possible world w, in which wrong connections happen, from the actual 
world, in which they do not happen and memory and perception are immune to error through 
misidentification. A case of ‘ordinary memory’, that is, a case in which the rememberer is the 
original experiencer, would be a special case of quasi-memory in w, but in our world it is not. 
One of the things that show this is precisely the fact that memory is immune to error through 
misidentification, while quasi-memory is not. 
 
Quasi-perception in the actual world 
 
One can object that the fantastic situations we talked about may well obtain, some day, in the 
actual world. Let us assume that this is right, and consider what would happen if, in the actual 
world, an ordinary subject found himself in such a situation. 
 Consider the first case of quasi-perception I mentioned, that in which the subject is 
connected to someone else’s body, whose condition he can feel ‘from inside’. Let us suppose 
 181 
that this actually happens to some actual person. The internal mode of representation normally 
justifies that person in self-ascribing the represented property (having one’s legs crossed, 
say); but due to malfunctioning caused by the wrong connection, the self-ascription, though 
justified in view of the general design of the system, turns out to be false in that particular 
case. As Evans points out, a subject in this condition has the illusion that he stands in the right 
relation to that which his experience is about. In the case at hand, he has the illusion of being 
the person whose legs are crossed. He feels exactly as if his legs are crossed. And the 
subject’s illusory judgment that his legs are crossed is not identification-dependent. The 
falsity of the judgment does not show that its content involves a mistaken identification 
component (‘I am the person whose legs are crossed’), but simply that the subject’s 
justification in making the identification-free judgement depends upon an assumption of 
normal functioning of the system — an assumption which may well be defeated (Evans 
1982 : 187 ; Shoemaker 1986/1996 : 16). 
 Arguably, the situation is different if the subject, A, knows he is connected to B’s 
body. Knowing that the system does not work properly, he will fight against the illusion of 
being F when he internally feels F-ness. What can we say about such a case ? Should we say 
that, in that situation, A judges that F-ness is instantiated, and has to explicitly identify the 
person — B — who is felt (from inside) to be F ? 
 That is far from obvious. In a first stage, as we have seen, the subject will be under the 
illusion that he is F, and the illusion will persist even though the subject knows it is an 
illusion. After some time, arguably, the illusion will weaken. Assuming the subject can get rid 
of it, there are several possibilities. The internal experience of F-ness may simply become 
meaningless for the subject, because it provides him with no information he can reliably use. 
Or A may be able to give it a new meaning, by exploiting the connection to B’s body. For 
example, let us suppose that A has devices for remotely controlling B’s body (as in a 
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videogame), and learns to react to B’s felt F-ness by making B behave appropriately. The 
subject will progressively gain the ability to displace himself, as it were, into B’s body : he 
will feel and act through that body.
lxxv
 This is easier to imagine if we suppose that the 
subject’s perceptions are all quasi-perceptions, where it is B, not A, who is standing in the 
right relations to what is perceived. I would say that, in such a case, the subject will continue 
to self-ascribe the properties represented in the internal mode, but he will be displaced into 
B’s body. The subject will adjust to his new situation, just as a subject with inverted glasses 
does, after some time. 
 
Introducing the identification component 
 
There is a complication if we suppose that A has merely acquired an ‘auxiliary’ self which 
coexists with the subject’s main self, as a videogame character coexists with the player of the 
game. This version requires on a part of the subject an ability to switch from one perspective 
to the other. In such a case also, I would think, the subject will continue to ‘self-ascribe’ the 
relevant relation to what the experience represents, but there will be two different ‘selves’ for 
the subject to ascribe the relation to. 
 This is where an identification component comes into the picture. In the imagined 
situation, the subject has to infer which ‘self’ is at issue. This type of inference is familiar : we 
have something similar in memory. We know that a remembered experience belongs to our 
past, but often we don’t know when, in the past, the experience took place — we have to infer 
this. (This may not be the case when the memory is very fresh, and bears its freshness on its 
sleeves ; see footnote 66 below.) The same indeterminacy might affect a self-ascription : the 
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subject might have to infer which of his two ‘selves’ stands in the right relation to the content 
of the current experience. 
 Shoemaker’s quasi-memory examples are analogous but more radical than that. We 
are to imagine a world in which having a memory means that someone has experienced what 
we remember, but the memory mode does not tell us anything regarding the person who had 
the original experience. That must be inferred from the content of the experience, just as we 
infer the specific time and place of the original experience. Evans argues that if we had only 
such quasi-memories, we could never evolve a concept of ourselves (Evans 1982 : 243). That 
may be right. But in any case, the memory mode would, in such a possible world, have a 
different semantics from that of the memory mode in the actual world. In a memory state 
M(p), the mode M means that the subject of the state has perceived that p in the past (and that 
this perception has caused the present memory). In the counterfactual situation imagined by 
Shoemaker, the memory mode means that someone has had the corresponding perception in 
the past (and that this perception has caused the present memory). This sheds no more light on 
the actual semantics of memory states than the fact that we can imagine a counterfactual 
situation in which the memory mode means not only that the rememberer has had a 
corresponding perception in the past, but also that he’s had such an experience at a particular 
time and place, somehow encoded in the mode.
lxxvi
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Chapter 22 
Reflexive states 
 
 
 
Perception and memory 
 
In perception and memory, the subject of the state — the person to whose mental life the 
conscious state belongs — is identical to the person who stands in some relation R, dictated 
by the state (and in particular by its mode), to what the state represents. In visual perception, 
the relation R
vis
 is the causal-epistemic relation of seeing the state of affairs represented. In the 
internal (proprioceptive/kinaesthetic) mode, the relation R
int
 is the relation of instantiating the 
property that is represented, or, better perhaps, the relation of being the person whose 
property is represented. In episodic memory, the relation R
m
 is the relation of having 
perceived what the memory state represents.
lxxvii
 
 The mode fixes not only the nature of the relevant relation R, but also the higher-level 
relation (viz. identity) between the person bearing that relation R to what is represented and 
the person undergoing the conscious state. Shoemaker’s thought experiments involving quasi-
memory, and the analogous thought experiments involving quasi-perception, are useful 
because they enable us to single out this aspect of the contribution of the mode, namely, the 
relation of identity between the subject of the state and what, for want of a better term, I will 
call the R-filler : the person who stands in relation R to what is represented. The subject of the 
state and the R-filler are not easy to tease apart, precisely because their identity is guaranteed 
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by the architecture of the system and the nature of the state. Teasing them apart is what the 
thought-experiments do for us. 
 Because of the identity between the subject and the R-filler, perception and memory 
are reflexive states :
lxxviii
 in perception, a subject x is aware that he himself is perceiving some 
state of affairs ; through memory, the subject is aware that she herself has perceived the state 
of affairs she rememembers ; etc. In all such cases a constraint which I will later refer to as 
the ‘Reflexive Constraint’ is satisfied, and it is satisfied in virtue of the mode of 
representation. 
 
Intentions and emotions 
 
When one intends to do something, one is in a state with a content (what one intends to do) 
and a mode (the intention mode). The content of the state is an action, or rather an action 
schema : one’s doing a certain thing. Because that action is represented in the intention mode, 
the state will count as satisfied only if the subject of the state fills the agent role in the schema 
— only if he himself does the thing in question. As Shoemaker writes, « intentions have as 
their ‘intentional objects’ actions to be done by the very person who has the intention » 
(Shoemaker 1970/2003 : 47).
lxxix
 In other words, intention is a reflexive state. 
 Among the reflexive states are many emotional states, such as guilt, shame, or pride 
(Shoemaker 1970/2003 : 47 ; Higginbotham 1995 : 237). Shoemaker again : 
 
The appropriate objects of remorse, and of a central sort of pride, are past actions done 
by the very person who is remorseful or proud, and the appropriate objects of fear and 
dread, and of delighted anticipation, are events which the subject of these emotions 
envisages as happening to himself. (Shoemaker 1970/2003 : 47) 
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The words ‘delighted anticipation’ provide a ready-made analysis of the complex state they 
denote in two components : the subject’s anticipation, and the emotion of delight which that 
anticipation causes. The component state of anticipation is already reflexive because « one 
can only anticipate what is conceived to lie in one’s own future » (Higginbotham 1995 : 237). 
To be sure, we can imagine a state of ‘quasi-anticipation’ where the anticipating subject 
would be anticipating situations lying in someone else’s future. Some fortune-tellers pretend 
to have this gift of quasi-anticipation. But the emotion of delight is conditional upon the 
identity between the subject of the complex emotional state and the R-filler. If some very 
pleasant situation lies ahead in my neighbour’s future, I will not be as happy as I would if it 
lay in my own future : 
 
Even the most unselfish man, who is willing to suffer [so] that others may prosper, 
does not and cannot regard the pleasures and pains that are in prospect for him in the 
same light as he regards those that are in prospect for others. He may submit to torture, 
but he would hardly be human if he could regularly view his own future sufferings 
with the same detachment (which is not indifference) as he views the future sufferings 
of others. (Shoemaker 1970/2003 : 48) 
 
 The analysis of ‘delighted anticipation’ in two components applies to the other 
emotions discussed by Shoemaker and Higginbotham. Remorse, pride and guilt are emotions 
caused by memories of things done, where the memory mode guarantees that the remembered 
actions are actions we performed. If those actions did not belong to our own past but to 
someone else’s past — if the underlying memories were not genuine memories but quasi-
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memories — the emotions in question, to the extent that they would arise, would presumably 
be weaker than they actually are. 
Another emotional state to which the two-component analysis applies is relief. Like 
the state of delighted anticipation, being relieved that p is a complex state, involving an 
emotion (relief) and a doxastic state (the belief that p) which causes the emotion 
(Higginbotham 1995). In Prior’s example, ‘Thank Goodness that’s over’,lxxx what causes the 
emotion of relief is the belief expressed by ‘that’s over’ : the belief that a certain painful 
episode has reached its conclusion and (therefore) belongs to the past. The episode in question 
must have been painful to the subject of the relief state, and it must be past with respect to that 
very state. This shows that relief is another reflexive state. 
 
Reflexivism 
 
Reflexive states, as I have characterized them so far, are reflexive in virtue of their mode : the 
mode secures the identity between the subject of the state and the R-filler. There is immunity 
to error through misidentification precisely because the subject’s involvement is secured by 
the mode without resting on an identification. 
There is an alternative analysis of reflexive states, however. According to that 
alternative analysis, a reflexive state is a state whose content refers to the state itself. Such an 
analysis has been put forward by Higginbotham in connection with Prior’s ‘thank Goodness’ 
example. 
The object of relief is essentially tensed, according to Prior. Knowing that the 
conclusion of the painful episode takes place at a certain time brings relief only if the time in 
question is thought of in a certain way, corresponding to the use of the tense. Higginbotham 
fleshes out Prior’s scenario by imagining someone’s relief that his root canal is over 
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(Higginbotham 1995 : 226-49). When leaving the dentist’s chair, at time t* (say, Friday at 
four o’clock), the subject thinks : ‘Thank Goodness that’s over’. What brings relief is not the 
thought that the root canal is concluded at t* ; for the subject might have known previously 
that the root canal would be over by 4 o’clock, and that would not have brought the same sort 
of relief as the thought that the root canal is over. Only the tensed thought brings relief, 
because the tensed thought presents the time at which it holds as the present time. 
 In ‘Tensed Thoughts’ and subsequent papers, Higginbotham brings together the 
extensional analysis of tense discussed in Chapter 5 and Prior’s view that the content of relief 
must be tensed. According to (a simple version of) the extensional account, the proposition 
expressed by a present tense sentence such as ‘That’s over’ involves a temporal relation 
(simultaneity or overlap) between the time of the painful episode and the time of utterance.
lxxxi
 
If the subject’s relief is felt but not linguistically expressed, we must replace the time of 
utterance by the time at which the state of relief occurs. On Higginbotham’s analysis, the 
subject in Prior’s example is in a complex state of relief s, consisting of an emotion (relief) 
and a belief that causes the emotion, where the content of the belief is the proposition that the 
painful episode s’ is before s. The state is reflexive (self-referential) simply because its 
content involves a reference to the state itself. 
In ‘Remembering, Imagining, and the First Person’ (2003a) Higginbotham generalizes 
this analysis to all reflexive states. They are all states the content of which is a reflexive 
proposition involving the state itself as a constituent. Higginbotham’s view is similar to that 
held by John Perry since the early nineties. According to Perry, essentially indexical beliefs 
— the beliefs which are the most closely tied to perceptual intake and behaviour — are beliefs 
the content of which is a reflexive proposition.
lxxxii
 And of course, both Higginbotham’s and 
Perry’s views are similar to Searle’s self-referential analysis of the content of experience. 
There is a school of thought here, which we may refer to as ‘Reflexivism’. Among 
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reflexivists, I should also mention the advocates of a generalization of Reichenbach’s token-
reflexive analysis, such as Manuel Garcia-Carpintero. 
There is an important sense in which the reflexivists are right : the complete content of 
a reflexive state — its truth-conditions — cannot be spelled out without reflexively referring 
to the state itself. But I object to the temptation to think that the explicit content of the state is 
self-referential. Of course, the reflexivists do not say so, because they do not draw the 
distinction between explicit content and complete content ; but precisely, I object to their not 
drawing that distinction when they claim that the content of the state is self-referential. 
In part V, I already criticized Searle’s reflexivist analysis of perception and memory : 
the self-referential element Searle rightly detects comes from the mode, I argued, and does not 
affect the (explicit) content of the state. The same thing holds for relief. What ‘That’s over’ 
expresses is a temporal proposition, true at any time t iff the painful episode is over at t. What 
brings relief is the subject’s belief, at t*, that this proposition holds. The subject’s belief is 
indeed true iff the temporal proposition in question is true at the time of the thought episode, 
that is, at t* ; but this does not make t* (or the thought episode) a constituent of the 
proposition that is the (explicit) content of the relief-causing belief. The time t* only comes 
into the picture through the act of asserting that proposition, linguistically or mentally. 
 In part VII I will expose the limitations of the reflexivist approach. This will enable 
me to emphasize the merits of my own approach, based on the SMR framework and the 
mode/content distinction. One of those merits, as I hope I have shown, is that it provides a 
straightforward explanation of the phenomenon of immunity to error through 
misidentification. 
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Part Seven 
 
 
Relativization and Reflexivity 
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Chapter 23 
The (alleged) reflexivity of de se thoughts 
 
 
 
De re and de se 
 
If I think of a certain object, a, that it is F, I have a de re thought regarding a. The thought is 
true iff a is F, regardless of how the object a is thought about. In contrast, a descriptive (or ‘de 
dicto’) thought about a is such that the mode of presentation plays a truth-conditional role (in 
the terminology of Recanati 1993 : the mode of presentation is ‘truth-conditionally relevant’ 
in descriptive thoughts, and ‘truth-conditionally irrelevant’ in de re thoughts). Even if a turns 
out to be the strongest man in the world, the (descriptive) thought that the strongest man in the 
world can lift 150 kilos has general rather than singular truth-conditions, hence it is not 
specifically about a. Instead of being true iff a can lift 150 kilos, it is true iff there is a man x 
such that for every man y distinct from x, x is stronger than (or, perhaps, at least as strong as) 
y and x can lift 150 kilos. 
 De se thoughts are a particular case of de re thought.
lxxxiii
 A de se thought is a de re 
thought about oneself, that involves a particular mode of presentation, namely a first person 
mode of presentation. (One may entertain a de re thought about oneself that does not involve 
such a mode of presentation, as in Kaplan’s famous mirror example.lxxxiv) As Frege wrote in 
‘The thought’, « every one is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which 
he is presented to no one else » (Frege 1918-19: 25-6). I call the 'special and primitive' mode 
of presentation which occurs in first person thoughts 'EGO' or rather 'EGOx' where 'x' stands 
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for the name of the person thinking the thought (for example 'EGOLauben' in the case of first 
person thoughts about Lauben).
lxxxv
  
 Qua de re thought, a de se thought such as the thought that a would express by 
uttering ‘I am F’ is true iff a is F. Like all de re modes of presentation, the mode of 
presentation EGO
a
 does not affect the truth-conditions of the thought it occurs in. If a points to 
himself in a mirror and says ‘He is F’, the de re thought he then expresses has the same truth-
conditions as the de se thought a expresses by saying ‘I am F’: both thoughts are true iff a is 
F. But of course, the thoughts themselves are different, as they involve different modes of 
presentation — a first person mode of presentation in one case, a demonstrative, third person 
mode of presentation in the other. As a result, thinking one thought has very different 
behavioural consequences than thinking the other (see Castañeda 1999 and Perry 1993b for 
well-known examples). 
 
Ascribing de re thoughts 
 
When one ascribes a de re thought, the mode of presentation under which the ascribee thinks 
of the object (the res that his de re thought is about) may become truth-conditionally relevant. 
It becomes truth-conditionally relevant if the ascription is ‘opaque’, that is, if the ascriber 
implicitly specifies the mode of presentation under which the ascribee thinks of the object his 
thought is about.
lxxxvi
 If I say ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly’, I mean that she does 
so when she thinks of him as Superman, not when she thinks of him as Clark Kent. It is 
because the mode of presentation becomes truth-conditionally relevant in opaque ascriptions 
that one may simultaneously assert ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly’ and ‘Lois 
Lane does not believe that Clark Kent can fly’. 
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 I said that in an opaque ascription, the mode of presentation is implicitly specified. I 
said so because a sentence such as ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly’ merely 
suggests, but does not explicitly say, that Lois Lane thinks of Superman as Superman. This is 
what makes the semantics of belief reports especially problematic (and interesting): on the 
one hand we want to say that the mode of presentation affects the truth-conditions ; on the 
other hand we want to say that it has the status of ‘pragmatically imparted information’ 
(Salmon 1986) and is not explicitly contributed by some lexical item or phrase or construction 
in virtue of the semantic rules of the language. Because of these features belief reports are 
among the phenomena that call for a revision of the standard views regarding the 
semantics/pragmatics interface (Recanati 1993, 2004). 
 Yet there are a few cases in which it seems that the mode of presentation is explicitly 
contributed in virtue of the semantic rules of the language. Ascriptions of de se thoughts are a 
case in point. 
 
Ascribing de se thoughts 
 
Let us consider the following sentences : 
 
(1) Johni expects that hei will be elected 
(2) John expects that he himself will be elected 
(3) John expects to be elected 
 
In (1), the ascription may be interpreted as transparent or opaque, depending on the context. 
Transparent reading : we are told that John expects, concerning some individual who happens 
to be John himself, that he will be elected, but we are not told how he thinks of that 
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individual. Opaque reading : some particular mode of presentation is contextually specified, 
as in the Superman case. For example, it may be contextually clear that (1) is meant to report 
a de se thought of John’s. What (1) contextually says, on that reading, is that John has an 
expectation he might express by saying ‘I will be elected’. But the contextually specified 
mode of presentation may not be a first person mode of presentation. It may be contextually 
clear that John’s expectation concerns the man now speaking on TV, who (unbeknown to 
John) happens to be John himself. On that reading what (1) contextually says is that John 
expects that man (who happens to be himself) to be elected. Here John might express his 
expectation by saying ‘That man will be elected’, but not by saying ‘I will be elected’. (We 
can construct a scenario in which John expects the man he sees on TV to be elected, but does 
not himself expect to be elected.) 
 It is often said that the emphatic reflexive ‘he himself’ in (2) disambiguates (1) and 
imposes the de se reading. On this view (2) can only report a de se thought of John’s, a 
thought John himself could express by saying ‘I will be elected’ (see e.g. Corazza 2004: 280-
281). In the first paper ever written on this topic, Geach described ‘he himself’, so interpreted, 
as « an oratio obliqua proxy for the first person pronoun of oratio recta » (Geach 1957 : 129). 
Some years later Castañeda devoted a series of papers to such proxies, which he dubbed 
‘quasi-indicators’. A quasi-indicator not only imposes an opaque interpretation of the report it 
occurs in, but imposes a specific opaque interpretation such that the ascribee thinks of the 
object his thought is about in the first person way. Assuming ‘he himself’ is a quasi-indicator, 
(2) means that John expects John, thought of under the mode of presentation EGOJohn, to be 
elected. 
 I agree that (2) strongly suggests that what is being reported is a de se thought, 
because it is hard to interpret the emphatic reflexive otherwise. But this interpretation is not, 
strictly speaking, mandatory. (Nor has Geach or Castañeda ever claimed that it was.) One can 
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imagine contexts in which (2) would not report a de se thought, and that shows that ‘he 
himself’ is not a ‘quasi-indicator’ in virtue of the rules of the language, but simply has quasi-
indicator uses, like the unadorned third person pronoun ‘he’.lxxxvii If this is true, then the 
difference between (1) and (2) is not as great as one may have thought. 
 Still, there is a way of disambiguating (1) and imposing the de se reading by purely 
linguistic means. As various authors have argued, following Chierchia (1989), what 
distinguishes sentence (3) from (1), and perhaps also from (2), is that (3) can only be 
interpreted as opaquely ascribing a de se thought. 
 
PRO as a quasi-indicator 
 
Sentence (3) is usually analysed as involving a covert anaphoric element, PRO, as subject of 
the infinitive clause, with the subject of the main clause as antecedent. So (3) says that John 
expects PRO to be elected, where PRO inherits its reference from the antecedent ‘John’. 
Besides being anaphoric on the subject of the higher clause, a second essential feature of PRO 
is that it imposes an interpretation of the complement clause as denoting a de se thought. Thus 
(3) reports a de se expectation, and (4) or (5), which use (almost) the same construction with 
PRO,
lxxxviii
 also ascribe to the subject, John, a state whose content is irreducibly first 
personal : 
 
(4) John remembers PRO being elected 
(5) John imagines PRO being elected 
 
This can be seen by contrasting (4) and (5) with ‘John remembers himself being elected’ and 
‘John imagines himself being elected’ respectively : these sentences can be given a non-de se 
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reading, while (4) and (5) cannot (Higginbotham 2003a : 510-512). In (4) and (5), what is 
remembered or imagined can only be about the subject, i.e. the very person imagining or 
remembering, not only in the de facto sense that it is John whose election is remembered or 
imagined by John, but in the stronger sense that John, the person the memory/imagining is 
about, is thought of as the person currently remembering or imagining. This is where the de 
se element comes from, according to Higginbotham. It is not simply that John has a thought 
about John : he has a thought reflexively concerning the thinker of that thought. Not only is 
the individual the thought is about the same as the individual who has the thought, but that 
individual is thought of as the individual who has the thought. This suggests to Higginbotham 
the following analysis of PRO : 
 
Following the analogy of reflexive thoughts with respect to time, (…) we identify as 
the peculiar semantic contribution of PRO that it presents the subject as the subject (or 
experiencer) of the event or state e as given in the higher clause, or (e) for short. 
(Higginbotham 2003a : 514) 
 
Higginbotham therefore analyses (3), (4) and (5) as (6), (7) and (8) respectively : 
 
(6) e1 Expects [John, e1, ^(e2) Is-elected ((e1), e2)] 
(7) e1 Remembers [John, e1, ^(e2) Is-elected ((e1), e2)] 
(8) e1 Imagines [John, e1, ^(e2) Is-elected ((e1), e2)] 
 
Here ‘e
1
’ and ‘e
2
’ are Davidsonian event variables, which Higginbotham, like Parsons, uses to 
stand for states as well as for events properly speaking. Leaving temporal considerations 
aside, (6), (7) and (8) say that there is a state e
1
 of expecting, remembering or imagining 
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whose subject (experiencer) is John, and whose content is the proposition that there is a state 
or event e
2
 of being elected whose subject is the subject of e
1
. Analysing the semantic 
contribution of PRO in this way guarantees both the anaphoric link between PRO and the 
subject of the higher clause and the first personal quality of the thought denoted by the 
complement clause. 
 
De se thoughts as reflexive thoughts 
 
Higginbotham’s analysis of ascriptions of de se thoughts yields an analysis of de se thoughts 
themselves. A de se thought is a thought containing the special mode of presentation EGO, 
which we can now analyse as a sort of mental PRO. To think of an individual as oneself 
(EGO), one has to think of him or her as the thinker of that very thought. Just as Prior’s 
relieving thought ‘That’s over’ is, for Higginbotham, a mental state e whose content is the 
reflexive proposition that the painful event — the root canal, say — is temporally located 
before e (chapter 22), the de se thought expressed by ‘I am F’ is a mental event e whose 
content is the reflexive proposition that (e) — the thinker of this very thought — is F. 
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Chapter 24 
Reflexivity : internal or external ? 
 
 
 
Two approaches 
 
As I emphasized when I discussed Searle’s views, I think whatever reflexivity characterizes 
experiential states such as perception or memory is external and comes from the mode of 
representation. The content of the representation, in the narrow sense in which ‘content’ 
contrasts with ‘mode’, is not reflexive. Thus I disagree with Higginbotham’s analysis, which 
construes the relevant reflexivity as internal to content. 
 For Higginbotham, the subject who remembers having been elected entertains a 
memory e
1
 the content of which is the following proposition : 
 
(1) (e2) Is-elected ((e1), e2) & e2 < e1 
 
The proposition in question is doubly reflexive : it refers to the subject who undergoes the 
memory state of which it is the content, and it locates the remembered event e
2  as anterior to 
that memory state (‘<’ is the relation of temporal precedence). 
 I would offer a much simpler analysis. I take the content of the subject’s memory to be 
simply the event of being elected. In the Davidsonian framework favoured by Higginbotham, 
this simple content can be represented as (2) : 
 
(2) (e) Is-elected (x, e) 
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This is both a temporal and a personal proposition.
lxxxix
 (2) is the proposition that one is 
elected — a proposition which (given a fixed world) is true at all and only those person-time 
pairs <x, t> such that x is elected at t. A memory with that proposition as content is true tout 
court iff the proposition is true with respect to the subject who remembers and the time of the 
original experience from which the memory derives. It follows that if John has, at time t*, a 
memory whose content is (2), John’s memory is true only if John has been elected prior to t*. 
On this view, both the pastness of the remembered event and the subject’s involvement in that 
event derive from the fact that what is represented is represented in the memory mode. 
 
Implicit and explicit de se thoughts 
 
The same ‘externalization’ move can be made (and, I will argue, must be made) with respect 
to de se thoughts. 
 In the SMR framework, there are two types of de se thought : implicit and explicit. An 
explicit de se thought is a thought the (explicit) content of which involves an ‘identification 
component’, through which the object thought about is identified as oneself. The subject who 
sees himself in the mirror and thinks ‘My legs are crossed’ entertains such a thought, and 
explicitly thinks of the person whose legs are crossed as being herself. (As Evans would put 
it, the content of the thought is conjunctive : Someone’s legs are crossed, and I am that 
person.) Here the concept EGO occurs on the side of the lekton, so the thought may be said to 
be internally de se. In contrast, implicit de se thoughts are identification-free, and they are de 
se only externally: no concept EGO occurs as part of the lekton. The lekton is a personal 
proposition, without any constituent corresponding to the person to whom a property is 
ascribed. The first person comes into the picture only at the evaluation stage : to assert a 
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personal proposition is to present it as true with respect to oneself and the present time. Since 
a personal proposition is a property of person-time pairs, for someone to assert such a 
proposition is, in effect, to self-ascribe the property that occurs on the side of the lekton (Loar 
1976 : 358 ; Lewis 1979a ; Chisholm 1979, 1981). Here, the self-ascription introduces an 
element of reflexivity (since the property that is the content of the assertion is ascribed to the 
person who makes the assertion) but it is external to content : it comes from the assertive 
mode. 
 
The importance of implicit de se thoughts 
 
The distinction between implicit and explicit de se thoughts accounts for the observation that 
some, but not all of our de se thoughts have the property of immunity to error through 
misidentification. When, looking at the mirror and seeing my legs crossed, I think ‘My legs 
are crossed’, I entertain a de se thought — a thought about myself in which I think of myself 
‘in the first person’ — yet the thought is not immune to error through misidentification. 
According to the SMR account, immunity to error through misidentification follows from the 
fact that (only) implicit de se thoughts are identification-free, since they do not involve the 
concept of self on the lekton side. 
 The notion of an implicit de se thought in which the self is not represented (Perry 
1986b) is important not only to understand the phenomenon of immunity to error through 
misidentification, but also to understand the concept of self that occurs in explicit de se 
thoughts. Indeed, the ability to entertain implicit de se thoughts is arguably a necessary 
condition for anyone to evolve the concept EGO. That is so because, as suggested by Evans, 
Perry, and myself following them, the concept EGO is best construed as a repository for 
information gained in a first person way (a repository which, in virtue of the Generality 
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Constraint which applies to concepts, is also hospitable to information concerning the same 
object as information gained in the first person way — see Recanati 1993 : 123-25). Now a 
piece of information is gained in the first person way if and only if it is the content of an 
implicit de se thought. It follows that the first step in an elucidation of the concept of self is a 
correct analysis of the functioning of implicit de se thoughts.
xc
 
 
Higginbotham on immunity 
 
As we saw in chapter 23, Higginbotham treats the concept EGO as a mental equivalent of 
PRO analysable as ‘the thinker of this very thought’. One prima facie advantage of this 
analysis is that it makes the mental indexical EGO similar to the linguistic indexical ‘I’, and 
extends to the former Reichenbach’s token-reflexive analysis of the latter.xci One prima facie 
disadvantage is that the distinction between implicit and explicit de se thoughts is not 
available, in the reflexivist framework as spelled out by Higginbotham : all de se thoughts are 
seen as involving the EGO concept, that is, (e). How, then, can the phenomenon of immunity 
to error through misidentification — and its failure in an entire class of cases — be accounted 
for ? Higginbotham cannot account for it by appealing to the identification-free character of 
implicit de se thoughts, since he does not acknowledge the existence of such thoughts. 
 Higginbotham offers another explanation of the phenomenon. His discussion of 
immunity to error through misidentification is brief, and I am not sure I understand him 
correctly, but my (tentative) interpretation of what he says is the following. The concept ‘the 
subject of this state’ that the subject uses in thinking about himself is used, as it were, 
attributively when the thought is immune to error through misidentification: the subject refers 
to the subject of the state, whoever s/he is. Since that is so, no identification mistake can be 
made. In the famous Donnellan example, no error of identification can be made by saying 
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‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ when ‘Smith’s murderer’ is used attributively (Donnellan 1966). 
Errors of identification can occur only if one uses the description referentially to talk about, 
say, Jones : in such a case the speaker exploits the additional premiss that Jones is Smith’s 
murderer, and that premiss may turn out to be false. In attributive uses there is no such 
additional premiss, so the judgment is, in a certain sense, identification-free even though, in a 
weaker sense, the object the thought is about is ‘identified’ as Smith’s murderer. 
 On Higginbotham’s account as I understand it, failures of immunity in first person 
thoughts are similarly traced to the fact that the subject does not primarily or exclusively think 
of the person the thought is about as (e), but in some other way. The use of the first person 
in such cases is justified by the additional belief that the object identified in that other way is 
identical to (e). So a de se belief is involved, and it exhibits the property of immunity which 
derives from employment of the reflexive concept (e), but it is only one element in a 
complex belief state which involves also non-de se elements (such as the belief that the 
person in the mirror has his legs crossed). If the speaker only thought of himself, i.e. (e), as 
having his legs crossed, his self-ascription would be immune to error through 
misidentification ; but the subject who sees himself in the mirror also thinks of himself as the 
person in the mirror, and that is the source of the failure : the judgment that the person in the 
mirror is (e) may well be mistaken, hence the de se belief based on it — the belief that 
(e)’s legs are crossed — is susceptible to error through misidentification. In attributive uses 
the de se judgment is not based upon such an additional premiss, so the judgment is, in a 
certain sense, identification-free even though, in a weaker sense, the object the thought is 
about is ‘identified’ as (e). 
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Chapter 25 
What is wrong with Reflexivism 
 
 
 
 
Higginbotham and the blindsighted neuroscientist 
 
Let us consider the following passage where Higginbotham summarizes his views regarding 
de se thoughts and their immunity to error through misidentification: 
 
What is the reason for immunity to error through misidentification in the case of 
thinking, on the basis of a present perception, ‘I hear trumpets’ ? I shall assume it is 
this : that when I am in the relevant perceptual state, what I think is that the subject of 
that state hears trumpets. Hence, there can be no question of my identifying myself as 
the subject of the state. (Higginbotham 2003a : 507) 
 
 The example of the blindsighted neuroscientist from chapter 20 is a prima facie 
counterexample to this analysis. The blindsighted neuroscientist is, and knows he is, in a 
visual state e
1
 which, because of his condition, is not available to his consciousness. Knowing 
that he is in that state, and thinking of himself as the person currently in that state, he 
conjectures (from the sounds he is hearing) that what he sees is a canary. So he has a thought 
the content of which is : that the subject of e
1
 — the visual state he is actually in — is seeing a 
canary. It seems that Higginbotham’s conditions are satisfied : the subject is in the relevant 
visual state, and he thinks the subject of that state sees a canary. Yet, as we have seen, the 
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judgment is clearly not immune to misidentification if it is formed on the basis of the sounds 
the subject is hearing (at the same time as he blindly sees the canary).
xcii
 
 In response, Higginbotham might point out, correctly I think, that we do not have 
genuine reflexivity in that example, since the subject’s thought that the subject of e
1
 sees a 
canary is not the same mental state as e
1
 itself. The state e
1
 is the visual state of (blindly) 
seeing the canary. The thought is simultaneous with the visual state and accompanies it, but it 
is not identical to it. 
 In the ordinary cases Higginbotham has in mind — when, for example, the subject 
hears trumpets and judges that he hears trumpets — there is also a distinction between the 
perceptual state and the judgment. The judgment accompanies the perceptual state and is, 
perhaps, an aspect of that state, but it is not identical to it. Still, there is a relevant difference 
between a normal episode of hearing trumpets and the rather abnormal situation of the 
blindsighted neuroscientist who judges from the sounds he hears that he is seeing a canary. In 
the former case, it makes sense to say that the judgment that the subject hears trumpets is an 
aspect (a part) of his auditory experience. This is enough to render the experience reflexive 
since the judgment, which (on this assumption) is part of the overall experience, refers to the 
subject of the experience. In the blindsighted neuroscientist case, in contrast, the subject’s 
judgement that he sees a canary cannot be considered as an aspect (a part) of his perceptual 
experience. The subject’s judgment is clearly not part of his auditory experience, since it is 
inferentially based on it. Nor is it part of his visual experience — since, not being conscious 
of seeing, the subject does not have anything that may count as a ‘visual experience’. So we 
may accept that in a normal perceptual episode, the judgment that one is perceiving what one 
is (conscious of) perceiving is an aspect of the perceptual experience, thereby guaranteeing 
reflexivity (the judgment refers to the experience of which it is a part). No reflexivity is 
achieved in the blindsighted neuroscientist case because the visual state is not conscious and 
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the subject’s judgment that he is seeing a canary is not an aspect of his visual experience. The 
judgment refers to the subject of the visual state, but the visual state is disjoint from the 
conscious mental state to which the judgment belongs. 
 
The crucial objection 
 
Even though the counterexample ultimately fails, it reveals what I take to be a fundamental 
problem for Higginbotham’s account (and Reflexivism more generally). According to the 
reflexivist account, to have a de se thought is to be in a mental state the content of which is 
the proposition that the subject of that state is F (for some value of ‘F’). Similarly, to have a 
tensed thought is to be in a mental state the content of which is the proposition that the time of 
the state is F. Mental indexicality thus reduces to reflexivity. To this attempted reduction I 
object that Higginbotham’s conditions are not sufficient. A further condition must be 
satisfied, without which the account does not work : Not only must the state e
1
 the subject is 
in have a reflexive content (including a reference to that very state), but it must be a fully 
conscious state. That means at least that (i) the state must be conscious (the subject must be 
experientially aware of it), (ii) the subject must be aware of it as a state of his own (the subject 
must self-ascribe the state), and (iii) he must be aware that he is presently experiencing the 
state. If any of these conditions fails, that is, if the state e
1
 the subject is in is not fully 
conscious, then, even if its content is reflexive in the right way, the state will not count as a de 
se thought or a tensed thought or whatever it is that Higginbotham is trying to analyse. 
 If justified, this objection is rather devastating, for the extra condition required to 
make the analysis work also makes the analysis superfluous. In order to analyse what it is for 
a thought to be about oneself or about the present, Higginbotham presents complex conditions 
on the content of the mental state, but then it turns out that there is an additional condition : 
 206 
the state itself must be fully self-conscious, that is, the subject must think of it as a state he 
himself is in at the present time ! The entire analysandum reappears in the extra condition that 
must be added to the analysans to make it work.
xciii
 No objection, I think, could be more 
devastating than this one. 
 Of course, I have only stated the objection. I have not provided any support for it. The 
support actually comes from the counterexamples which the objection inspires. The 
counterexamples in question are examples in which the subject is in a certain state with the 
sort of reflexive content which Higginbotham presents as sufficient to get the right type of 
thought, but where the state is not fully self-conscious. If, in such circumstances, we do not 
get the right type of thought, this is evidence that Higginbotham’s account fails and that the 
extra condition required to make it work (self-consciousness) makes the whole account 
superfluous. 
 The blindsighted neuroscientist case was an attempt at constructing such a 
counterexample. It was a case in which the mental state the subject is in is not a conscious 
state. The attempt fails because, as we have seen, the proposition which is supposed to 
provide the reflexive content of the state is not really reflexive since the state it refers to is 
disjoint from the state to the content of which it belongs. So the counterexample fails, but the 
general objection stands, and we only have to construct other counterexamples : 
counterexamples in which the state is conscious, but not fully self-conscious in the sense 
required for Higginbotham’s account to deliver the right results. 
 
De se thoughts and schizophrenia 
 
Let us suppose that the state e
1
 the subject is in is conscious, in such a way that its content (to 
the effect that the subject of e
1
 is F) is truly reflexive, contrary to what happens in the 
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previous example ; but let us suppose the subject is a schizophrenic patient who believes that, 
among the mental states he is conscious of, some are not really his mental states, but those of 
some other person that have been somehow implanted in him. Let us refer to them as the 
subject’s ‘alien’ states, and, for any such state, to its putative owner as ‘the Other’. Suppose 
the subject takes the state e
1
 to be an alien state. The state e
1 
might be, for example, the state of 
thinking the following thought : ‘The owner of this mental state is good and omnipotent’ (or  
equivalently : ‘I am good and omnipotent’). The schizophrenic subject in whose mental life 
this thought occurs will understand that the Other — the person from whom the thought 
emanates — declares himself/herself to be good and omnipotent. If he thinks his psychiatrist 
is the Other, he will tentatively ascribe the property of being good and omnipotent to the 
psychiatrist, not to himself. This is a counterexample, because the subject is in a certain state 
(he consciously entertains a certain thought), the content of the state reflexively refers to the 
subject of the state (whom the deluded subject takes to be different from what it actually is), 
yet the subject does not entertain a de se thought, to the effect that he himself is good and 
omnipotent. What this shows is that being in a state with a reflexive content is not sufficient 
to ground a self-ascription, let alone an immune self-ascription. The state, as we have seen, 
must be conscious, but even that is not sufficient : the subject must not only be conscious of 
the state, he must be conscious of being the subject of the state (the ‘owner’ of the thought). 
 Higginbotham briefly considers the type of case I have just discussed : 
 
Could a person x be in a state e of imagining being F without recognizing that x = 
(e), the subject of the property of events being imagined ? If this can happen, then 
perhaps, as tentatively suggested in Campbell (1999), that person would have thoughts 
of which he did not seem to himself to be the author. In any case, it seems safe to 
assume that any such condition would be pathological. (Higginbotham 2003a : 520) 
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Pathological, indeed ; but that does not save Higginbotham from the counterexample. What 
the example shows is that it is not sufficient for entertaining a de se thought to entertain a 
thought with a reflexive content involving the concept (e). An additional condition must be 
satisfied : the subject must self-ascribe the property of being the owner of that reflexive 
thought. That self-ascription, which Higginbotham’s account presupposes, is external to the 
reflexive content in terms of which Higginbotham attempts to account for de se thoughts. To 
be sure, that ‘external’ self-ascription is automatic for normal subjects, and fails only in 
pathological cases ; but its existence is sufficient to refute Higginbotham’s analysis of de se 
thoughts in terms of a purely internal property of their content (its alleged reflexivity). 
 
Richard’s counterexample 
 
In ‘Objects of Relief’, Mark Richard has constructed a similar counterexample to 
Higginbotham’s analysis of tensed thoughts as reflexive thoughts referring to the time of the 
thought (Richard 2003b). Richard’s scenario is the following: 
 
Suppose that I am given to particularly vivid recall of things that have happened in the 
past. (…) Not only do I on occasion so recall external events, but on occasion I have, 
or at least believe that I have, such recollections of my internal reactions to them. For 
example, I at times recall (without trying) hearing the tolling of the midnight bells and 
occurrently thinking, ‘This [the bell tolling] marks midnight’. On some such 
occasions, I take the entire episode to be a memory, of my experience of the bells and 
my mental reaction thereto ; on others, I am unsure whether I am recalling something 
past or not. (Richard 2003b : 168) 
 209 
 
In this setting, imagine the following situation : Richard hears a sound with characteristics M, 
and as part of his auditory experience e, judges that there is a sound with characteristics M 
audible at the time and place of e. However, because of his special condition, Richard 
mistakes his current perceptual experience (including the reflexive judgment that is part of it) 
for a vivid memory of an earlier perception (including the reflexive judgment that was part of 
it). He wrongly thinks he is recalling an earlier perceptual experience rather than currently 
having one.
xciv
 In such a case, Richard will fail to think of the sound as present, even though, 
in having the auditory experience e, he thinks of the sound as simultaneous with e (which he 
mistakenly locates in the past.) This establishes that, to think of something as present, it is not 
sufficient to think of it as simultaneous with the state of one’s so thinking ; for one may 
temporally mislocate the state of one’s so thinking. As Richard concludes 
 
What makes Higginbotham’s account plausible is the fact that a reflexive state indeed 
is normally one that presents itself as present. But, as I hope the argument has made 
clear, thinking reflexively of a state is only normally, not necessarily, thinking of it as 
present. (Richard 2003b : 170)
xcv
 
 
 In his response to Richard, Higginbotham surprisingly concedes the point. He accepts 
that his conditions are not sufficient, and that the extra condition which must be added to 
them (self-consciousness) makes the whole analysis at least look superfluous : 
 
The feeling of relief presupposes an element of self-consciousness, an element that is 
masked when one considers only public utterances, which by their nature are self-
conscious acts. (…) The state of being relieved involves the state itself as a constituent 
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of the object of relief, and demands also the location of that state as present… But 
now that the latter point has been made explicit, it can be questioned whether the 
apparatus of cross-reference was essential to begin with. (Higginbotham 2003b : 193-
4) 
 
Higginbotham still defends his analysis by arguing that it provides a key to the linguistic 
phenomenon of ‘sequence of tenses’. Be that as it may, I take Reflexivism to be refuted by the 
counterexamples. Other phenomena will be discussed in part VIII (chapters 26 and 27), which 
can be accounted for in the SMR framework but arguably not in a reflexivist framework. 
 
APPENDIX : WHAT IS RIGHT WITH REFLEXIVISM 
 
In the challenging report he wrote about this book for Oxford University Press, Manuel 
Garcia-Carpintero argues that Reflexivism can be saved, by appealing to the very distinctions 
which, he says, I show everybody needs (between explicit and implicit de se thoughts, and 
between the two levels of content). For example, the complete content of the blindsighted 
neuroscientist’s thought ‘I am seeing a canary’ can be made explicit as ‘I hear that I am 
seeing a canary’ (or, in Carpintero’s own terms, as ‘I believe that I am seeing a canary’). Only 
this complete content, Carpintero argues, should be rendered according to the reflexivist 
proposal. On this view Reflexivism is vindicated because it can be shown that (implicit) de se 
thoughts are, indeed, thoughts the complete content of which can be rendered as a reflexive 
proposition. The counterexamples vanish, because they are all cases in which a certain 
reflexive proposition is the explicit content, but not the complete content, of the thought 
episode under analysis. 
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In Garcia-Carpintero’s revised reflexivist framework, ‘(e)’ refers to the thinker of the 
higher-order thought that captures the complete content of the state. So we can maintain that 
the subject thinks of himself reflexively as ‘the thinker of this thought’ — even in the 
schizophrenic example — provided ‘this thought’ refers to the inclusive, higher-order thought 
capturing the complete content of the state. (In the schizophrenic example, according to 
Garcia-Carpintero, the higher-order thought is the subject’s judgment that the Other declares 
himself good and omnipotent). Similarly, we can maintain that to think of an event as present 
is to think of it as contemporary with the thought itself, provided ‘the thought itself’ again 
refers to the inclusive, higher-order thought capturing the complete content of the state. In 
Richard’s example, Carpintero points out, the tolling of the bells is thought of as 
contemporary with the experience but not with the higher-order judgment that this experience 
is a perception or a memory. 
 I agree that Reflexivism can be defended along such lines.
xcvi
 I already conceded that 
 
There is an important sense in which the reflexivists are right : the complete content of 
a reflexive state — its truth-conditions — cannot be spelled out without reflexively 
referring to the state itself. (p. 00) 
 
So I grant that the complete content of the relevant states can be rendered as a reflexive 
proposition. With this attenuated version of Reflexivism I have no quarrel — indeed, I 
endorse it — but this is not the doctrine I referred to as ‘Reflexivism’ and criticized in this 
chapter. The form of Reflexivism I criticized embodies the idea that a reflexive state (or a de 
se thought) just is a state (or a thought) the content of which is suitably reflexive. To this I 
object that, if one were to explicitly think the reflexive proposition that is said to capture the 
complete content of a reflexive state, one would not thereby be in such a state.
xcvii
 As Garcia-
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Carpintero himself acknowledges, only if the reflexive proposition in question is the complete 
content of a state does the state in question count as reflexive in the relevant sense. What does 
the work of accounting for the peculiarities of reflexive states here is not, or not merely, the 
notion of a reflexive proposition : to make Garcia-Carpintero’s point and get rid of the 
counterexamples, we need the mode/content distinction and the correlative distinction 
between two levels of content. 
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Part Eight 
 
 
The first person point of view
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Chapter 26 
De se thoughts and subjectivity 
 
 
 
Three types of case 
 
We have distinguished having a de re belief about an individual x who happens to be oneself, 
and having a true de se belief. In Kaplan’s example, the subject who (unbeknown to him) 
points to himself in the mirror and says ‘His pants are on fire’ has a de re belief which is 
about himself, as a matter of fact, but which is not a true de se belief. When he realizes that he 
is the person in the mirror, he stands corrected : ‘My pants are on fire’, he now says, and that 
expresses a genuine de se thought. The de se thought in question is ‘explicit’ : it rests on an 
identification (the person in the mirror = EGO). Even if one does not accept the SMR 
framework with its distinction between implicit and explicit de se thoughts, there is an 
empirical difference between two sorts of de se thought : those that are immune to error 
through misidentification and those that are not. However, I will assume the SMR framework 
and continue to refer to such thoughts as ‘implicit and ‘explicit’ de se thoughts. 
 So we end up with a double distinction : (i) a first distinction between de re thoughts 
about oneself that are not de se,
xcviii
 and true de se thoughts ; and (ii) a second distinction 
between explicit de se thoughts, which are subject to error through misidentification, and 
implicit de se thoughts, which are immune to such errors. (See Ludwig 2005 : 111-13 for a 
clear statement of the resulting three-fold distinction.) 
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De se reports and their readings 
 
There is a clear semantic difference between (1) and (2) : 
 
(1) He remembers himself delivering a speech to the salesmen 
(2) He remembers delivering a speech to the salesmen 
 
The difference can be summarized as follows : Reports using the PRO construction, like (2), 
can only be reports of implicit de se thoughts, while reports using a reflexive pronoun, like 
(1), are ‘unmarked’ and can be interpreted in any of the three ways. 
 Suppose the subject, A, was filmed delivering a speech to an assembly of salesmen. 
He retained no memory of that experience, but, having recently seen the film, remembers the 
episode from the film. At this point there are two possibilities : he  may have identified 
himself as the person in the film, or he may not. If he has, this is an ‘explicit de se’ type of 
case. The thought is de se, but subject to error through misidentification. (The subject may 
have been wrong in identifying himself with the character in the film.) If he has not identified 
himself as the person in the film, this is a de re type of case : the subject who remembers the 
scene in the film remembers himself giving the speech, without realizing it is himself that his 
memory (and the film) is about. Sentence (1) is compatible with both cases, and it is also 
compatible with the ‘implicit de se’ type of case, that is, the case in which the subject has 
retained first person memories of the original experience, without the mediation of the film. 
 In contrast to (1), which has all these interpretations, (2) can only have a de se 
interpretation. The de re interpretation is ruled out. Moreover, it seems that only the implicit 
de se interpretation is possible.
xcix
 So the semantic distinction between the two constructions 
does not correlate in any simple way with either of the two distinctions we made : that 
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beween de re and de se thoughts, and that beween two types of de se thought. The first 
construction is unmarked and compatible with all interpretations (including the de re 
interpretation) while the second construction specifically requires the implicit de se reading. 
 
First person and third person point of view 
 
There is yet another distinction : between the first person or subjective point of view and the 
third person or objective point of view. Both the de re case and the explicit de se case involve 
the third person point of view. The subject who remembers himself from the film, whether or 
not he has identified the character in the film as himself, has a third person point of view on 
the scene : he sees himself objectively from outside, as a spectator does. In contrast, the 
subject who directly remembers giving the speech to the salesmen, without the mediation of 
the film, has first person memories. He subjectively remembers what it was like to give the 
speech. (See Figure 2) 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 According to Vendler (1979), both types of case are, in a certain sense, subjective. 
Episodic memory is always memory of an experience, hence something subjective and 
perspectival. But in one case the experience is, directly, the experience of, say, giving the 
speech to the salesmen, while in the other case (the ‘objective’ case) the experience is that of 
seeing the character in the film giving a speech to the salesmen. Both experiences are 
intrinsically subjective, but in one case the character giving the speech stands as an ‘object’ in 
the subjectively experienced scene, while in the other case the person giving the speech is not 
‘in’ the remembered scene : he is (only) the experiencer — the person whose experience is 
remembered — and has the same status as that of the spectator of the film. 
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Accounting for subjectivity 
 
The PRO construction, which imposes the ‘implicit de se’ reading, also imposes the first 
person point of view. Why? In Higginbotham’s framework, the connection between on the 
one hand immunity (which distinguishes implicit from explicit de se cases) and, on the other 
hand, first person point of view, is stipulated. Higginbotham assumes that the semantic 
contribution of PRO is a complex mode of presentation analysable in two distinct features : 
one feature (which Higginbotham represents as ‘(e)’) accounts for immunity, while the other 
(which Higginbotham represents as ‘(e’)’) accounts for the subjective or first person point of 
view : 
 
When one remembers or imagines PRO being F, then the linguistic element PRO is 
distinguished in two ways : (i) by being understood as the thing (e) that is in the state 
e of remembering or imagining itself ; and (ii) by being at the same time understood as 
the bearer of the thematic role (e’) as determined through the selection for the subject 
of the predicate F(e’) (so in general that (e)= (e’) is presupposed). I shall abbreviate 
this dual role of PRO as ‘(e) & (e’)’. (…) We thus bring about the fact that… the 
subject cannot make an error of misidentification, and the fact that what is 
remembered [or imagined] is remembered [or imagined] as an action performed. 
(Higginbotham 2003a : 518) 
 
This, however, is a purely descriptive move. No explanation is provided for there being such a 
conjunction of features. The conjunction is taken as a brute fact. 
In the SMR framework an explanation is provided. Immunity and subjectivity are seen 
to derive from a common source. In the implicit de se reading the lekton is a personal 
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proposition. This guarantees immunity (since no identification component is involved). But it 
also guarantees the subjective point of view : not being a constituent of the scene represented, 
the subject himself cannot be construed objectively and can only have the role of the 
spectator, i.e. that of the person from whose point of view the scene is experienced. 
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Chapter 27 
Memory and the imagination 
 
 
 
 
Crossmodal comparison 
 
The typology of cases I have just presented in chapter 26 is appropriate for the memory mode. 
If we change the mode, the typology will possibly change. So, for example, if we leave 
memory and turn to the imaginative mode, which is similar to memory in many respects, we 
find a couple of differences. 
Let us consider the similarities first. We find the same type of contrast between (3) and (4) 
as we found between (1) and (2), repeated below : 
 
(1) John remembered himself giving a speech to the salesmen 
(2) John remembered giving a speech to the salesmen 
 
(3) John imagined himself giving a speech to the salesmen 
(4) John imagined giving a speech to the salesmen 
 
Like (2), (4) can only have a reading where what is imagined is imagined ‘in the first person’. 
The imaginer puts himself in the shoes of the person giving the speech and feels, or tries to 
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(imaginatively) feel, like that person undergoing the relevant experience. First person 
imagination is just like first person memory. 
 In the case of memory we saw that, in contrast to (2), (1) was compatible with ‘third 
person’ memories mediated by the film. This seems to be true of (3) as well, in contrast to (4). 
I can certainly ‘imagine myself giving the speech’ from a third person, external point of view 
— by having the mental camera look at me from outside, as it were. This is 
phenomenologically different from imagining giving the speech. 
 At the beginning of his paper on imagination, Vendler emphasizes the 
phenomenological difference between third person and first person imagination, 
corresponding to the contrast between (3) and (4) : 
 
We are looking down upon the ocean from a cliff. The water is rough and cold, yet 
there are some swimmers riding the waves. « Just imagine swimming in that water » 
says my friend, and I know what to do. « Brr ! » I say as I imagine the cold, the salty 
taste, the tug of the current, and so forth. Had he said « Just imagine yourself 
swimming in that water », I could comply in another way too : by picturing myself 
being tossed about, a scrawny body bobbing up and down in the foamy waste. In this 
case, I do not have to leave the cliff in imagination : I may see myself, if I so choose, 
from the very same perspective. Not so in the previous case : if I indeed imagine being 
in the water, then I may see the cliff above me, but not myself from it. » (Vendler 
1979 : 161) 
 
This illustrates what, following Vendler, I said earlier about the subjective and the objective : 
the objective imagination is a particular case of the subjective, namely the case in which the 
subject imagines seeing himself swim in the water. In that special case the subject plays two 
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roles : he is not only the experiencer, the person from whose point of view the scene is seen, 
but he is also an object in the scene. This duality enables the subject to look at himself 
(herself) from an external, third person point of view. In contrast, the subjective case is the 
case in which the subject only plays the role of experiencer : s/he is not an object, an aspect of 
what is represented. What is represented is only « the cold, the salty taste, the tug of the 
current, and so forth ». 
 So much for the similarity between imagination (and imagination reports) and memory 
(and memory reports). Now, to the differences. 
 
De re imaginings 
 
What one’s perception or memory is about is often determined by external factors of which 
we are unaware, like the identity of the object who stands in the right causal-epistemic 
relation to us. With imagination, the situation is different. What determines what one’s 
imagination is about is not some external fact of which one may be unaware, but what 
Bernard Williams aptly called one’s ‘imaginative project’ (Williams 1973). So, when we turn 
from perception and memory to imagination, it seems that we loose the de re case, that is, the 
case in which I represent something about myself without realizing that it is myself whom the 
representation is about. If this is right, (3) does not have as many interpretations as (1). I can 
hardly ‘imagine myself being F’ without realizing that it is myself whom I am imagining 
being F. 
 This is not quite right, however. The thinker’s imaginative project itself may be de re. 
Thus, as John Hawthorne pointed out to me, a subject may entertain a de re thought about 
himself (as in Kaplan’s mirror example), and imagine that person being F : that makes his 
self-imagination de re, though in a derivative manner.
c
 The claim that imagination does not 
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allow for the de re case should therefore be qualified : no de re case is possible unless the de 
re character of the imagining is inherited from a mental state in another mode than the 
imagination mode, through some kind of anaphoric link. 
This may not be a specific feature of the imagination, however. According to Philippe 
Schlenker (p.c.), the same thing holds for other modes, such as desire. In footnote 76, I gave 
the following example of a de re desire about oneself : 
 
While running a race, Bill is watching a race (on his video sunglasses) among three 
participants. Unbeknownst to him, he’s actually watching the race he’s running, and 
the runner he favors is actually himself. Though he doesn’t know it, he wants himself 
to win. 
 
Such a de re desire about oneself is arguably possible only because the desire is anaphorically 
grounded in the subject’s perception, whose de re character it inherits. 
Does belief also have this feature ? Can one’s belief be de re about oneself only 
indirectly, through an anaphoric link ? This is a complex issue which I cannot go into here. 
But even if we assume that belief and desire, like the imagination and unlike perception, can 
be de re about the subject only through an anaphoric link, one must acknowledge an 
important difference between imagining and believing. An anaphoric link may be intermodal 
(as in the cases I have mentioned) or intramodal. By this I mean that a representation may be 
anaphorically grounded in another representation in the same mode. Now, among the states 
which can be de re about the subject only in virtue of an anaphoric link, some accept an 
intramodal anaphoric link and some do not. Here we find that the imagination does not work 
like belief. 
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A belief may well be de re about the subject in virtue of its anaphoric link to another belief. If 
I believe that a member of my university has been awarded a considerable grant, I may 
anaphorically believe something about that lucky fellow. In this way I can form a de re belief 
about myself (if I turn out to be the lucky fellow in question). What about the imagination ? 
An imagining may likewise be grounded in some other exercise of the imagination through an 
intramodal anaphoric link. I may imagine meeting a most beautiful woman, and, in a 
subsequent imaginative episode, imagine going on holiday with her. In the case of 
imagination, however, we cannot get a de re imagining about ourselves through such an 
intramodal link. Suppose I imagine that a member of my university becomes the next 
president of the US, and keep fantasizing about that imaginary character. Even if I happen to 
have all the properties I imagine that person to have (being a member of this university, being 
the next president of the US etc.), imagining that person to be F would still not be a case of 
unwittingly imagining myself to be F. So there definitely is a sense in which, although not 
impossible, the de re cases are hard(er) to get in the imaginative mode. Despite their 
differences, the perception mode, the memory mode and the belief mode are all world-
involving in a way in which the imaginative mode is not ; so it is possible to be mistaken as to 
what one’s perception, memory or belief is about, but no such mistake is possible in the case 
of imagination unless the mistake itself is inherited from some antecedent representation in 
another mode.
ci
 
 
De se imaginings 
 
Can we, in imagination, get the counterpart of the explicit de se case ? I think we can, but 
again, there will be a difference. It will not be a matter of the subject’s wrongly or rightly 
identifying as himself the person his imagination is about since, as we have seen, what one’s 
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imagination is about is a matter of intentional stipulation and does not have to be identified.
cii
 
However, we have seen that the subject’s imaginative project may be de re. Similarly, the 
subject’s imaginative project may be de se in the explicit, identification-dependent fashion. It 
will be so if it satisfies two obvious conditions. First, the imagining must be de se : the subject 
must think of the object of his/her imagination as himself/herself. Second, the subject must 
represent himself/herself from an objective point of view, that is, from outside. 
 In implicit de se memories, as we have seen, what one remembers is viewed from 
inside : we remember the action as it appears to the agent who performs it. In de re and 
explicit de se memories, what one remembers is viewed from outside : we remember someone 
doing the action and (in the explicit de se case) we identify that person as ourselves. The same 
thing is possible with the imagination : as Vendler emphasizes in the quoted passage, we may 
imagine something about ourselves by adopting an external point of view — the point of view 
of an outside observer. This comes as close to the explicit de se case as is possible in the 
imaginative mode. 
 Thus far, I have suggested that some readings are harder to get in the imaginative 
mode than they are in the memory mode. We cannot conclude that imagination reports have 
fewer interpretations than memory reports, however. First, as we have seen, the de re reading 
of (3) is not altogether missing, even if it is harder to get than the de re reading of (1). Second, 
the specific features of the imaginative mode make an extra interpretation possible, which is 
not available in the other modes. That extra possibility, characteristic of imagination, shows 
up when we consider (4) and ‘implicit de se’ readings. In the next two chapters, I will argue 
that there are two types of implicit de se reading in the imagination mode, so that (4) can be 
interpreted in two distinct ways. One interpretation, which I call the ‘quasi-de se’, has no 
counterpart in the case of (2). 
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APPENDIX : DOES THE LACK OF WORLD-INVOLVINGNESS PRECLUDE APPLICATION OF THE SMR 
FRAMEWORK ? 
 
In his preliminary review of this book for OUP, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero objected to my 
claim that the mode determines the situation of evaluation. This is not the case with the 
imagination, he suggested, precisely because the imagination is not world-involving in the 
way perception and memory are :  
 
It sounds initially plausible that the perceptual and mnemonic mode can help 
determine what specific time or place (or subject, in other cases) the contents are 
about, when we try to determine the correctness conditions for perceptual or 
mnemonic experiences with those contents, or their associated judgments ; that sounds 
plausible, because it sounds plausible that specific causal relations with the 
extramental world are constitutive of the nature of those modes. However, this does 
not apply to the imagination. One, I suppose, could have imaginings with those very 
same relativist contents, those for ‘it is raining’ or ‘the bell tolls’ ; and those 
imaginings should have, or could have in some cases, correctness-conditions as 
determinate as those of perceptual or mnemonic judgments. How are they determined 
by the ‘imaginative mode’ ? Recanati invokes a phrase from Williams, appealing to 
the subject’s ‘imaginative projects’, but one would like to hear more about that. To 
give form to the worry, I think almost everybody assumes that, while the number of 
contents is infinite (due to productivity), there is a small number of forces/modes. 
Does every ‘imaginative project’ correspond to a different ‘mode’ ? How many of 
them are there, then ? Cannot one imagine that the bell tolls concerning the place 
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where his father was born ? The place where the father of one’s father was born ? And 
so on, and so forth ? 
 
 Garcia-Carpintero’s first worry concerns the factors which determine the situation a 
particular imagining is relative to. As he anticipated, I respond that what determines the 
situation a particular imagining is relative to is one’s imaginative project. In the example I 
gave earlier, ‘Imagine that swimmer crying for help’, the relevant situation is the current 
perceptual situation, involving the swimmer the speaker and his addressee can both see. The 
addressee is invited to imagine that, in the very situation they are in, the swimmer they see 
calls for help. But the situation an imagining is relative to may itself be an imaginary 
situation. By imagining the swimmer crying for help, relative to their current perceptual 
situation, the imaginer has created such an imaginary situation, which can be used as the 
situation a further imagining is relative to. This is the familar two-part structure : 
‘Imagine/suppose that p ; then q’. Here the first statement introduces an imaginary situation ; 
the second statement says something with respect to that situation. As I have just pointed out, 
the first statement, which introduces an imaginary situation, may itself be relative to a real 
situation : it introduces an imaginary situation (e.g. a situation in which the swimmer cries for 
help) by imagining something (that the swimmer cries for help) with respect to some real 
situation (the current perceptual situation). 
 Garcia-Carpintero also worries about productivity/systematicity. His point here is very 
general. As he himself acknowledges, that point « applies not just to the contents of 
imaginings but to all contents, including those of judgments/beliefs/assertions » : 
 
The place concerning which we judge ‘it is raining’ could be the town where my 
friend lives, the town where my friend’s friend lives, and so on and so forth. To place 
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all these aspects of systematically and productively determined contributions to 
correctness conditions in the ‘mode’/’force’ side, as opposed to the content side, does 
not seem acceptable. 
 
There is, indeed, a striking contrast between two cases : the case in which the subject sees that 
it raining in the situation he is in, and the case in which his judgment bears upon a remote 
situation. In the first case the subject’s judgement that it is raining is relative to the perceptual 
situation. The place relevant to the evaluation of the judgment is fixed by the perceptual 
mode. But when I imagine/consider the situation in a remote place (say, Chicago), and think 
‘it is probably raining’, what fixes the place of evaluation is only my imaginative project. In 
this case, the subject has total freedom, it  seems, and that means that the situation of 
evaluation is very much unconstrained. Does it still make sense to say that, in such a case, the 
mode ‘fixes’ the situation of evaluation ? Would it not be more reasonable, in view of general 
considerations regarding productivity/systematicity, to say that the place of rain is actually 
part of the content, in such a case, rather than external to it ? 
 I will deal with this sort of issue extensively in book III. I will maintain that what 
determines the situation in the problematic sort of case is the mode, appearances 
notwithstanding. I will draw a distinction between two basic modes, corresponding to the two 
types of case : the egocentric mode, of which the perceptual mode is a prime instance, and the 
anaphoric mode (chapters 40-41). A thought in the anaphoric mode concerns whatever entity 
is currently salient in our mind, even though the entity in question is not articulated in the 
thought that concerns it, but only in some other mental representation that serves as cognitive 
background for it. Thanks to the anaphoric mode, we can entertain thoughts relative to any 
situation we can imagine, including situations we have explicitly specified or characterized 
through the lekta of previous (linguistic or mental) representations. In the closing section of 
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the book, I will go as far as to claim that some of the crucial representational resources we 
have in the service of productivity/systematicity, namely index-shifting operators, owe their 
very existence to the anaphoric mode, which they presuppose. 
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Chapter 28 
Imagination and the self 
 
 
 
Being Napoléon 
 
Can we imagine being Napoléon ? Of course we can. Yet this raises a problem, if one admits, 
as a piece of metaphysical truth, that one could not be (nor have been) Napoléon. There are 
accidental properties which one has and which one might not have, but one’s identity is not 
among them. I am  François Recanati, Napoléon is another person, living in a different 
century, and I could simply not have been him, or be him — although I might have had 
different properties than those I actually have. I might have been a high-ranking general, or an 
Emperor. But it is not the case that I might have been Napoléon himself. Still, I can easily 
imagine being Napoléon. 
 Vendler says the tension between metaphysical impossibility and imaginability is 
relieved if we pay attention to the difference between imagining oneself being Napoléon, and 
imagining being Napoléon. Only in the former case is something impossible imagined : 
 
I can imagine being you, Napoléon, or even Napoléon at the battle of Waterloo. (…) 
« But », you object, « how can you imagine being me or, worse, being Napoléon, since 
you are not and this, as we are told, is a necessary truth. (…) » Not so, I reply, for I do 
not try to imagine myself being you, Napoléon, or even simply myself being at the 
battle of Waterloo. This would be impossible indeed, as impossible as imagining you 
being Napoléon or fighting in that battle. What I can do is imagine being Napoléon, 
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i.e. having the experiences he must have had on the battlefield, or on other occasions. 
And this, as we have learned, is quite a different thing from imagining myself in some 
situation or other. (Vendler 1979 : 172-3) 
 
This provides us with another argument against the reflexivist. If we put the self into the 
content of what is imagined, as the reflexivist does by construing the content of de se thoughts 
as reflexive, we end up with the embarrassing conclusion that what we imagine when we 
imagine being Napoléon is something impossible. In the SMR framework the content of 
implicit de se thoughts — the sort of thought one entertains when one imagines being 
Napoléon — is a personal proposition, which does not contain oneself as a constituent but 
only the properties which one self-ascribes. The subject only comes into the picture in the 
evaluation phase. 
 Still we have a problem. Even if the content does not include the self, the self comes 
into the picture at the next step, in the act of entertaining that content in the relevant mode. If 
this act is represented as the act of self-ascribing the property that is the content of the 
thought, just as in perception but with an additional element of pretense (in order to 
distinguish imagination from genuine experience), then don’t we have the same contradiction 
one step later ? How can I (pretend to) self-ascribe the property of being Napoléon and 
fighting the battle of Waterloo, if those are properties that it is impossible for me to 
instantiate ? 
 One response involves distinguishing the possible from the imaginable. Even if the 
situation is (metaphysically) impossible, still it is imaginable, one might argue. I will not be 
concerned with that possible response in what follows. Another response, more interesting 
given my present purposes, is implicit in the passage just quoted from Vendler : when I 
imagine being Napoléon and fighting the battle of Waterloo, I imagine certain properties 
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being instantiated, but it is not to myself that I (self-)ascribe the properties in question. Rather, 
I ascribe them to Napoléon.  
 
Cartesian selves 
 
In ‘Imagination and the Self’, Bernard Williams discusses what it is for someone to imagine 
being Napoléon. Three characters seem to be involved : the person doing the imagining (the 
imaginer), the person who is imagined to be Napoléon (the imaginee), and Napoléon. The 
crucial question is: who is the imaginee ? Like Vendler, Williams points out that, if the 
imaginee is the imaginer, we get something metaphysically impossible, for the imaginer could 
not really be Napoléon. This suggests that the imaginee is not the imaginer’s actual self but 
what Williams calls an ‘attenuated’ self, deprived of all the properties which make it 
impossible for the actual imaginer to be Napoleon. But what, exactly, is such an attenuated 
self ? 
 
If we press this hard enough, we readily get the idea that it is not necessary to being 
me [in the attenuated sense] that I should have any of the individuating properties that 
I do have, this body, these memories, etc. And for some of them, such as the body, we 
may think that it is not necessary to have one at all… The limiting state of this 
progress is the Cartesian consciousness : an ‘I’ without body, past, or character. 
(Williams 1973 : 41) 
 
At this point, says Williams, we reach an impasse : 
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Suppose I conceive it possible that I might have been Napoleon — and mean by this 
that there might have been a world which contained a Napoleon exactly the same as 
the Napoleon that our world contained, except that he would have been me [in the 
attenuated sense of ‘me’]. What could be the difference between the actual Napoleon 
and the imagined one ? All I have to take to him in the imagined world is a Cartesian 
centre of consciousness ; and that, the real Napoleon had already. Leibniz, perhaps, 
made something like this point when he said to one who expressed the wish that he 
were the King of China, that all he wanted was that he should cease to exist and there 
should be a King in China. (Williams 1973 : 42) 
 
 
Williams’s way out 
 
To break the deadlock, Williams suggests doing without the imaginee. There are, he says, 
only two characters involved: the imaginer, and Napoléon. It is to Napoléon himself that the 
imagined properties and experiences are ascribed : 
 
Consider… the narration… appropriate to this sort of imagination. It is going to be of 
the general form : ‘I have conquered ; the ideals of the Revolution in my hands are 
sweeping away the old world. Poor Maria Walewska, I wonder where she is now’ and 
so on and so on, according to whatever knowledge or illusions I possess about 
Napoleon. Now suppose that we actually heard someone saying things like this. In 
general, when we hear utterances in the first person, there is only one question to be 
asked relative to the identity of the ‘I’ involved : ‘Who is the speaker ?’ But in the case 
of utterances as unlikely as this, there are two questions : ‘Who is the speaker ?’ and 
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‘Who is it that he either believes that he is, or is pretending to be ?’ In the present case, 
the latter alternative is in question : a man engaged in an imaginative narration like 
this would be a man pretending to be, or playing the rôle of, Napoleon. The ‘I’ of his 
discourse is to be taken as an ‘I’ uttered by Napoleon ; who it stands for, if it stands 
for anybody, is Napoleon. But of course, this being the playing of a rôle, the actual 
utterer is someone else, who in the next moment may use ‘I’ in its ordinary way with 
respect to his ordinary self. (…) [Similarly,] what I am doing, in fantasy, is something 
like playing the rôle of Napoleon… In the description of this activity, only two people 
need figure : the real me and Napoleon. There is no place for a third item, the 
Cartesian ‘I’, regarding which I imagine that it might have belonged to Napoleon. 
(Williams 1973 : 44-45) 
 
 On this view, not only I am not a constituent of the state of affairs which is the content 
of my imagination, but even if we look at the complete content (the ‘Austinian’ proposition), 
including the situation in which the imagined state of affairs is imagined to hold, I  — the 
actual imaginer — do not come into the picture. The content of the imagination is assumed to 
hold in Napoléon’s situation. 
 
The quasi-de se 
 
What I have just said suggests that imagination is not ‘just like perception with an additional 
element of pretense’. There is a much bigger difference between the basic experiential modes 
(perception and memory) and the imagination. 
 Memory and perception are reflexive states such that what they represent concerns the 
rememberer or the perceiver : the rememberer and the perceiver stand in some actual-world 
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relation R to what the memory or the perception represents. Imagination is different : what it 
represents need not concern the imaginer. While, in perception or memory, I self-ascribe the 
property of being R-related to what is represented, in imagination no R-relation to the 
imagined scene is imposed by the act of imagining. The real-world connection between the 
experiencer and what is experienced is suppressed when we turn to the imagination. As a 
result, one can imagine states of affairs to which we can bear no actual-world connection 
whatsoever. 
 This feature of imagination makes it similar to quasi-perception and quasi-memory. I 
will, therefore, coin the term ‘quasi-de se’ to refer to the type of thought one entertains when 
one imagines, say, being Napoléon. The type of imagining at stake is clearly first personal, 
yet the imaginer’s self is not involved — not even at the ‘evaluation’ stage. The properties 
that are imaginatively represented are not ascribed to the subject who imagines them, but to 
the person whose point of view she espouses. 
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Chapter 29 
Imagination, empathy, and the quasi-de se 
 
 
 
The Reflexive Constraint 
 
Following Shoemaker, I imagined the alternative modes of ‘quasi-perception’ and ‘quasi-
memory’, which are like perception and memory, save for the fact that the content of the state 
need not concern the person in the state. In quasi-perception and quasi-memory, it may not be 
the person in the experiential state, but some other person, who is R-related to what the state 
represents. 
 Like Evans, I emphasized how dissimilar quasi-perception and quasi-memory are from 
ordinary perception and ordinary memory. Their ‘semantics’, as I put it, is different. 
Perception and memory obey what we may call the Reflexive Constraint : if the state is 
veridical, the person undergoing it must be R-related to what it represents. The Reflexive 
Constraint does not apply to quasi-perception and quasi-memory. Now quasi-perception and 
quasi-memory are counterfactual modes — modes of experience that do not actually exist — 
but we have just seen that, among the existing modes, one is similar to quasi-perception and 
quasi-memory in that it does not obey the Reflexive Constraint. That mode is the imagination. 
The person in whose situation the imagined state of affairs is supposed to hold need not be the 
imaginer himself ; it may be anybody, including Napoleon, or the last man to be alive on 
Earth. The imaginer ‘sees’ the world vicariously, through the eyes of his imaginative target, 
just as the quasi-rememberer vicariously ‘remembers’ the experiences of another person. 
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 It follows that we have to make room for a new kind of de se thought, or rather, for a 
distinction within implicit de se thoughts. Implicit de se thoughts involve a personal 
proposition on the side of the lekton, i.e. a property of persons, which the subject of the 
thought self-ascribes in the standard cases in which the Reflexive Constraint holds. But in 
imagination, as we have just seen, the Reflexive Constraint does not hold. It follows that there 
are two possibilities, for implicit de se thoughts entertained in the imaginative mode. 
 
Two types of first person imagination 
 
In one type of case, the imagination concerns the subject himself. For example, the subject 
imagines (himself) being a racing driver. In such cases, says Williams, 
 
There is no great problem concerning the me that the fantasy is about : it is the actual 
empirical me, or more or less so. This does not mean, of course, that in order to 
entertain this fantasy of myself as a champion racing driver I have to engage in an 
elaborate work of intercalating racing-driving activities hypothetically into my past 
carreer, or extending hypothetically my future career so as to embrace them ; I do not 
have to join the imagined activities in any determinate way on to my actual history. 
Nevertheless, I am, very often, putting quite a lot of my actual self into it, and where 
not consciously doing this, am prepared, as it were, to accept a lot of my actual self in 
the fantasied scene. It is, for example, relative to my real wants, ambitions, and 
character that the imagined happenings are, to me in them, satisfying or upsetting. 
(Williams 1973 : 39) 
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Note that we are talking about first person imagination : the sort of imagination that can be 
reported by saying ‘He imagined being a racing driver’, using the PRO construction. What we 
now see is that, in the case of imagination, such reports can be understood in two ways. What 
is imagined in the first person way may concern the imaginer’s actual self, as we have just 
seen, or it may concern some other person, as in the Napoleon example. There is no such 
ambiguity of reports using the PRO construction when the reported state is a state of 
perception or memory, because the Reflexive Constraint holds for such states. So imagination 
reports enjoy a reading (the ‘quasi-de se’ reading) which perception and memory reports do 
not have.
ciii
 
 As Williams notes (1973 : 44), a quasi-de se form of imagination would not be 
appropriately reported by using the reflexive form ‘I imagine myself being Napoléon/fighting 
the battle of Waterloo’. Only the PRO construction can be used. This is presumably due to the 
fact that the imaginer’s self is not involved at all in quasi-de se imagination. 
 
Empathy 
 
I said that imagination is a mode for which the Reflexive Constraint does not hold. Since 
imagination involves no genuine experience, but only pretense, one might think that, perhaps, 
the Reflexive Constraint holds of experience generally. But this would be wrong. 
 There are quasi-de se thoughts outside the realm of the imagination. Empathy is a case 
in point. In empathy, one entertains representations which have the perspectival character that 
is characteristic of implicit de se thoughts, but which concern some person distinct from the 
empathiser. 
 Suppose I see someone hammering his own finger. In a surge of empathy, I think : 
‘Ouch, it hurts !’ This sentence arguably expresses a personal proposition, true at a person and 
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a time if and only if that person feels pain at that time ; but the relevant person — the person 
with respect to which the personal proposition is asserted — is not the the person making the 
assertion (the empathizer), that is, myself, but the person I empathize with. Still, the 
representation has a clear experiential component : feelings and emotional reactions are 
involved, which are integral to the mental state, even though the person which the content of 
the state concerns is not the person in the state. Here, we have an experience that does not 
obey the Reflexive Constraint. 
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Book III 
 
EGOCENTRICITY AND BEYOND 
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Part Nine 
 
 
Unarticulated constituents in the lekton ? 
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Chapter 30 
The context-dependence of the lekton : 
how far can we go ? 
 
 
 
Redefining the lekton 
 
In chapter 10, following Barwise, I suggested that the lekton corresponds to the cognitive 
content of an utterance, while the Austinian proposition corresponds to its complete truth-
conditional content, as determined in part by psychological factors and in part by 
environmental factors. In chapter 15, however, we saw that the lekton can be equated to the 
utterance’s cognitive content only if it is purely psychological, hence context-independent. 
Lewis indeed promoted a version of Moderate Relativism where the lekton is the meaning of 
the sentence-type (modeled as a function from context-index pairs to truth-values) : 
everything nonpsychological — everything not ‘in the head’ — is rejected on what I call the 
situational side, that is, the side of that against which the lekton is evaluated. This includes 
(for Lewis) both the context and the index it determines. 
 At this point the question that arises is this : what reason can we have for insisting that 
the lekton must be context-dependent (in the manner of Kaplan’s ‘contents’), hence not purely 
psychological ? At the end of chapter 15 I said that I would provide another justification for 
construing the lekton as context-dependent (i.e., a justification distinct from the cognitive 
significance justification, which precludes context-dependence). The time has come to 
actually provide it. 
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Rather than equate the lekton/situation distinction with that between purely 
psychological and environmental determinants of truth-value, as Lewis does, I suggest that we 
align it with the distinction between content and mode, presented and elaborated in book II. 
This is most natural since, as we have seen, the mode fixes the situation of evaluation, and 
thereby determines aspects of the complete content that are not articulated in the 
representation, hence that are not part of its explicit content. In this framework, as I will now 
show, the view that the lekton is context-dependent can be argued for. 
 
Unarticulated constituency vs indexicality 
 
Let us consider visual perception once again. Besides the constituents of the visual scene — 
the various entities that are seen — there are additional elements that are relevant to the 
veridicality of perception but which do not figure among the elements of the scene. Such 
elements are, as Perry says, ‘unarticulated’. Thus the subject who sees is not herself an aspect 
of what is seen, but an aspect of the situation with respect to which what is seen is to be 
evaluated. The subject’s perception that p is veridical if and only if it is the case that p in the 
situation which affects the subject’s senses and causes his or her current perceptual 
experience. The subject is not a constituent of what is seen, but it features in the complete 
(Austinian) content of the experience via the situation component, as determined by the 
mode.
civ
 
Now when it comes to those elements which are represented as part of the visual 
scene, hence belong to the lekton, we have to draw a distinction between their internal 
representation and their actual identity as determined by external, environmental factors. 
Going back to Vendler’s example, suppose that, from above the  cliff, I point to one of the 
swimmers and say : ‘Imagine he cries for help ; what would you do ?’ The swimmer I point to 
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is a constituent of the imagined scene. My addressee is invited to imagine that swimmer 
crying for help. Who the swimmer actually is depends upon the context : it depends upon the 
identity of the person to whom I happen to point. To be sure, that identity does not matter 
much in the present case. What the addressee is invited to imagine is, in effect, a scene in 
which someone with the same properties as those we see the actual swimmer to have starts 
crying for help. But if we turn to the basic experiental modes, perception and memory, the 
situation changes. If we see the swimmer crying for help, the content of what we see involves 
the swimmer — that very individual. He is seen as instantiating certain properties, but his 
numerical identity is also relevant to what we see : what we see is that swimmer (not some 
other person with the same properties) crying for help. 
Of course, it is open to us to say, with Lewis, that in the visual case just as in the 
imagination case, the lekton should only include the purely psychological content of the 
representation : a representation of a swimmer standing in a certain contextual relation to us, 
and crying for help. Since the identity of the swimmer is fixed by the situation (as determined 
by the mode), it should not figure in the content, on the Lewisian view. I grant that this is a 
perfectly coherent position to take, but there is an alternative position which is no less 
coherent : we may construe the perceived scene as a state of affairs in the world, with a real 
individual as a constituent (the swimmer, whose identity depends in part upon the context), 
and still distinguish that scene and its constituents from the elements that are not constituents 
of the scene, but only come into the picture via the situation of evaluation as determined by 
the mode. Those unarticulated constituents (e.g. the perceiver) do not correspond to anything 
in the representation. There is an obvious difference between the perceiver and the swimmer 
in that respect. The swimmer is visually represented (hence he is a constituent of the lekton), 
but the visual representation by itself does not fix his identity, which depends upon the 
context (hence the lekton is context-dependent). In contrast, the perceiver is not visually 
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represented : he is not a constituent in the visual scene (hence not a constituent of the lekton), 
but comes into the picture via the situation of evaluation which the perceptual mode imposes. 
To use Perry’s terms, the swimmer is ‘articulated’ in the representation, though in a context-
sensitive manner ; the perceiver remains ‘unarticulated’. 
 To conclude, what justifies maintaining the three-level version of the two-stage picture 
(as I called it in chapter 15) is a pair of important distinctions : that between content and 
mode, and that between indexicality and unarticulated constituency (a distinction which 
applies to mental as well as to linguistic representations). To capture those distinctions 
properly, we need the Austinian proposition with its two components (lekton, and  situation), 
and we need to acknowledge constituents of the lekton whose identity depends upon the 
context, as the reference of indexicals does. The three levels we end up with are : the meaning 
of the sentence-type (or, in the mental realm, the narrow psychological  content of the 
representation), the context-dependent lekton (corresponding to Kaplan’s content), and the 
Austinian proposition including a situation of evaluation in addition to the lekton. 
 
Unarticulated constituents in the lekton : 
Barwise vs Perry 
 
Aligning the lekton/situation distinction with that between content and mode enables us to 
make sense of the context-dependence of the lekton. But how far can we go in that direction ? 
How context-dependent can the lekton be ? Here, we have a choice between two possible 
positions. We may hold that only articulated constituents — elements of content to which 
something in the representation explicitly corresponds — can figure in the lekton ; or we may 
tolerate unarticulated constituents in the lekton as well as in the situation. On this issue 
Barwise and Perry took conflicting stances. For Barwise, the lekton is the articulated content 
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of the representation ; for Perry, the lekton may well include unarticulated constituents. Thus 
far, I have assumed, with Barwise, that only articulated constituents go into the lekton, since 
the lekton is the explicit content of the representation ; but the arguments in favour of the 
opposite view are worth considering and discussing. 
Barwise uses the Holmes-Watson example (chapter 10) to illustrate his disagreement 
with Perry (Barwise 1989a: 240). In the example, Holmes and Watson face each other, with 
the salt and the pepper standing in between them. Holmes says 'The salt is left of the pepper', 
because the salt is left of the pepper from Holmes's perspective. From Watson's perspective, 
the pepper is left of the salt, but Watson is mistaken as to which shaker is which and he 
wrongly says 'The salt is left of the pepper'. Holmes and Watson apparently 'say the same 
thing', but Holmes is right and Watson wrong. Some unarticulated constituent must be 
involved, which accounts for the difference in truth-value. This unarticulated constituent is 
the perspective: the salt is on the left from Holmes's perspective, but it is not on the left from 
Watson's perspective. (That is why Holmes is right and Watson wrong.) Thus far Barwise and 
Perry agree, but now a decision has to be made : the unarticulated constituent may be fed into 
the content to be evaluated (the lekton), or into the situation which that content concerns. 
 On the first option, both Watson and Holmes are talking about the same 'objective' 
situation (the situation they share), but they state different facts about that situation. The facts 
they state are, respectively: 
 
Holmes: 
Left-of (salt, pepper, perspective H) 
Watson: 
Left-of (salt, pepper, perspective W) 
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Watson's and Holmes's perspectives turn out to be (unarticulated) constituents of the facts 
which they state. According to Barwise, that is the view which Perry favours. 
 On the second option, taken by Barwise, Holmes and Watson assert the same 
(relativized) fact: 
 
Left of (salt, pepper) 
 
However, Holmes and Watson talk about different situations. The situations are individuated 
in terms of Holmes's and Watson's subjective perspectives on them. 
Barwise ascribes to Perry the view that, in general, ‘unarticulated constituents’ are 
constituents of the content to be evaluated, rather than aspects of the situation with respect to 
which the content is evaluated (the situation which the representation ‘concerns’, in the 
terminology of Perry’s early paper, ‘Thought without Representation’). This is rather 
suprising, since Perry’s main point in that early paper was precisely that more cases of 
unarticulatedness can be handled in terms of the ‘concerning’ relation than one might as first 
suppose. Be that as it may, it is important to realize that, even in ‘Thought without 
Representation’, Perry remained very cautious and resisted the sort of generalization which 
characterizes Barwise’s approach and mine. Not all instances of unarticulatedness, he then 
suggested, can be handled in terms of relativized propositions and the concerning relation. 
In the next chapter, I will present what I take to have been Perry’s criterion, at the time 
of ‘Thought without Representation’, for distinguishing the cases of unarticulatedness that 
can be handled in terms of the concerning relation from those that cannot. The latter are cases 
in which, according to Perry, an unarticulated constituent is a constituent of the lekton rather 
than an aspect of the situation which the representation concerns. After critical discussion 
(chapters 32-33), I will reject Perry’s criterion and maintain that the lekton can only include 
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articulated constituents. 
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Chapter 31 
Unarticulatedness and the ‘concerning’ relation 
 
 
 
Thought without representation 
 
In ‘Thought without Representation’, Perry introduces the notion of an unarticulated 
constituent and the distinction between ‘concerning’ and ‘being about’. A representation 
‘concerns’ the situation with respect to which it is evaluated, and it is ‘about’ the constituents 
of the content to be evaluated. That distinction comes out most clearly in the case of the Z-
landers, a small group of people who « do not travel to, or communicate with residents of, 
other places » (Perry 1986b/1993b : 212) and have no name for Z-land, the place where they 
live. As Perry points out, a Z-lander's utterance of 'It's raining' is true if and only if it is 
raining in Z-land (at the time of utterance); but the Z-landers do not have a concept or idea of 
Z-land as opposed to other places. Z-land is not ‘articulated’ in their representations, whether 
linguistically or mentally. Their weather thoughts 'concern' Z-land, not by virtue of containing 
a representation of Z-land (in which case they would be 'about' Z-land), but by virtue of their 
being in Z-land. The unarticulated constituent — Z-land — is directly provided by the 
environment. 
 In such cases the mental representation, considered in abstraction from the 
environment which it concerns, expresses less than a complete proposition. The Z-landers 
think 'It is raining': the content thus articulated is not fully propositional — it is a 
propositional function, which is truth-evaluable only with respect to a particular place 
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(determined by the environment). Now, as Perry pleasantly says, « there is a little of the Z-
lander in the most well-traveled of us » (Perry 1986b/1993b: 216). The difference between the 
Z-landers and us is that we do have a notion of the place where we live, as opposed to other 
places; so we are capable of entertaining a thought about the place where we are, such as 'It's 
raining in Paris, but not in Saint Tropez'. Perry's point, however, is that when we are in Paris 
(or Palo Alto) and we say or think 'It is raining', we need not think reflectively about the place 
we are in. We can think 'It is raining' and let the place we are in complete the content of our 
thought.  
 
When I look outside and see rain and grab an umbrella or go back to bed, a relatively 
true belief, concerning my present surroundings, will do as well as a more articulated 
one, about my present surrounding. (Perry 1986b/1993b : 216 ; emphasis mine) 
 
Unarticulatedness without relativization 
 
Not all instances of unarticulatedness can be handled in terms of ‘propositional functions’ and 
the concerning relation, however. Contrary to what many commentators assume, the two 
distinctions which Perry introduces in ‘Thought without Representation’ (concerning/being 
about, and articulated/unarticulated) are not coextensive. For Perry, there are unarticulated 
constituents that are genuine constituents of content, rather than aspects of the situation with 
respect to which the content is evaluated.
cv
 The following example, discussed by Perry, 
presumably falls into that category : 
 
Suppose… that my son has just talked to my older son in Murdock on the telephone, 
and is responding to my question, « How are things there ? » Then his remark [‘It is 
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raining’] would not be about Palo Alto [the place where he is], but about Murdock... 
My son belief [is] about Murdock, and his intention [is] to induce a belief in me that 
[is] about Murdock by saying something about Murdock. Here it is natural to think 
that we are explaining which unarticulated constituent a statement is about, in terms of 
something like the articulated constituents of the beliefs and intentions it expresses. 
(Perry 1986b : 211). 
 
In this case at least, according to Perry, the statement is ‘about’ the unarticulated location ; it 
does not (merely) ‘concern’ it. The content of the assertion is a classical proposition with the 
location as (unarticulated) constituent, rather than a propositional function evaluated with 
respect to that location.  
 
The Externality Principle 
 
Though he did not discuss the issue explicitly, the following passage seems to me 
representative of Perry’s view, in ‘Thought without Representation’, regarding the cases 
which can and those which cannot be handled by appealing to relativized propositions and the 
concerning relation: 
 
In those parts of our life where there is an external guarantee that the weather 
information we receive and our actions will concern our own locale, there is no reason 
for our beliefs to play the internal coordinating role they need to at other times. (Perry 
1986b : 216 ; emphasis mine) 
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This actually covers two sorts of case. There are, on the one hand, the cases in which the 
subject has no representation whatsoever of the relevant parameter, which only the theorist 
can articulate. That is the ‘Z-lander’ sort of case. There are also the cases in which the subject 
herself can articulate the relevant parameter, but need not do so because the value of the 
parameter is fixed by the external environment, without any need for the subject herself to 
cognitively discriminate the situation of concern from other possible situations. That is what 
happens in the mode of thinking or discourse that specifically concerns local weather : 
 
Those belief states that directly control behavior for local weather merely concern 
local weather, rather than being about it. All believers who had just seen rain and were 
about to open their umbrellas [should] be reckoned as believing the same propositional 
function, but the truth conditions of their beliefs... differ with their location. (Perry 
1986b : 217) 
 
So ‘It is raining’ expresses a propositional function when it is uttered in talking about local 
weather. Even though ‘It is raining’, in such circumstances, turns out to have the same truth-
conditions as ‘It is raining here’, they are not synonymous : ‘It is raining’ expresses a place-
relative propositional function, while ‘It is raining here’ articulates the place which therefore 
goes into the evaluated content instead of being simply part of the circumstance of evaluation. 
In the ‘It is raining’ case, it is the mode of discourse, as Perry says, that constrains the 
representation to be evaluated with respect to the place in which it is tokened. The content 
itself is locationally neutral — it does not specify the place of rain. 
 The cases that presumably cannot be handled in this way, according to Perry, are the 
cases in which it is incumbent upon the subject to discriminate what her thought or statement 
is tacitly about, because there are several possible options and no ‘external fact’ to pick out 
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one. That is what happens in the mode of thinking or discourse about non-local weather, as in 
the Murdock example. In the Murdock case, according to Perry, the subject expresses the 
belief that it’s raining in Murdock. The place (Murdock) is not linguistically articulated, but it 
is a constituent of content nonetheless. 
All this suggests that Perry’s criterion for treating an unarticulated constituent as an 
aspect of the situation rather than as an implicit ingredient of the lekton may have been the 
following principle : 
 
Externality Principle 
For an unarticulated constituent to be an aspect of the situation rather than an implicit 
ingredient of the lekton, it must be contributed by the external environment rather than 
cognitively discriminated. 
 
Whether or not Perry actually endorsed something like this principle, I reject it and will 
criticize it in the next two chapters. I will ultimately argue against the very idea that there are 
unarticulated constituents in the lekton : I will defend Barwise’s position, according to which 
the lekton is the articulated content of the representation (and everything unarticulated falls 
on the situational side). 
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Chapter 32 
Three (alleged) arguments for the Externality Principle 
 
 
 
The mental articulation argument 
 
The Externality Principle may be tentatively justified by means of three arguments. The first 
one, suggested by Perry’s description of the Murdock case, runs as follows. Perry insists that, 
in that case, it is not the location of the speaker, but his intentions and beliefs, which 
determine the place on which the truth-value of the statement depends. Since that is so, the 
place in question has got to be mentally represented, that is, articulated in the mental 
representations which underlie the speaker’s utterance. In particular it must be articulated in 
the belief which the utterance expresses (the belief that it is raining in Murdock). So Murdock 
is an articulated constituent of the content of the belief.
cvi
 If, as seems legitimate, we assume 
that the content of the utterance is the same as that of the belief which it expresses, it follows 
that the place is a constituent of the content of the utterance as well, even if it is not 
articulated in the utterance itself (but only in the belief that the utterance expresses). 
Conclusion : the place is an articulated constituent of the content of the subject’s belief — the 
subject believes, and intends to communicate, that it is raining in Murdock — and an 
unarticulated constituent of the content of the utterance (‘It is raining’) which expresses that 
belief. It is not simply an aspect of the situation which the utterance concerns. 
 I do not accept this piece of reasoning, and I reject its conclusion. I have no quarrel 
with the assumption that the content of an utterance is the same as that of the belief which it 
expresses,
cvii
 nor with the premiss that Murdock must be mentally represented if the speaker is 
 254 
to be credited with the appropriate communicative intentions. Still, there is a premiss in the 
above reasoning which I find unpalatable. The fact that Perry’s son must think of Murdock 
and intend to say something about Murdock when he utters ‘It is raining’ possibly entails that 
Murdock is articulated in some mental representation of his, but does not entail that the belief 
he expresses by his utterance ‘It is raining’ is the locus of that articulation. So what I deny is 
the legitimacy of the inferential step corresponding to the phrase ‘in particular’ in the 
following portion of the argument : 
 
The place in question has got to be mentally represented, that is, articulated in the 
mental representations which underlie the speaker’s utterance. In particular it must be 
articulated in the belief which the utterance expresses (the belief that it is raining in 
Murdock). 
 
I grant that the relevant place (Murdock) is articulated in some mental representation in the 
speaker’s mind, which mental representation crucially serves as background for his utterance 
‘It is raining’, but I deny that the mental representation in question must be identical to the 
very belief he expresses by this utterance. Without begging the question, we cannot rule out 
the following option : (1) by his utterance the speaker expresses the belief that it’s raining ; 
(2) that belief is location-relative and concerns Murdock ; (3) what determines that the belief 
concerns Murdock (rather than some other place) is some other mental representation in the 
speaker’s mind, involving Murdock as an articulated constituent. 
In general, the contextual facts which fix the value of the situational parameter for a 
given mental representation may well be cognitive factors, involving other mental 
representations. To take an example I have used elsewhere (Recanati 1997, 2000b), suppose I 
say : « Berkeley is a nice place. There are bookstores and coffee shops at every corner. » This 
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is a two-sentence discourse. Berkeley is an articulated constituent of the first statement, and 
an unarticulated constituent of the second statement. Nothing prevents us from saying that the 
second statement concerns the place which the first sentence explicitly mentions. The fact that 
that place is cognitively discriminated via the mental representation corresponding to the first 
sentence does not entail that it is articulated also in the mental representation corresponding to 
the second sentence. On the contrary, the fact that the subject has just entertained a 
representation explicitly about Berkeley contributes to explaining why the second 
representation concerns that city. Likewise, I think it is the mental representation 
corresponding to Perry’s question ‘How are things there ?’, not that corresponding to his 
son’s answer ‘It is raining’, which articulates Murdock.cviii The place thus articulated in the 
question can serve as the situation which the answer concerns. 
 Given all this, I see no reason not to accept that, in many cases (including the 
Murdock case), the situation which an utterance or thought concerns is determined by 
cognitive factors such as the topic of the conversation or what the thinker is mentally 
focussing on, rather than by external facts like the location of the speaker.
cix
 In such cases, 
admittedly, the situation s which the representation r concerns will itself have to be somehow 
represented or articulated — it will have to be cognitively discriminated — but that would 
raise a problem only if that entailed that s is articulated in r. As we have just seen, that 
consequence does not follow. 
 
The behavioural argument 
 
The second argument in favour of the Externality Principle is the following.
cx
 One reason to 
hold that two persons who look out the window and say ‘It’s raining’ believe the same thing 
(even though their locations are different) is that, because of their belief, they are disposed to 
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act in the same way : by grabbing their umbrellas, cancelling plans for picnic, etc. It follows 
that what they believe — in the causal-explanatory sense of that phrase — can be construed as 
a place-relative proposition, or propositional function. But when the unarticulated location of 
the raining event is not fixed by the environment (i.e. by the place the believer is in), but by 
cognitive factors — as in the Murdock case — the relevant dispositions are absent. After his 
phone call to his brother, Perry’s son knows that it is raining (in Murdock), but, being himself 
in Palo Alto, he is not disposed to grab his umbrella.  It seems therefore that, even in the 
causal-explanatory sense, Perry’s son does not believe the same thing, or does not express the 
same belief, when he says ‘It is raining’ after the phone call with Perry’s older son, as he 
expresses when he says ‘It is raining’ after looking out the window in Palo Alto. In the latter 
case it makes sense to say that he believes the propositional function that it is raining, hence 
harbors the same belief as anyone who looks out the window and sees rain ; but in the 
Murdock case what Perry’s son believes is the complete proposition that it is raining in 
Murdock. That explains why Perry’s son, in the Murdock case, is not disposed to act in the 
way one acts when one believes the propositional function that it is raining : by grabbing 
one’s umbrella and cancelling out picnic plans. 
 I will postpone discussion of that argument until chapter 41, for it connects up with 
issues of simulation and shiftability to be dealt with then. I now turn to the third potential 
argument in support of the Externality Principle : the argument from invariance, which I will 
discuss and reject in chapter 33. 
 
The argument from invariance 
 
The argument I have in mind is implicit in the following passage from Perry : 
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In cases in which the same unrepresented parameter is relevant to a whole mode of 
thinking or discourse, we should classify each specific belief or utterance with a 
propositional function. The truth-value would be that of the proposition obtained by 
applying the function to the value of the parameter fixed by facts about the whole 
system. (Perry 1993a: 221 ; emphasis mine) 
 
Here what matters is the invariance of the unarticulated constituent. This condition of 
invariance is trivially satisfied in the Z-land case : 
 
All of the information (or misinformation) [the Z-landers] get about the weather, 
through observations or reports of others, is about Z-land. All of the actions they 
perform, in light of their weather beliefs, take place in Z-land, and are appropriate or 
not depending on the weather there. (Perry 1986b/1993b : 213) 
 
The invariance condition is also, though less obviously, satisfied in the case of Perry’s son 
looking out the window and saying ‘It’s raining’. To be sure, in contrast to the Z-land case, 
the place of rain is liable to vary : each utterance of ‘It is raining’ concerns the place where 
the utterance is made, and that place can vary. But in another sense, the place does not vary : 
it is always the place where the subject is. The parameter is fixed, even if its values vary as a 
function of speaker’s location. In contrast, when the unarticulated constituent is not fixed by 
the environment, but by cognitive factors, it can freely vary according to the speaker’s 
intentions : the invariance condition is not satisfied. Or at least, that is what the argument 
from invariance says. 
The following passage, which summarizes Perry’s view, stresses invariance as the 
crucial consideration : 
 258 
 
Sometimes all of the facts we deal with involving a certain n-ary relation involve the 
same object occupying one of the argument roles. In that case, we don’t need to worry 
about that argument role ; we don’t need to keep track of its occupant, because it never 
changes. We can, so to speak, pack it into the relation. For centuries people in Europe 
assumed that ‘being a summer month’ was a property of months. July was a summer 
month, December was not. Once they started to visit the Southern Hemisphere, they 
had to take account of the relativity to places. July was a summer month in the 
Northern Hemisphere, but not in the Southern Hemisphere. A child who is 
unconcerned about and even unaware of the weather anywhere but where he is, can 
treat the issue of whether it is raining or not as a property of a time, rather than a 
relation between times and places. He says, « It is raining now » rather than « It is 
raining here now. » (In this case the argument role is not always occupied by the same 
place, but always occupied by a place with a fixed relation to the agent, the place he is 
at.) (Perry 2000 : 328 ; emphasis mine) 
 
The same idea can be found in Barwise’s paper ‘Situations, Facts, and True Propositions’. 
Given a situation s and a relation R with n argument roles, Barwise says, an argument role r of 
R is undiscriminated in s iff there is an entity c such that c fulfils that role in any state of 
affairs of s involving R. (For an argument role to be undiscriminated is, therefore, for its filler 
to be invariant.) When that is so, one can ‘project’ the relation R to a relation R
r
 of one fewer 
roles, by suppressing the role in question. This operation Barwise calls ‘relativization’. It is 
justified by the fact that « from the perspective of an agent with focus situation s, the role r 
might as well not exist, since it is completely undetectable in that situation » (Barwise 1989a : 
253). 
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The dissymmetry, emphasized by Evans, between worlds and times, and the 
correlative acceptability of relativization-to-worlds as opposed to relativization-to-times 
(chapter 2), may itself be construed in terms of invariance, as I pointed out in footnote 5. For 
Evans, there is one and only one world that is actual ; and all our assertions are about that 
world. In contrast, there are many different times, none of which has a unique status 
corresponding to that of the actual world. The invariance condition is satisfied in one case, not 
in the other ; and relativization is legitimate only when that condition is satisfied. 
To sum up, invariance is what justifies taking an unarticulated constituent out of the 
lekton. Externality matters only insofar as it is what guarantees invariance. 
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Chapter 33 
Invariance 
 
 
 
Millikan vs Perry 
 
Ruth Millikan is another author who insists on invariance as the crucial condition determining 
whether or not an aspect of truth-condition should be treated as an aspect of explicit content. 
According to her, 
 
The meaning of the sign is determined as a function of values of significant variables 
or determinables exhibited by the sign. Put another way, the meaning varies 
systematically to parallel significant (mathematical) transformations of the sign. 
(Millikan 2004 : 48) 
 
It follows that 
 
Aspects of a truth condition are explicitly represented only when expressed as values 
of variables that can accept alternative values. What is constant over all possible 
representations in a system often represents quite a lot, but represents it only 
implicitly. (Millikan 2006 ; emphasis mine) 
 
This criterion enables us to distinguish, among aspects of a truth condition, what is explicitly 
represented and what is not. She gives the following example : 
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Consider… the dance of the honey bee. By its orientation on the hive wall it shows the 
direction of nectar relative to a line from the hive to the sun. Change the dance 
orientation and the represented direction of nectar changes accordingly. Direction is 
explicitly represented in the dance (by direction). The bee dance also talks about 
nectar, but no change will make it talk about something else, say, the direction of milk 
or peanut butter. Nectar is represented only implicitly. Likewise the hive and the sun. 
Though all three, nectar, hive and sun, figure in the dance’s truth conditions, none is 
represented explicitly. (Millikan 2006 ; emphasis mine) 
 
Although Perry and Millikan both appeal to invariance, their views of the matter 
differ. As we have seen, Perry accepts cases of parametric variation as cases of invariance. 
The child who says ‘It’s raining’ talks about the place where he is. « In this case », Perry says, 
«  the argument role is not always occupied by the same place, but always occupied by a place 
with a fixed relation to the agent, the place he is at. » Given the context in which the utterance 
takes place, the occupant of the argument role is fixed (by the environment) and cannot vary. 
But for Millikan, this is not enough. She contrasts the dance of the honey bee with the STOP 
sign (Millikan, p.c.). The location of the STOP sign indicates the location of the stopping 
event, but the location of the STOP sign is liable to vary, hence the location of the stopping 
event, which varies accordingly, is an aspect of the content of the sign. It is, in her terms, 
explicitly represented. To determine what is explicitly represented, what we must do, 
according to Millikan, is look and see what aspects of the representation can be transformed 
in a systematic way to yield other representations in the same system that represent other 
things. The location of the STOP sign is one such aspect that gives rise to meaningful 
transformations, hence is a meaningful component of the overall sign, just like the direction in 
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the bee dance case. Now the same analysis applies to ‘It is raining’. The place where the 
statement is made or the belief held determines the place where rain is said or believed to 
occur, thus the location goes into the content of the statement/belief and counts as ‘explicitly 
represented’, for Millikan. 
To be sure, the place of rain is linguistically unarticulated in ‘It is raining’ : no word or 
morpheme stands for it in the sentence. But for Millikan, that does not mean that the place of 
rain is unarticulated tout court. There is something in the overall sign that stands for the place 
of rain, she argues, but it is not a linguistic symbol : it is the place of utterance. The place of 
utterance is an element of the sign that stands for itself, that is, contributes itself (that very 
location) to the content of the utterance : an utterance of ‘It is raining’ occurring at a certain 
location says that it is raining at that location. The place which is a constituent of the 
proposition expressed by the utterance is the semantic value of… the place of utterance 
construed as a meaningful component of the utterance.
cxi
 Rather than ‘unarticulated’, the 
location of the raining event is reflexively articulated, Millikan says — it is articulated by 
means of what she calls a ‘reflexive sign’ : 
 
Times that represent times and places that represent places are perfectly ordinary 
ingredients of natural signs… We can invent a special term for the case where a sign 
element represents itself. Call these sign elements « reflexive ». (Millikan 2004 : 49) 
 
In the case of the Z-landers, Millikan would agree with Perry that the place is not 
explicitly represented, since it is truly invariant. But she would reject Perry’s contention that 
‘there is a little of the Z-lander in the most well-traveled of us’. Likewise, she agrees with 
Perry that the subject of perception is not explicitly represented, for it cannot vary. The 
content of perception is selfless — the self comes into the picture only through the 
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architecture of the system. But she treats the place and time of perception differently : they are 
elements of the representation that stand for themselves and contribute themselves to the 
explicit content of the perception.
cxii
 
 
Implicit representation 
 
Millikan’s notion of invariance is absolute, Perry’s notion relative. Being absolute, Millikan’s 
notion of invariance is stronger than Perry’s, but Perry’s weaker notion is no less legitimate 
and can serve to ground a notion of implicit content distinct from, and more inclusive than, 
the notion Millikan defines in terms of absolute invariance.  
 Let us grant that changes in the time or place of perception are ‘transformations’ that 
yield systematic changes in the perception’s truth-conditions. Still, there is a sense in which a 
perception can only represent what is going on at the time and place of perception. That is 
fixed by the perceptual mode. In the same way, an episodic memory can only represent a past 
event which the subject has experienced. That is fixed by the memory mode. As Perry rightly 
points out, there is an element of invariance here. To be sure, there is also an element of 
variability. What is fixed by the perception mode is the relation which, say, the time of the 
represented event must bear to the time of the perceptual episode ; and that time can vary. But 
the relevant relation to the perceptual or memory episode — the relevant ‘parameter’, as Perry 
says — is fixed by the mode and cannot vary. This is sufficient to distinguish the values of the 
parameter in question, which are provided automatically (as a function of the time and place 
of the perceptual or memory episode), from the elements of content that are explicitly 
represented and can vary freely, without being constrained or determined in this way. 
 I conclude that Perry’s view and Millikan’s do not really conflict — they talk about 
different things, despite using the same terminology (‘implicit’ vs ‘explicit representation’, 
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etc.). Perry and Millikan both accept that a representation has truth-conditions, and each of 
them draws a distinction — a different distinction — between aspects of the truth-conditions 
in question. I will assume that the representation’s truth-conditions are a certain state of 
affairs that it represents. Thus the Z-lander’s thought ‘It is raining’ represents the occurrence 
of rain in Z-land at the time of the thought episode. Millikan’s criterion can be used to 
distinguish, among the various aspects of what is globally represented, what belongs to the 
meaning of the representation and what does not. By her criterion, the meaning of a sign is 
« determined as a function of values of significant variables or determinables exhibited by the 
sign ». Both the weather condition (rain) and the time of the raining event satisfy that 
condition and therefore belong to the meaning of the representation, but the place of rain (Z-
land) does not because it is invariant in the absolute sense. Using the weaker notion of relative 
or parametric invariance as a criterion, Perry draws a different distinction between what is 
explicitly represented and what is only implicitly represented. What is implicitly represented 
covers all the aspects of what is represented that are fixed (either absolutely or relatively) and 
cannot vary freely. Presumably, what is explicitly represented (in language or thought) in 
Perry’s sense can only belong to the representation’s meaning, in Millikan’s sense, since it is 
compositionally determined ; but not every aspect of the representation’s meaning, in 
Millikan’s sense, is explicitly represented in Perry’s sense. 
What is explicitly represented, in Perry’s sense, is what I call the lekton. In my 
framework as in Perry’s, the place of rain is only implicitly represented when an ordinary 
subject looks out the window and says ‘It is raining’. The explicit content of the 
representation is a propositional function — a function from places to truth-values ; and the 
place which serves as argument to the function is determined via a certain relation (identity) 
to the place of utterance — a relation which itself is fixed by what Perry calls ‘the mode of 
thinking or discourse’. 
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The invariance argument rebutted 
 
We have just seen that, in a standard use of ‘It is raining’ to talk about the local weather, the 
external environment (viz. the place and time of the utterance event) determines the place or 
time which the utterance implicitly represents. But what about the case in which the place of 
the raining event is determined by cognitive rather than environmental factors ? What about 
the Murdock case ? Is the place explicitly or implicitly represented, in such a case ? 
If we accept the Externality Principle, as it seems that Perry does, we should say that 
the location of the raining event is explicitly represented and belongs to the lekton, despite the 
fact that it is linguistically unarticulated. But why should we accept the Externality Principle ? 
As we have noticed, what really matters is invariance. According to the argument from 
invariance, we should accept the Externality Principle because « when the unarticulated 
constituent is not fixed by the environment, but by cognitive factors, it can freely vary 
according to the speaker’s intentions : the invariance condition is not satisfied. » If the place 
of rain is not the place of utterance, but is fixed by what the speaker has in mind or intends to 
refer to, it can vary indefinitely. In one context the speaker will be talking about Murdock and 
his utterance ‘It is raining’ will say that it is raining in Murdock, in another context he will be 
talking about Paris. There is limitless variability here. Hence the place is explicitly 
represented despite being linguistically unarticulated. 
This argument in favour of the Externality Principle I find very weak. Once we have 
admitted the legitimacy of parametric invariance, one can easily extend that notion so as to 
cover the Murdock case as well. Perry himself distinguishes several ‘modes of thinking or 
discourse’. He distinguishes talk about the local weather from talk about the weather at other 
places. When one talks about the local weather, the relevant parameter is the place of 
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utterance : one’s weather talk concerns the place where one is. What is explicitly represented 
is the weather — the place is automatically determined by external facts regarding the 
utterance. Why not similarly construe the other type of discourse as a language game or 
discourse mode that sets up another parameter ? While a rain statement in the ‘local-weather-
talk’ mode concerns the place of the statement, a rain statement in the other mode concerns 
whichever place happens to be cognitively salient or is currently the topic of conversation. 
Clearly, what determines the value of that parameter is not the external environment, but 
cognitive factors. Still, the notion of parametric invariance applies : the mode of discourse 
fixes the relevant parameter (the place of utterance vs the place one is talking about), and the 
value of the parameter is determined by the relevant sort of factors (‘external’ or ‘cognitive’, 
as the case may be). There is variation in both cases, and in both cases the variation is 
constrained by the relevant parameter.
cxiii
 
 I conclude that neither the mental articulation argument, nor the argument from 
invariance, forces us to accept the Externality Principle. Since the Externality Principle is the 
only reason I can think of for insisting that some unarticulated constituents (those that are 
cognitively rather than externally determined) must belong to the lekton, and there is no 
compelling reason to accept the Principle, I will continue to assume that the lekton only 
contains elements that are explicitly articulated. 
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Part Ten 
 
 
Self-relative thoughts 
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Chapter 34 
The problem of the essential indexical 
 
 
 
In chapters 14-15 I mentioned two competing explanations of the phenomenon of indexical 
belief. Lewis accounts for indexical belief by claiming that its content is a relativized 
proposition (a property which the believer self-ascribes). Perry, instead, appeals to the 
distinction between the object of belief (a classical proposition) and the mode of presentation 
under which it is believed, and to the correlative distinction between belief and acceptance.
cxiv
 
I am going to argue that we need both relativized propositions and modes of 
presentation in a complete account of the phenomenon — an account that does not ignore the 
crucial distinction between implicit and explicit de se thoughts. I start with a general 
statement of the problem of indexical belief, also known (since Perry’s celebrated paper) as 
the ‘problem of the essential indexical’. In the next chapter I will present Perry’s objection to 
solutions based on relativized propositions. As we will see, there is a close connection 
between Perry’s argument against relativized propositions and the Externality Principle which 
I have just discussed (and rejected). 
 
The eternalization thesis 
 
In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap said he was dealing « only with languages which 
contain no expressions dependent upon extra-linguistic factors » (Carnap 1937 : 168). 
Carnap’s disciple Bar-Hillel lamented that this « restricts highly the immediate applicability » 
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of Carnap's views to natural languages since « the overwhelming majority of the sentences in 
these languages are indexical, i.e. dependent upon extra-linguistic factors » (Bar-Hillel 1963 : 
123). Bar-Hillel ventured the hypothesis that « more than 90 per cent of the declarative 
sentence-tokens we produce during our life-time are indexical sentences and not statements » 
(Bar-Hillel 1954 : 76 ; a 'statement', in his terminology, is a sentence that expresses the same 
proposition whichever context it occurs in). 
Despite his emphasis on the pervasiveness of indexicality, Bar-Hillel accepted that « a 
judgment [i.e. an ordered pair consisting of a sentence and a context] with an indexical 
sentence as first component can always, without loss of information, be transformed into a 
judgment with a statement as a first component, keeping the second component intact » (Bar-
Hillel 1954 : 76). Thus if, in context c, John says 'I am hungry' and thereby expresses the 
proposition that John is hungry at t (the time of c), he can express the same proposition in the 
same context by uttering "John is hungry at t".
cxv
  
 The thesis that indexical sentences can always be rephrased into a context-invariant 
form without loss of information deserves a name. Let us call it the 'eternalization thesis'.
cxvi
 It 
used to be very commonly accepted until fairly recently. In the late sixties a general principle  
— the principle of 'Expressibility' (Searle) or 'Effability' (Katz) — was put forward, which 
entails the eternalization thesis as a special case. According to that general principle, whatever 
may be conveyed by uttering a sentence S in a context c can also be literally expressed, in a 
context-independent manner, by means of a fully explicit sentence S'. One consequence of the 
principle is that « cases where the speaker does not say exactly what he means — the 
principal kinds of cases of which are nonliteralness, vagueness, ambiguity, and 
incompleteness — are not theoretically essential to linguistic communication »  (Searle 1969: 
20). Indexicality also counts as theoretically dispensable.
cxvii
 In principle, we can always 
replace an indexical expression by a nonindexical one. Instead of saying 'Thank God, he's 
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gone' I can say 'The man who just asked the stupid question about the relation betwen the 
mental and the physical has, thank God, left the room' (Katz 1977: 20) ; and instead of saying 
'That man is a foreigner' I can say 'There is one and only one man on the speaker's left by the 
window in the field of vision of the speaker and the hearer, and he is a foreigner' (Searle 
1969: 92). To be sure, that way of speaking would not be very convenient in practice. As Katz 
puts it, indexicality « allows speakers to make use of contextual features to speak far more 
concisely than otherwise » (Katz 1977: 19). 
 
A pragmatic constraint on indexical-elimination 
 
In practice, the transformation of indexical sentences into a context-invariant form raises 
« formidable problems » (Bar-Hillel 1963 :123). The eternalization thesis says that, for any 
sentence S, context c, and proposition p which S expresses in c, there is a sentence S' such 
that in every context (including c) S' expresses that same proposition p. So it is always 
possible to replace an indexical sentence S by a nonindexical sentence S': that is the gist of the 
eternalization thesis. Still, Bar-Hillel pointed out, there is a sense in which S cannot always be 
replaced by S'. Consider a very simple example: the replacement of 'I am hungry' (S) by 'John 
is hungry at t' (S'). S and S' express the same proposition (that John is hungry at t) in every 
context in which John is the speaker and t is the time of utterance; but that does not mean that 
S and S' can be freely interchanged in all such contexts. If the users do not know that John is 
the speaker and t the time of utterance, the sentences S and S' will not be taken to express the 
same proposition, hence they will not be intersubstitutable in the communicative situation. S 
will be actually replaceable by S' only in a small subset of the above set of contexts, namely 
the contexts in which (i) John is the speaker and t the time of utterance, and (ii) the language 
users are aware of that fact. 
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In general there is a pragmatic constraint on the transformation from indexical to 
nonindexical: the language users must know the relevant facts in virtue of which S and S' 
express the same proposition. But it is far from obvious that this constraint can be satisfied if 
the transformation from indexical to nonindexical is to be complete. In the examples I gave 
above ('The man who just asked the stupid question about the relation betwen the mental and 
the physical has, thank God, left the room',  'There is one and only one man on the speaker's 
left by the window in the field of vision of the speaker and the hearer, and he is a foreigner') 
the transformation was clearly not complete: there remained various sources of indexicality in 
the substitution sentences. Arguably, if we try to get rid of all indexicals, we will be in a 
position to do so only by invoking facts which are not known to the language users, that is, by 
violating the pragmatic constraint. 
 That difficulty, and the pragmatic constraint on which it is based, can be dismissed as 
irrelevant. Thus Goodman wrote: 
 
Against such translations, it is sometimes urged that they do not really convey the 
content of the originals. A spoken "Randy is running now" tells us that the action takes 
place at the very moment of speaking, while a "Randy runs [tenseless] on October 17, 
1948, at 10 p.m., E.S.T." does not tell us that the action takes place simultaneously 
with either utterance unless we know in addition that the time of the utterance is 
October 17, 1948 at 10 p.m. E.S.T. Since — the argument runs — we recognize the 
tenseless sentence as a translation of the tensed one only in the light of outside 
knowledge, we have here no genuine translation at all. But this seems to me no more 
cogent than would be the parallel argument that "L'Angleterre" is not a genuine 
translation of "England" because we recognize it as a translation only if we know that 
l'Angleterre is England. (Goodman 1951: 268-9) 
 272 
 
Goodman's quotation makes clear what is at issue: there are aspects of the intuitive 
'content' of the original that are left aside in the nonindexical translation, and at the same time 
'outside knowledge' — i.e. information which is not part of that intuitive 'content' — is 
exploited in producing the nonindexical translation. How is that intuitive notion of the 
'content' of the original utterance, what it 'tells us', related to that of the 'proposition' which it 
expresses, and which the nonindexical translation is taken also to express? Can we discard the 
intuitive difference in content between the original and its nonindexical translation, as 
Goodman suggests, on the grounds that they express the same proposition, much as 
'l'Angleterre' and 'England' denote the same country? 
 
Cognitive significance 
 
When we say that 'I am hungry' and 'John is hungry at t' ‘express the same proposition' with 
respect to a context c in which John is the speaker and t the time of utterance, we mean that 
they have the same truth-conditions. Both are true iff John is hungry at t. This is captured by 
saying that they express the same ‘singular proposition’, consisting of John, the time t, and the 
two-place relation of being hungry at a time. But if we have in mind more fine-grained 
propositions of the sort Frege was concerned with (what he called 'thoughts'), then it is 
unlikely that those utterances express the same proposition, even if they have the same truth-
conditions. As far as Fregean thoughts are concerned considerations of 'cognitive significance' 
play a crucial role alongside truth-conditional considerations. 
 Let us assume that John is rational. At t he may well assert 'I am hungry' while, at the 
same time, dissenting from 'John is hungry at t'. (That is possible if, lacking the relevant 
'outside knowledge', he does not know who he is, or what time it is. For example, he may 
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mistakenly believe that he is Peter, and that the current time is t'.) By Fregean standards, the 
fact that that is possible shows that the two sentences do not express the same 'thought', even 
with respect to a context in which John is the speaker and t the time of utterance. Following 
this line of argument, it can be shown that no transformation from indexical to nonindexical is 
possible without affecting the cognitive significance of the utterance and therefore changing 
the thought it expresses. One of the first philosophers to have made this point was Arthur 
Prior, who used an example very similar to Katz's 'thank God' example, in support of the 
opposite conclusion. I already quoted the example a couple of times: 
 
One says, e.g. 'Thank goodness that's over', and not only is this, when said, quite clear 
without any date appended, but it says something which it is impossible that any use of 
a tenseless copula with a date should convey. (Prior 1959/1976: 84; emphasis mine) 
 
The same point was to be made forcefully by Castañeda some years later, and, following 
Castañeda, by John Perry in a sequence of insightful and influential papers.
cxviii
 As a result of 
their work, the eternalization thesis is as commonly rejected nowadays as it was accepted in 
the first half of the twentieth century. The irreducibility and indispensability of indexicals is 
widely acknowledged. 
 
The problem and its solutions 
 
‘The essential indexical’, Perry says in his well-known essay by the same name, 
 
is a problem for the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions 
conceived as bearers of truth and falsity. (Perry 1979/1993b : 34) 
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If we individuate propositions in truth-conditional terms (in such a way that two utterances 
express the same proposition iff they are true in the same circumstances), then, indeed, the 
essential indexical poses a problem for the view that belief is a relation to propositions. How 
can it be that a rational subject believes P while disbelieving Q if P and Q, having the same 
truth-conditions, are said to be the same proposition ? 
To solve that problem there are a number of options available. First, we can make the 
belief relation triadic : we can say that propositions are believed under ‘guises’ or ‘modes of 
presentation’.cxix Replacement of an indexical by a non-indexical expression in the asserted 
sentence affects the guise, even if the proposition expressed is the same. The problem is 
solved because a rational subject may both believe and disbelieve the same proposition, 
provided he believes it under one guise (P) and disbelieves it under another guise (Q). This is 
the solution advocated by Perry himself, as we have seen. He distinguishes two levels of 
semantic value, corresponding to Kaplan’s distinction between character and content, and two 
relations (belief and acceptance) to those semantic objects. It is therefore possible to accept P 
while refusing to accept Q even if P and Q have, or determine, the same content in context. 
Alternatively, we can keep the belief relation dyadic, but, departing from 
Russellianism and the ‘coarse-grained’ individuation of propositions in terms of objects and 
properties, follow Frege in building propositions (‘thoughts’) out of ‘senses’ or modes of 
presentation, thus making them directly answerable to cognitive considerations. For that 
solution to work, special, nondescriptive senses of the sort invoked by the ‘neo-Fregeans’ 
must be associated with indexical expressions.
cxx
 
Both of the options I have listed — the neo-Russellian option and the neo-Fregean 
option — appeal to ‘modes of presentation’. That makes them rather similar ; so similar that it 
may be a mistake to oppose them. Indeed, there are positions that are intermediate between 
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them and cannot be easily classified as either neo-Russellian or neo-Fregean. In earlier work 
(Recanati 1993, 1995b) I described one such position : it keeps the belief relation dyadic by 
incorporating the modes of presentation into the singular proposition, alongside the objects 
and properties of which they are modes of presentation. The resulting ‘quasi-singular 
proposition’ is truth-conditionally equivalent to, but cognitively distinct from, the original 
singular proposition. 
 Besides this family of view, there is another type of approach, which does not posit 
‘modes of presentation’. That is the sort of view advocated by David Lewis in his treatment of 
belief de se.
cxxi
 Lewis’s theory of de se thoughts can be seen as a generalization of Prior’s 
treatment of tensed sentences. For Prior, as we have seen, tensed sentences express 
propositions which are true or false only relative to a time. Such propositions are incomplete, 
by Fregean standards : they are best thought of as propositional functions (taking times as 
arguments) or as predicates (of times). Incomplete though they are, we can maintain that they 
are the contents of tensed sentences, and also the content of the attitudes (e.g. relief) that we 
express by using such sentences. The relevant time, without which no truth-value can be 
determined, is arguably not a part of the content of the sentence, but an aspect of the 
circumstance in which the content is evaluated. We can treat indexical sentences in the same 
way, by holding that they express relativized propositions : propositions true at some indices 
but not at others. Thus if John is hungry at t
1
, ‘I am hungry’ is true at <John, t
1
>. The 
proposition expressed by that sentence is a relativized proposition, i.e. a function from 
centered worlds to truth-values — a property of individuals. Such a proposition is very 
different from the unrelativized proposition that John is hungry at t
1
, hence it is no mystery 
that one can believe the relativized proposition expressed by ‘I am hungry’ while disbelieving 
the unrelativized proposition expressed by ‘John is hungry at t
1
’. To believe the relativized 
proposition that one is hungry is, in effect, to self-ascribe the property of being hungry. As we 
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have seen, Lewis generalizes this point and argues that the object of the attitudes, in general, 
are not (classical) propositions, but properties. To believe a classical, unrelativized 
proposition P is nothing but to self-ascribe the property of inhabiting a possible world in 
which it is the case that P. 
 Even though, in ‘Thought without Representation’ (1986b), he himself appealed to 
relativized propositions, Perry devoted a section of his earlier paper ‘The Problem of the 
Essential Indexical’ (1979) to argue against that solution to the problem of the essential 
indexical : 
  
The problem [i.e. the problem which the essential indexical raises for  the view that 
belief is a relation to propositions individuated in truth-conditional terms] is not 
solved... by moving to a notion of proposition that, rather than true or false absolutely, 
is only true or false at an index or in a context (at a time, for a speaker, say). (Perry 
1979/1993b : 34) 
 
I will present and discuss Perry’s argument in detail in chapter 35. As I have said already, 
there is a close connection between that argument and some of the issues raised in the 
previous chapters, especially the Externality Principle (chapter 31), and the Reflexive 
Constraint (chapter 29). 
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Chapter 35 
Perry against relativized propositions 
 
 
 
Perry’s argument 
 
Can we use the relativized-propositions framework to deal with the essential indexical ? Can 
we say that an utterance such as ‘I am hungry’ expresses an Austinian proposition, the right-
hand-side of which is occupied by a relativized proposition, true only at a time and an agent ? 
According to Perry, if we say so, that will not help us solve the problem of the essential 
indexical. We cannot, in this way, properly capture the de se belief which is expressed by 
saying ‘I am hungry’. 
Perry’s argument proceeds in two steps. First, Perry attempts to establish that the subject 
does not merely believe the relativized proposition. The belief could not be evaluated as true 
or false if its content was exhausted by that proposition. For the belief to be evaluable, we 
need a situation of concern over and above the relativized proposition. In particular, we need 
a time and an agent, such that the relativized proposition is believed to be true with respect to 
that time and to that agent. Second step : Perry shows that, as soon as we bring the agent into 
the picture, the problem of the essential indexical re-appears : 
 
Once we have adopted these new-fangled propositions, which are only true at times for 
persons, we have to admit also that we believe them as true for persons at times, and not 
absolutely. And then our problem returns. (Perry 1979/1993b : 44) 
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The problem returns because there are different ways of thinking of the person relative to 
which the relativized proposition is believed to be true. When Perry thinks ‘I am making a 
mess’ at time t
1
, he believes the relativized proposition ‘x is making a mess at t’ to be true for 
himself at that time. But all the shoppers who watch him make a mess also believe that 
relativized proposition to be true for Perry at t
1
. Appealing to Austinian propositions 
consisting of a situation and a relativized proposition does not therefore solve the problem. 
Whether we use classical propositions or Austinian propositions, it seems that we need guises 
over and above the usual propositional constituents, in order to distinguish Perry’s first person 
belief from the other shoppers’ third person beliefs. 
 
Feldman’s response 
 
Evidently, one should block the argument at step 1 and maintain that the content of the belief 
is the relativized proposition. Only in that way can we hope to solve the problem of the 
essential indexical, for the very reason that Perry gives at step 2. The position I take is 
therefore the same as that defended a long time ago by Richard Feldman in his reply to Perry: 
 
Perry takes the doctrine of indexed propositions to entail that we do not simply believe 
such propositions, but rather believe that they are true at some index. However, we 
need not understand the doctrine in that way. Contrary to what Perrys says, we 
ordinarily do not believe that indexed propositions are true at some index. We simply 
believe them. In Perry’s example, when I realized what was happening I first came to 
believe the proposition that I am making a mess. Of course, I was then believing it at a 
certain place and time and in a certain possible world. And it was true for me in that 
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world at that place and time. Prior to my realization, I did not believe this proposition 
at all, although I may have believed some other proposition about this proposition. 
That is, I may have believed the meta-proposition that the proposition that I am 
making a mess is true at some index, namely, one containing the guilty shopper and 
that time. Similarly, the shopper watching me does not believe the proposition that I 
am making a mess, but he may believe some proposition about this proposition. For 
example, he may believe that it is true at an index containing me and then. So, on this 
view, the proposition that I am making a mess is one that I came to believe at the 
appropriate time and my coming to believe it can help to explain why I straightened 
my sack. (Feldman 1980 : 82) 
 
Indeed, in the situation-theoretic framework developed by Barwise (1989a), the cognitive 
content of the belief (that which accounts for the subject’s behaviour) is captured by the right-
hand-side in the Austinian proposition, that is, by the relativized proposition. The situation is 
needed only to account for the belief’s truth-conditions. So what the guilty shopper believes, 
on the situation-theoretic account, is the relativized proposition true at an agent x and a time t 
iff x is making a mess at t. 
 To be sure, that proposition is not semantically complete : it can be truth-evaluated 
only with respect to an agent and a time. In his reply Feldman says that the agent and the time 
are, simply, the agent and time of the context. The agent is the person who believes the 
relativized proposition, and the time is the time at which the agent believes it. Now Perry had 
anticipated such a position, and he responded to it in advance : 
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All believing is done by persons at times, or so we may suppose. But the time of belief 
and the person doing the believing cannot be generally identified with the person and 
time relative to which the proposition believed is held true. (Perry 1979/1993b : 44) 
 
This is the critical issue indeed. According to Feldman, an agent-relative proposition 
can only be evaluated with respect to the agent in the context of belief, i.e. with respect to the 
believer himself. So the agent does not have to be represented in order to play its role in 
fixing the belief’s truth-conditions : It is provided by the environmnent. This is also the 
position defended by Loar, and by Lewis following him. According to Loar, there is a 
primitive relation, the ‘self-ascriptive belief relation’, between believers and propositional 
functions (Loar 1976 : 358). Whenever a person stands in that relation to a propositional 
function, she entertains a de se belief, true iff the propositional function is true-of that person. 
Here again, we find that the index with respect to which the relativized proposition is 
evaluated is bound to be the ‘index of the context’ (to use the terminology from Lewis 1980). 
Only if we accept this constraint can we hope to solve the problem of the essential indexical 
by appealing to relativized propositions. 
 
The (Generalized) Reflexive Constraint 
 
The Constraint I have just stated is a generalization of the Reflexive Constraint from chapter 
29, so I will call it the ‘Generalized Reflexive Constraint’ (GRC). The Reflexive Constraint 
from chapter 29 said that the proposition that is the content of the state holds in a situation 
involving the subject of the state — a situation in which the subject stands in a certain relation 
R, fixed by the mode, to what is represented. The Generalized Reflexive Constraint says that 
the situation with respect to which the lekton is evaluated (the Lewisian index) is the situation 
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in which the state is tokened (the context). Not only the subject, but the other coordinates of 
the index (time, place, etc.) are reflexively equated to the corresponding parameters of the 
context. 
According to Perry, there is no reason to accept the Generalized Reflexive Constraint, 
for relativized propositions can be held true with respect to indices distinct from the index of 
the context.
cxxii
 That is what Perry thinks happens in the supermarket example : the guilty 
shopper takes the relativized proposition ‘x is making a mess’ to be true with respect to 
himself, but the other shoppers who watch him also take the relativized proposition to be true 
with respect to him. The difference — or more cautiously : one difference — between the 
guilty shopper who holds a first person belief and the other shoppers who hold a third person 
belief is that, for him but not for them, the ‘context of evaluation’ and the ‘context of belief’ 
coincide. Now the simple fact that they need not coincide shows that the problem of the 
essential indexical (i.e. the problem of characterizing the first person perspective) cannot be 
solved simply by appealing to relativized propositions. So the argument goes. As Perry puts 
it, 
 
The time of belief and the person doing the believing cannot be generally identified 
with the person and time relative to which the proposition believed is held true. You 
now believe that that I am making a mess was true for me, then, but you certainly do 
not believe it is true for you now, unless you are reading this in a supermarket. Let us 
call you and now the context of belief, and me and then the context of evaluation. The 
context of belief may be the same as the context of evaluation, but need not be. (Perry 
1979/1993b : 44) 
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However, we cannot consider Perry to have demonstrated the possibility of a 
divergence between the circumstance of evaluation and the context of belief, by providing a 
couple of examples; for the examples he provides are controversial (to say the least). As we 
have seen, Feldman denies that the other shoppers are belief-related to the relativized 
proposition ‘x is making a mess at t’ : they are, at best, related to a meta-proposition about it. 
Loar and Lewis would make the same denial. So the question we must ask is : Are there good 
theoretical reasons for accepting, or for rejecting, the Generalized Reflexive Constraint ? 
 
The Externality Principle and the GRC 
 
If the situation which a representation concerns was always fixed by environmental facts like 
the time of thinking/speaking or the location or identity of the thinker/speaker, that would be 
sufficient to justify the Generalized Reflexive Constraint. There would be no divergence 
between the context of belief and the situation of evaluation; the index with respect to which a 
representation is evaluated would always be the index of the context. But I argued that the 
situation of concern may be fixed by cognitive factors. One may entertain the place-relative 
representation ‘It is raining’ in the course of thinking about a place distinct from the place 
where one is. In such a case the index relative to which the representation ‘It is raining’ is 
evaluated is not the index of the context, because the ‘place’-coordinate of the index has been 
shifted to the place currently under focus. 
The Externality Principle and the Generalized Reflexive Constraint turn out to be two 
sides of the same coin. The Externality Principle tells us that the situation of concern is fixed 
by environmental facts, not cognitive factors. The Generalized Reflexive Constraint tells us 
that the situation of concern is anchored to the context and cannot be shifted. Were the 
Externality Principle correct, it would follow that the Generalized Reflexive Constraint holds 
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and that the sort of divergence between the context of evaluation and the context of belief 
which Perry invokes in ‘the Problem of the Essential Indexical’ cannot arise. His argument 
against relativized propositions would collapse.
cxxiii
 
Be that as it may, I reject the Externality Principle : the utterance/thought ‘It is raining’ 
may concern all sorts of place, whether or not the speaker/thinker happens to be in that place ; 
hence there may well be a divergence between the context of belief and the situation of 
evaluation, as Perry claims. Since I reject the Externality Principle, and the Generalized 
Reflexive Constraint that goes with it, it seems that I should accept Perry’s conclusion : that 
the problem of the essential indexical cannot be solved by appealing to relativized 
propositions. Those, like Lewis, who believe that the problem can be solved in this way take 
the Generalized Reflexive Constraint for granted: what determines the individual with respect 
to which the self-ascribed propositional function (or property) is evaluated is an 
environmental fact : the individual in question is bound to be the person who does the self-
ascribing (the ‘agent’ in the ‘context of belief’). There is no way in which one can, as it were, 
vary the person of evaluation by applying the propositional function to someone else. Thus 
the type of case imagined by Perry — the other shopper’s applying the propositional function 
‘x is making a mess’ to Perry — cannot arise. But for me, given the framework I adopt, such a 
situation ought to be possible. I may comment on someone’s appearance and say : ‘Very 
handsome !’ Here, arguably, I express a person-relative proposition (a property), true of 
persons at times, and I apply it to a certain individual whom my utterance concerns. Whether 
or not such a view is sustainable, it is clearly in the spirit of the general position I have put 
forward. Now if we accept that there are such person-relative propositions, which can be 
evaluated with respect to whichever persons they happen to concern, then it is clear that the 
problem of the essential indexical cannot be solved merely by appealing to such propositions. 
For the person whose appearance I comment upon when I say (or think) ‘Very handsome !’ 
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may happen to be myself, seen in a mirror and mistaken for someone else. In such a situation, 
arguably, I believe the propositional function ‘x is very handsome’ of myself, yet I do not 
believe the sort of thing that I could express by saying ‘I am very handsome’. I entertain a de 
re belief about myself, not a de se belief. I conclude that, without something like the 
Generalized Reflexive Constraint to anchor the situation of concern to the context, the 
problem of the essential indexical cannot be solved by appealing to relativized propositions 
(unsupplemented by guises or something of that sort). 
In chapter 36, this objection will be met, by accepting that — as we have already seen 
(chapter 29) — the Generalized Reflexive Constraint holds in a limited range of cases. 
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Chapter 36 
Context-relativity 
 
 
 
Indexicality and the GRC 
 
One of the differences between ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is raining here’ is that, while the first 
sentence can be evaluated with respect to a place different from the place of the context, the 
second sentence cannot : as we have seen (chapter 12), the indexical ‘here’ rigidly anchors the 
situation of evaluation to the context.
cxxiv
 Indexicals are freezing operators that make the 
relevant aspect of the situation of evaluation unshiftable. As far as indexicals are concerned, 
therefore, the Generalized Reflexive Constraint holds : the coordinates of the evaluation index 
that correspond to indexicals cannot be shifted but are set, once for all, by the context. 
It is interesting to note that Feldman, who maintains the Generalized Reflexive 
Constraint against Perry, models index-relative propositions by indexical sentences. To 
believe a relativized proposition, for him, is to accept an indexical sentence such as ‘I am 
making a mess’ : 
 
The idea [of believing a relativized proposition] may be clarified if we drop talk of 
propositions altogether and simply talk of sentences. What I came to believe was the 
sentence ‘I am making a mess’. I did not believe it before. I came to believe it at the 
same time I became prepared to say it. Note that I need not have become prepared to 
say-it-at-an-index or say that it is true at an index. I may have no thoughts about 
indices at all. I just became prepared to say this sentence. Of course, there was a time, 
 286 
place, etc., at which this happened. Similarly, I did not come to believe that the 
sentence is true at an index. I simply came to believe it. This coming to believe may 
have occurred at some index, but the index is not in any sense a part of the content of 
my belief. (Feldman 1980 : 82-3) 
 
Since he equates relativized propositions with indexical sentences, it is understandable that 
Feldman sticks to the GRC. For it is a property of indexical sentences that the relevant 
coordinates of the index are anchored to the context and cannot shift. 
At this point someone like Feldman, who thinks the problem of the essential indexical 
can be solved by appealing to relativized propositions, may argue as follows. It is true that the 
unarticulated constituents which go into the evaluation index are shiftable ; hence if we think 
of de se belief on the model of ‘It is raining’ the problem of the essential indexical will not be 
solved, because the GRC will not hold. But we need not think of de se belief on the model of 
‘It is raining’. We may think of it on the model of ‘It is raining here’. This is an indexical 
sentence, and that guarantees that the GRC holds. 
This intriguing move raises an obvious objection. In contrast to ‘It is raining’, the 
sentence ‘It is raining here’ does not express a place-relative proposition. Being articulated 
(by the indexical ‘here’), the place of rain is a constituent of the content articulated by the 
sentence — it is a constituent of the lekton. To say that de se belief should be thought of on 
the model of ‘It is raining here’ rather than on the model of ‘It is raining’ is therefore to give 
up the view that de se belief should be accounted for in terms of relativized propositions. 
Obvious though it is, the objection can be met, by distinguishing two dimensions 
under which indexical sentences differ from sentences like ‘It is raining’. In terms of this 
distinction, the proposal can be rephrased : the suggestion is that de se thoughts are more like 
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indexical sentences than like sentences such as ‘It is raining’ as far as one of the two 
dimensions is concerned. The situation is reversed when one considers the other dimension. 
 
(Un)articulatedness and (un)shiftability 
 
Indexical sentences such as ‘It is raining here’ contrast with location-relative sentences such 
as ‘It is raining’ in two dimensions. First, the place is articulated in the indexical sentence ‘It 
is raining here’, while it is unarticulated in ‘It is raining’. In my framework, whatever is 
unarticulated falls on the situational side, hence ‘It is raining’ expresses a location-relative 
proposition — a proposition true at some locations and false at others. Second, the place 
which the indexical adverb ‘here’ articulates cannot be shifted ; it is bound to be the place of 
the context. This is a property of the indexical qua freezing operator. In contrast, the place 
which remains unarticulated in ‘It is raining’ and features in the situation of evaluation can be 
shifted : as we have seen, it need not be the place of the context but can be any place that is 
currently in focus. 
[Table 2 near here] 
The suggestion, then, can be rephrased as follows. Let us construe the two dimensions 
as independent. They determine a matrix with four cells (Table 2). On the articulated side, we 
find not only the indexicals, which have the property of unshiftability, but also pronominal 
expressions which do not have that property.
cxxv
 On the unarticulated side, a sentence like ‘It 
is raining’ expresses a location-relative proposition that can be evaluated with respect to any 
place, as we have seen ; but why should there not also exist sentences which, like ‘It is 
raining’, express location-relative propositions, but propositions which can only be evaluated 
with respect to the place of the context ? Why should the fourth cell in the matrix 
(unarticulatedness + unshiftability) remain empty ? What I suggest, therefore, is that we make 
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room for a new category : that of context-relative representations, representations which 
display the two features of relativity (unarticulatedness) and unshiftability. Relativity makes 
them similar to ‘It is raining’, and unshiftability to ‘It is raining here’. If the fourth cell is not 
empty, there is a class of representations for which the Generalized Reflexive Constraint 
holds, even though they are not indexical. 
I will henceforth use ‘context-quotes’ to conventionally indicate that a given 
representation is relative to some feature of the context in which it is tokened. Thus in 
contrast to ‘It is raining’ which, because it can be evaluated with respect to any place, is 
relative to a shiftable situational component, 
c
It is raining
c
 (with the context-quotes) is relative 
to an unshiftable situational component : it can only be evaluated with respect to the place of 
the context. That is a feature it shares with the indexical sentence ‘It is raining here’. But in 
contrast to ‘It is raining here’, the relevant situational component (that to which the 
proposition is said to be relative) is not articulated, indexically or otherwise, in 
c
It is raining
c
. 
 
Context-relative representations in language and thought 
 
Context-relative representations, if they exist, are intermediate between indexical 
representations and situation-relative representations such as ‘It is raining’ (which can be 
evaluated with respect to any place and time). Like indexical sentences, their truth-value 
depends upon a feature of the context — for example the time or the place of the tokening. 
Whether we evaluate the indexical sentence ‘It is raining here and now’, or the context-
relative sentence 
c
It is raining
c
,
 
in both cases we must look at the place and time of the context 
to check whether or not the sentence is true. But the relevant feature of context is explicitly 
represented in the indexical case, while it remains unarticulated in the context-relative case, 
just as the situation of concern remains unarticulated in situation-relative sentences. 
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Do such representations exist? As far as natural language is concerned, that is far from 
obvious. It may be that, in natural language, we find only indexical sentences (‘It is raining 
here and now’) and situation-relative sentences (‘It is raining’), but no context-relative 
sentences. Be that as it may, we have already seen that there are context-relative 
representations in thought. The most basic kind of representation with which a perceiving-
and-acting organism must be credited presumably belongs to that category. 
An organism which (like most animals) does not have the reflective capacity to think 
of itself as a person among other persons yet perceives and acts should be credited with a 
primitive form of egocentric thinking — what I have called an implicit de se thought (chapter 
24).
cxxvi
 That is one of Perry’s major insights, in ‘Thought without Representation’ and 
elsewhere. I already quoted the following passage from ‘Perception, Action, and the Structure 
of Believing’: 
 
The information that we get at a certain spot in the world is information about objects 
in the neighborhood of that spot in a form suitable for the person in that spot. As long 
as this is the only source of information we have about ourselves, we need no way of 
designating ourselves, indexical or insensitive. Our entire perceptual and doxastic 
structure provides us with a way of believing about ourselves, without any expression 
for ourselves. (Perry 1986a/1993b : 148-149) 
 
Though relative to the subject, perceptual representations are not just person-relative 
representations ; for they are not applicable to other persons than the subject of the context. 
They can only be evaluated with respect to the context in which they are entertained — the 
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perceiving subject, and the time and place of perception. In other words, they are context-
relative representations, satisfying the Generalized Reflexive Constraint.
cxxvii
 
 Shall we say that only organisms devoid of an explicit representation of themselves 
entertain such context-relative representations, while we entertain more sophisticated, 
indexical representations containing the word ‘I’ or a mental analogue? Perry gave us a reason 
not to make that move. Just as ‘there is a little of the Z-lander in the most well-traveled of us’, 
there is a little of the simple perceiving-and-acting organism in the most reflectively self-
conscious of us. What Perry says about our thoughts concerning the local weather easily 
generalizes to perception-based thought, whether it is about the weather or anything else: 
 
What each of us gets from perception may be regarded as information concerning 
ourselves, to explain connections between perception and action. There is no need for 
a self-referring component of our belief, no need for an idea or representation of 
ourselves. When a ball comes at me, I duck ; when a milk shake is put in front of me, I 
advance. The eyes that see and the torso or legs that move are parts of the same more 
or less integrated body. And this fact, external to the belief, supplies the needed 
coordination. The belief need only have the burden of registering differences in my 
environment, and not the burden of identifying the person about whose relation to the 
environment perception gives information with the person whose action it guides. 
(Perry 1986b/1993b : 219) 
 
Again, perceptual representations are context-relative. They satisfy the GRC, but they do so in 
virtue of architectural facts, not through the use of explicit indexicals. 
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Expressing one’s subjective thoughts 
 
If there are context-relative representations in thought, but (presumably) not in language, how 
can we verbally express a context-relative thought, e.g. the thought that one is hungry or cold, 
or the thought that the wine tastes bad ? 
If we want to express a context-relative thought, using language, we have to use either 
a situation-relative sentence or an indexical sentence. If a situation-relative sentence is 
available that is the most appropriate tool. The difference between a situation-relative 
sentence and a context-relative sentence is small when the situation of evaluation happens to 
be the situation of utterance. It is a purely modal difference : the situation-relative sentence 
could be used to characterize another situation than the situation of utterance, while a context-
relative sentence could not. The difference between a context-relative sentence and an 
indexical sentence is more substantial, since the indexical sentence articulates the relevant 
contextual feature and makes it part of the lekton. That is why one would not express the 
context-relative thought 
c
It is raining
c, prompted by the perception of rain, by saying ‘It is 
raining here and now’. We would naturally say ‘It is raining’ (unless there is a good reason to 
explicitly represent the time and place of the context). 
But there are context-relative thoughts for which no situation-relative sentence is 
available. Self-relative thoughts are a case in point. If I want to express a self-relative thought, 
to the effect that I am hungry or cold, I can hardly say ‘Hungry !’ or ‘Cold !’, for that is not 
proper English. I have to use an indexical sentence and say : ‘I am cold’, or ‘I am hungry’. In 
contrast to ‘It’s raining here’, which makes sense only if there is a good reason to explicitly 
represent the place of the context (typically because of an intended contrast between that 
place and some other place), I can use an indexical sentence such as ‘I am hungry’ to express 
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a context-relative thought because, given the lack of an appropriate situation-relative 
sentence, there is no clear alternative. In this way we can perhaps explain why Wittgenstein 
(in the Blue Book) and some of his followers have insisted that there are two uses of ‘I’ : a 
subjective use whereby an indexical sentence ‘I am F’ expresses a self-relative thought, and a 
more objective use whereby it expresses a proposition with the subject as a constituent. The 
word ‘I’, they say, is a genuine referring expression only in the second type of case (see e.g. 
Chauvier 2001). 
Sometimes, the language makes a situation-relative sentence available to express a 
self-relative thought. ‘The wine tastes bad’ is an example. I can use that sentence to express 
the self-relative thought 
c
The wine tastes bad
c
. I do not have to say : ‘The wine tastes bad to 
me’. Still, the thought I express is irreducibly subjective : cThe wine tastes badc — the thought 
I express — is true if and only if the wine tastes bad to me, the thinker of that thought. In 
contrast to the thought, however, the natural language sentence ‘The wine tastes bad’ is not 
itself context-relative, but only situation-relative. As Kölbel and Lasersohn have argued, 
predicates of personal taste require a ‘judge’ coordinate in the index of evaluation, but the 
judge need not be the speaker — it may be any person or group whose taste serves as 
standard.
cxxviii
 So the claim I make when I say ‘The wine tastes bad’ can always be interpreted 
as more general or more objective than it is (i.e., than it is when construed as the mere 
expression of a self-relative thought). If I want to avoid such interpretations of my claim, I 
will have to make the relativity to myself explicit by using an indexical : ‘The wine tastes bad 
to me’. But if I do that, I introduce a possibly unwelcome contrast between my viewpoint (my 
taste) and that of others, a contrast which is absent when I merely express my feelings. 
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Chapter 37 
Implicit and explicit de se thoughts 
 
 
 
Return of the essential indexical 
 
I have just mentioned the Wittgensteinian distinction between ‘two uses of ‘I’’.‘I’ is used ‘as 
subject’ in a sentence ‘I am F’ if the sentence expresses a self-relative thought, as when I feel 
hot and I express my feeling by saying ‘I am hot’. It is used ‘as object’ if the sentence 
expresses a thought explicitly about myself, e.g., the thought that I was born in 1952. In my 
framework, a thought explicitly about oneself is a thought the content of which (the lekton) 
involves oneself as a constituent. That is not sufficient, of course : such a thought counts as a 
first person thought, as a thought about oneself, only if the constituent in question is thought 
of under the mode of presentation EGO. 
This connects up with the distinction I drew earlier between implicit and explicit de se 
thoughts (chapter 24). In implicit de se thoughts, the self is not articulated, it only features in 
the index of evaluation. Implicit de se thoughts are, in effect, self-relative thoughts. In explicit 
de se thoughts, the self is explicitly identified, and it is identified as oneself. Explicit de se 
thoughts contrast both with implicit de se thoughts, which are identification-free (they 
‘concern’ the subject without being about him or her), and with those de re thoughts which 
happen to be about oneself but which are not internally first personal (because one is not 
thought of under the mode of presentation EGO, but under a third person mode of 
presentation, as in Kaplan’s mirror example). 
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The distinction between the two uses of ‘I’, and the two types of de se thought, leads 
us back to the problem of the essential indexical. I have shown that, by appealing to context-
relative representations, we can account for de se belief. In defense of a Lewisian type of 
account, I have argued that Perry’s objection does not hold, since context-relative 
representations satisfy the Generalized Reflexive Constraint. But the problem of the essential 
indexical is not thereby solved in its full generality, for it arises also with respect to the 
‘objective’ use of indexical sentences. If I entertain an explicit de se thought and express it by 
uttering the sentence ‘I was born in Paris (in contrast to you, who were born in Chicago)’, my 
utterance expresses a proposition with me as constituent. Yet the indexical is no less essential 
in that sentence than in any other : if we replace it by a non-indexical expression, we affect 
the cognitive significance of the utterance. As Perry might say, ‘our problem returns’. 
To sum up, the Lewisian account with its relativized propositions is appropriate only 
for implicit de se thoughts which are, indeed, self-relative. But implicit de se thoughts are 
only one particular category of de se thoughts. Another category is that of explicit de se 
thoughts, and for them, an account à la Perry, with first person modes of presentation, seems 
unavoidable. No ‘EGO’ mode of presentation is required to account for implicit de se 
thoughts, which are identification-free and involve no explicit representation of the self ; but 
we need such a mode of presentation if we are to come up with a general account of de se 
thought, and a general solution to the problem of the essential indexical. 
 
De re thought as a variety of de se thought 
 
In ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’ (section XII), Lewis compares his own account of indexical 
belief with that of Perry, and he puts the matter thus : For Perry, de se thought is a variety of 
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de re thought ; for Lewis, de re reduces to de se. Lewis summarizes Perry’s position as 
follows: 
 
Perry’s scheme (…) provides, in the most straightforward way possible, for other-
ascription as well as self-ascription of properties. Ascription of properties to 
individuals, in general, is called belief de re. Perry’s scheme is made for belief de re, 
and belief de se falls under that as a special case. (Lewis 1979a/1983 : 151-2) 
 
For Lewis, however, « The subject’s self-ascriptions are the whole of his system of beliefs. 
Other-ascriptions of properties are not some further beliefs alongside the self-ascriptions », 
but a particular case of self-ascription. 
Let us start with de re thoughts — thoughts about a certain object x, to the effect that it 
has property F. Such thoughts give rise to Frege’s problem : it is possible for a rational person 
to think of the same object, x, both that it is F and that it is not F. How can that be ? Frege 
solved the problem by appealing to modes of presentation over and above the objects thought 
about. A rational subject can believe of x, thought of under a mode of presentation m, that it is 
F, and at the same time believe of the same object x, thought of under a different mode of 
presentation m’, that it is not F. Insofar as the modes of presentation are distinct, there is no 
irrationality. So de re thoughts involve two things : the res thought about, and the way it is 
thought about (the mode of presentation). The mode of presentation is the internal, 
psychological aspect of the thought, while the res thought about depends upon the external 
environment. 
De re thoughts in general involve nondescriptive modes of presentation, that is, modes 
of presentation which essentially depend upon contextual relations to the object. The object 
the thought is about is the object which stands in the right contextual relations to the subject 
 296 
or to the mental episode in which the mode of presentation occurs. For example, a 
demonstrative mode of presentation ‘that G’ is typically based upon a certain contextual 
relation to the object, in virtue of which the subject is able to focus his or her attention on it 
and gather (typically perceptual) information from it. The mode of presentation can be 
thought of as a temporary mental file in which the subject can store the information acquired 
in virtue of the contextual relation in question.
cxxix
 
According to Perry, the concept EGO is a special case. It is a mental file that is based 
upon a special relation which every individual bears to himself or herself, namely identity. In 
virtue of being a certain individual, I am in a position to gain information concerning that 
individual in all sorts of ways in which I can gain information about no one else, e.g. through 
proprioception and kinaesthesis. The mental file EGO serves as repository for information 
gained in this way (as well as for any information that is about the same individual as 
information gained in this way). So de se thoughts are a species of de re thought, namely de 
re thoughts involving the mode of presentation EGO. 
For Lewis, the reduction goes in the other direction : de re thoughts are a species of de 
se thought. Let us assume, following Perry (and Evans), that a nondescriptive mode of 
presentation of the sort that occurs in de re thoughts is constitutively associated with a certain 
relation R to objects, an ‘acquaintance relation’ whose obtaining creates an information link 
that the subject can exploit. When I think a de re thought to the effect that a certain object is 
F, and the object in question is thought of under a mode of presentation m based upon a 
certain relation R
m
 to that object, what I do, according to Lewis, is self-ascribe the property of 
standing in relation R
m
 to an x that is F. For  example, to think ‘That is F’ is to self-ascribe 
the property of standing in the demonstrative relation R
dem
 to some object x that is F (Lewis 
1979a/1983 : 154-55).
cxxx
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 I see two problems with Lewis’s view. First, the view entails, or seems to entail, that 
the subject is able to think of the contextual relation R in which he or she stands to the object 
of his/her thought. This entailment is absent from the pure ‘mode of presentation’ view. That 
view simply says that the subject thinking a de re thought exercises a mental file, whose 
existence is contingent upon a certain relation R to the object. The subject need not be aware 
of that relation, or be able to articulate it. So for example the relation can be that which holds 
when a Kripkean causal chain links me to Cicero. We may be reluctant to say that the subject 
who believes that Cicero was rich thereby self-ascribes the property of being related to some 
rich individual x by a K-causal chain involving his use of the name ‘Cicero’, since the subject 
presumably lacks the notion of a K-causal chain. 
Let us, however, grant that this objection can be met.
cxxxi
 Another  problem I see with 
Lewis’s view is that he fails to draw the crucial distinction between implicit and explicit de se 
thought. In terms of that distinction, Lewis’ point should be rephrased as follows : de re 
thought is a species of implicit de se thought. The self’s involvement is implicit, because it is 
determined by the belief mode (construed as a self-ascriptive mode) and is invariant. The 
invariance in question is of the strongest form possible: every belief, for Lewis, is de se. 
Whether the subject thinks ‘I am hot’, ‘That is gigantic’, or ‘Ice melts’, in all cases the subject 
self-ascribes a property : the property of being hot, the property of being R
dem
-related to an 
object x that is gigantic, or the property of inhabiting a possible world in which ice melts. 
What about other type of de se thought, i.e the case in which the subject explicitly 
thinks about himself/herself ? What about a thought like ‘I was born in 1952’ ? Lewis offers 
his theory as a theory of de se thought in general. For him, the subject who thinks ‘I am hot’ 
self-ascribes the property of being hot (or, equivalently, the property of being identical to an x 
who is hot). Presumably, he would hold that the subject who thinks ‘I was born in 1952’ self-
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ascribes the property of having been born in 1952 (or, equivalently, the property of being 
identical to an x who was born in 1952). 
 
De se thoughts as a variety of de re thought 
 
Insofar as the self’s involvement is implicit, no Frege case can arise when I self-ascribe a 
property : I cannot be misled as to whom I ascribe the property to, because the identity of the 
individual to whom I ascribe the property is determined by the architecture of the belief 
system in an invariant manner.  A belief is a self-ascription, period. To use Millikan’s terms, 
the ascribee is simply not among the ‘variables that can accept alternative values’. When I 
hold an ordinary belief, the self is represented only implicitly, just as the actual world is 
represented only implicitly. 
Yet there are de se thoughts in which the self is represented explicitly. (They are what 
Millikan 2004 calls ‘ego-explicit’ thoughts.) Such thoughts naturally give rise to Frege cases. 
Imagine that I see myself in the mirror and come to believe that I have a bump on my 
forehead. Two modes of presentation are involved here : a demonstrative mode of 
presentation of the man I see in the mirror, and the EGO mode of presentation. I am related to 
the individual my thought is about both through the R
dem
 relation and the R
ego
 relation. The 
information that I have a bump on my forehead is gained through the R
dem
 relation (it is gained 
by looking at the mirror), but I know that the person I am looking at is myself, so I safely 
transfer that information into my EGO file, and can act in the relevant way (by touching my 
forehead and checking the presence of the bump). Since modes of presentation are involved, 
mistakes can be made. I can be wrong in assuming that the man in the mirror is myself ; or, on 
the contrary, I may fail to recognize the man in the mirror as myself and entertain 
contradictory beliefs about what is in fact the same person (‘That man has a bump on his 
 299 
forehead, but I do not’). All this shows that the de se thought ‘I have a bump on my forehead’, 
in this type of case, is a species of de re thought, as Perry claims. But this is compatible with 
Lewis’s view that de re thought is a species of de se thought. The two views are consistent, 
given the distinction between implicit and explicit de se thought. 
As I said, Lewis’s claim should be rephrased as the claim that every thought is an 
implicit de se thought. The simplest of such thoughts are the self-ascriptions of properties like 
being hot or being hungry. But more complex properties can be involved, like the property of 
seeing an object that is F, or more generally the property of standing in a contextual relation R 
to some object that is F. Thus de re thoughts turn out to be a species of implicit de se thought. 
Still, we can maintain, with Perry, that explicit de se thoughts are themselves a species of de 
re thought, involving a special relation R
ego
 to the res the thought is about.
cxxxii
 If this is right, 
then an explicit de se thought (e.g. the thought that one was born in 1952) is itself a variety of 
implicit de se thought : to believe that one was born in 1952 is to self-ascribe the property of 
being R
ego
-related to an x such that x was born in 1952. 
Since the R
ego
-relation is the relation of identity, is it easy to overlook the 
difference between self-ascribing the property of being F and self-ascribing the property of 
being R
ego
-related to an x such that x is F. But there is a significant difference : in one case but 
not in the other, the object of which being F is predicated is explicitly identified, and can be 
mis-identified. This is enough to justify talk of ‘modes of presentation’. 
I conclude that Perry and Lewis are both right. There is a sense in which de se thought 
is a special case of de re thought, but there is also a sense in which de re thought is a special 
case of de se thought. The apparent conflict between Perry’s and Lewis’s perspectives is due 
to insufficient appreciation of the crucial distinction between implicit and explicit de se 
thoughts. Given that distinction, we need both relativized propositions and modes of 
presentation in a complete account of belief de se. 
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Part Eleven 
 
 
Shiftability 
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Chapter 38 
The Generalized Reflexive Constraint  
 
 
 
Lewis and the GRC 
 
In chapter 29 I introduced the Reflexive Constraint as a characteristic feature of perception 
and memory and, more generally, of a family of states which, following Higginbotham, I 
called the ‘reflexive states’ (chapter 22). In virtue of the Reflexive Constraint, the content of 
such a state has to be evaluated in a situation involving the subject of the state — a situation 
in which the subject stands in some relation R, determined by the mode, to what the state 
represents. 
The Generalized Reflexive Constraint (GRC), introduced in chapter 35, is more 
demanding. According to the GRC, the situation with respect to which the content of the state 
is evaluated must involve not only the subject of the state, but also the time of the state, the 
location of the state, and so on and so forth : in Lewis’s terms, the index with respect to which 
the content is evaluated must be the ‘index of the context’. The Generalized Reflexive 
Constraint anchors the situation of evaluation to the context and makes it unshiftable. 
In Lewis’s theory, the GRC holds across the board. Whenever a representation is 
tokened in the subject’s mind, the content of the representation is evaluated with respect to a 
situation involving the subject and the time and place of the tokening. In other words, the 
content is construed as a property which is ascribed to the context in which the representation 
is tokened.
cxxxiii
 If the subject feels that she is hot, the content of the representation is the 
property of being hot, which the subject ascribes to herself at the present time. If the subject 
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believes that this is a hot saucer, the content of the representation is another property which 
the subject ascribes to herself at the present time, namely the property of being R
dem
-related to 
an x such that x is a hot saucer. If the subject conjectures that it was hot two weeks ago, she 
conjecturally ascribes to the context she is in the property of being two weeks later than a 
situation in which it was hot at the same place. 
So for Lewis the index of evaluation can only be the index of the context ; it cannot be 
shifted. To be sure, Lewis acknowledges that the index can be shifted through the use of 
operators, but, precisely because this is done by means of operators, only sentences in the 
scope of operators can have their index of evaluation shifted. Autonomous sentences are 
always evaluated with respect to the index of the context. It follows that the GRC holds for 
them. Embedded sentences are another story : they are evaluated with respect to whichever 
shifted index may have been introduced by an operator higher up in the (autonomous) 
sentence of which the embedded sentence is a part. 
 
Operator-shiftability vs free shiftability 
 
The claim that the situation of evaluation can be shifted only through the use of operators can 
be disputed. As I pointed out in chapter 12, a simple, unembedded sentence like ‘It is raining’ 
may well concern a place distinct from the place of utterance. If the speaker and the hearer are 
involved in a conversation about what is going on at a certain place l, distinct from the place 
of utterance, the sentence ‘It is raining’ uttered in that context will presumably be about l, not 
about the place of the context. In this regard, ‘It is raining’ behaves differently than the 
indexical sentence ‘It is raining here’, since ‘It is raining here’ can only be evaluated with 
respect to the place of utterance. The GRC holds with respect to the latter, it seems, but not 
with respect to the former. That means that, unless a freezing operator like the indexical 
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adverbs ‘here’ and ‘now’ keeps the evaluation relative to the context of utterance, the 
situation of evaluation is shiftable even in the absence of operator. 
 Lewis accepts only one type of shiftability, however : operator-shiftability, i.e. 
shiftability by means of operators. Modal and temporal operators admittedly shift the point of 
evaluation : they take us to a point of evaluation distinct from the initial or default point 
which is the index of the context. But operator-shiftability only concerns sentences in the 
scope of operators ; it does not concern autonomous sentences. The possibility of shifting the 
index of evaluation for autonomous sentences as in the example I have just given is 
something that Lewis does not acknowledge. Let us call the form of shiftability which Lewis 
does not accept, and which a simple sentence like ‘It is raining’ illustrates, ‘free’ shiftability. 
 Faced with prima facie examples of free shiftability such as ‘It is raining’ used to talk 
about a remote situation, Lewis can argue that they involve an implicit operator. To change 
the example a bit, suppose that we are talking about the situation in Chicago, and I say : ‘At 
this time of the year, it is freezing’. This may be construed as elliptical for a more complex 
sentence : ‘In Chicago, at this time of the year, it is freezing’, where ‘in Chicago’ is a place-
shifting operator taking us from the place of utterance to the place named by the proper noun 
‘Chicago’. 
Lewis himself appeals to implicit operators in his theory of fiction : 
 
If I say that Holmes liked to show off, you will take it that I have asserted an 
abbreviated version of the true sentence « In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes 
liked to show off ». As for the embedded sentence « Holmes liked to show off », taken 
by itself with the prefixed operator neither explicitly present nor tacitly understood, we 
may abandon it to the common fate of subject-predicate sentences with denotationless 
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subject tems : automatic falsity or lack of truth value, according to taste. (Lewis 
1978/83 : 262-3) 
 
So ‘Holmes liked to show off’ turns out to be ambiguous, according to Lewis. Taken as an 
abbreviated sentence headed by an implicit operator, it is true ; taken as unabbreviated, it is 
(say) truth-valueless. Similarly, on the suggested analysis, ‘At this time of the year, it is 
freezing’ is ambiguous. Taken by itself with the prefixed operator ‘In Chicago’ neither 
explicitly present nor tacitly understood, it expresses a falsehood if it is uttered in Berkeley in 
February, because without the operator the sentence is bound to be evaluated with respect to 
the index of the context (in virtue of the GRC).
cxxxiv
 With the implicit operator prefixed to it, 
it expresses a truth, because then the embedded sentence in the scope of the operator is 
evaluated with respect to a shifted index in which Chicago substitutes for Berkeley. 
Just as there are autonomous sentences that are, or seem to be, evaluated with respect 
to a shifted index (e.g. ‘It is freezing’ used to talk about the situation in Chicago), there are 
mental representations which do not satisfy the GRC because their content is evaluated in a 
situation distinct from the situation in which they are tokened. Memory states are an obvious 
example. To be sure, memory satisfies the Reflexive Constraint : the content of a memory 
must be evaluated with respect to a situation experienced by the subject who remembers. But 
memory does not satisfy the Generalized Reflexive Constraint : the situation of evaluation 
reflexively involves the subject who remembers, but its time coordinate is not the time at 
which the memory occurs. If, at a time t, I remember that p, it must have been the case that p 
at a time t’ anterior to t. Here t’ is the time of evaluation, and it is distinct from t, the time of 
the memory. 
 Here also, it is possible to dispose of the apparent counterexample to the GRC, by 
arguing that the index is shifted through the use of an operator. The memory mode, it may be 
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argued, is in effect an operator analogous to the past tense operator. A memory that p is 
evaluated with respect to a shifted time t’ anterior to the time t at which the memory occurs. 
The mode contributes an operator like ‘in my past experience, it was the case that’. The 
content of the sentence embedded under that operator is evaluated with respect to a shifted 
index, but the content of the complete sentence headed by the operator is evaluated with 
respect to the index of the context, as the GRC demands. 
 
Farewell to the GRC 
 
Considered as an index-shifting operator, the memory mode M, in a memory representation 
M(p), contributes a specification of the relation R to which the subject stands to the state of 
affairs remembered. Instead of remaining external to the content of the representation, the 
relation R is now internalized and becomes an aspect of the lekton, contributed by the 
operator. That is what makes it possible for the lekton to be evaluated with respect to the 
subject’s present situation, in conformity to the GRC, rather than with respect to some past 
situation in which the subject experienced the scene he now remembers. Only the embedded 
part of the representation (the proposition p corresponding to what is remembered) is 
evaluated with respect to the past situation, in the course of evaluating the complete lekton 
(including the M operator) with respect to the present situation. 
In chapter 37 I objected to a similar move concerning the nondescriptive modes of 
presentation that occur in de re thoughts. A nondescriptive mode of presentation is 
constitutively associated with a certain relation R to objects, a relation whose obtaining 
creates an information link that the subject can exploit. Here also Lewis’s theory internalizes 
the relation R and makes it part of the lekton. When I think a de re thought to the effect that a 
certain object is F, and the object in question is thought of under a mode of presentation m 
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based upon a certain relation R
m
 to that object, what I do, according to Lewis, is self-ascribe 
the property of standing in relation R
m
 to an x that is F. 
I objected to this view that it entails, or seems to entail, that the subject is able to think 
of the contextual relation R in which he or she stands to the object of his/her thought. This is 
objectionable because the subject need not be aware of that relation, or be able to articulate it. 
For example, an ordinary subject who believes that Cicero was a Roman orator presumably 
lacks the notion of a Kripkean causal chain, so we may be reluctant to say that in so believing 
he or she self-ascribes the property of being related to some Roman orator x by a Kripkean 
causal chain involving his use of the name ‘Cicero’. 
 It is unclear whether or not a similar objection to Lewis’s story can be raised in the 
case of memory and other psychological modes which are prima facie counterexamples to the 
GRC. Be that as it may, I think the original objection — that which concerns modes of 
presentation — suffices to make us suspicious of Lewis’s version of Moderate Relativism. 
Lewis’s theory, characterized by the context-independence of the lekton and the GRC, is 
unattractive because (like Reflexivism) it puts too much into the lekton. 
On the alternative theory I advocate, the lekton is context-dependent, and it is equated 
to the content in the sense in which ‘content’ contrasts with ‘mode’. Thus the content of an 
episodic memory that p is simply the proposition that p. That proposition is not evaluated with 
respect to the subject’s present situation, as the GRC demands, but it is evaluated with respect 
to some situation the subject experienced in the past (and which left the memory as a trace). 
On this version of Moderate Relativism, the Generalized Reflexive Constraint does not hold, 
and there is no reason not to acknowledge the phenomenon of free shiftability. 
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Chapter 39 
Parametric invariance and m-shiftability 
 
 
 
Egocentrism 
 
In Lewis’s framework, as we have just seen, every thought is de se. Whether the subject 
thinks ‘I am hot’ or ‘Frege died in 1925’, in both cases he or she self-ascribes a property (the 
property of being hot, or the property of inhabiting a world in which Frege died in 1925). So 
there is a dissymmetry between ‘I am hot’ and ‘He is hot’. The subject who thinks ‘I am hot’ 
self-ascribes the property of being hot. The subject who thinks ‘He is hot’ self-ascribes the 
property of being R
dem
-related to an x such that x is hot. While Perry treats self-ascriptions and 
other-ascriptions as being on a par — as being two types of de re thought, involving distinct 
kinds of modes of presentation — Lewis considers the self-ascriptive case as basic, and other-
ascriptions as a particular case of self-ascription. Every ascription, including other-ascription, 
is (at bottom) a self-ascription, for Lewis.
cxxxv
 
 In the Lewisian framework all the thoughts of a given individual concern himself or 
herself ; hence the invariance condition we talked about in chapter 33 is satisfied. The self has 
the same status as Z-land in Perry’s tale. Indeed, Lewis’s treatment of belief de se conforms to 
Perry’s instructions : 
 
In cases in which the same unrepresented parameter is relevant to a whole mode of 
thinking or discourse, we should classify each specific belief or utterance with a 
propositional function. The truth-value would be that of the proposition obtained by 
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applying the function to the value of the parameter fixed by facts about the whole 
system. (Perry 1993a: 221 ; emphasis mine) 
 
 This invariance claim should be qualified, however. First, the subject to whom the 
thought is (self-)ascribed is fixed and invariant only for a given subject ( !). If we consider 
several subjects, then, of course, the subject will vary, and the content of a thought — the 
property it expresses — will be (self-)ascribed to the subject of that thought. Second, even 
though Lewis speaks of ‘self-ascription’, what the lekton is predicated of in his framework is 
more accurately described as a centered world, involving not only the subject, but a certain 
world and a certain location in that world. Now the world which the subject inhabits is 
invariant, in Lewis’s system ;cxxxvi but his or her spatio-temporal location in the world 
constantly varies. Even if we fix the subject and (consequently) the world, the subject’s 
thoughts will concern different centered worlds if they are tokened at different times. 
 Despite this lack of invariance, something is fixed even in this case : the function that 
takes the context of thought as argument and returns the situation which the thought concerns 
as value. In Lewis’s framework, given his acceptance of the GRC, this is the identity 
function : a thought concerns the context of its tokening. The context, hence the topic 
situation which is the value of the function, varies, but the function is fixed by the system and 
does not vary. This is an instance of what I earlier described as ‘parametric invariance’ 
(chapter 33). 
 
Parametric invariance 
 
When a determinant of truth-value is invariant in the strong, absolute sense — as Z-land is in 
Perry’s tale — it is represented only implicitly. It is not an aspect of the lekton but belongs to 
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the situation which the lekton concerns. However, contrary to what Millikan suggests, 
absolute invariance is not a necessary condition for implicitness. Following Perry, I argued 
that parametric invariance suffices. So the place and time of perception are elements which 
vary systematically and whose variation determines a corresponding variation in the 
veridicality conditions of the perception : the perception is true if and only if its content holds 
in the situation of perception. For Millikan, that is enough to show that the time and place in 
question belong to the explicit content of the perceptual representation (since they are 
expressed as values of variables that can accept alternative values). Still, as Perry rightly 
points out, there is an element of invariance there : a perception can only represent what is 
going on at the time and place of perception. The function (here, the identity function) from 
the context of the perceptual episode to the relevant aspect of its truth-conditions is fixed by 
the perceptual mode and cannot vary, even if its values vary systematically. This is sufficient 
to distinguish the values of the function in question, which are provided automatically (as a 
function of the time and place of the perceptual episode), from the elements of content that 
are explicitly represented and can vary freely, without being constrained in this way. 
Parametric invariance as I have described it involves the following four elements : the 
mode of representation determines a function from the context of tokening to some implicit 
aspect of the representation’s satisfaction conditions. (We can perhaps treat absolute 
invariance as a special case, where the function is a constant function.) This framework makes 
clear that the GRC holds only in special cases, namely, the cases in which the function is the 
identity function. Perception is the typical example: the situation a perception concerns is the 
situation of perception, so the (Generalized) Reflexive Constraint holds (chapter 36). But, as 
we have seen, the GRC does not hold in the case of memory. Whereas a perception represents 
what is going on at the time and place of perception, an episodic memory represents a past 
event which the subject has experienced. In both cases, the mode fixes the situation which the 
 311 
representation concerns as a function of the situation in which the perceptual or memory 
episode takes place ; but the function is identity only in the case of perception. 
In memory, as in all the cases in which the GRC fails, the index of evaluation shifts 
away from the index of the context. Rather than view this as a special case to be accounted for 
by positing an implicit operator that is absent in the normal case, I have just suggested that we 
view the cases in which the GRC holds as the special cases in which the function determined 
by the mode is the identity function. On this account the shift, or the absence of shift, is built 
into the function that is fixed by the mode ; so the cases in which the index shifts and the cases 
in which it does not are exactly on a par. Whenever the function is not the identity function, 
the index of evaluation ‘shifts’. This sort of shift (‘m-shift’, where ‘m’ stands for ‘mode’) is 
very different from that which is effected through the use of operators (‘o-shift’, where ‘o’ 
stands for ‘operator’). There is a clear sense in which an o-shift represents a departure from 
the normal/current situation of evaluation. But, arguably, an m-shift constitutes no such 
departure. 
 
o-shift vs m-shift 
 
In instances of o-shift, the representation is syntactically complex. It involves an operator and 
an embedded representation in the scope of that operator. Like the complete representation, 
the embedded representation possesses a content. Both the content of the complete 
representation and that of the embedded representation can be modeled as functions from 
situations to truth-values. Following standard compositional procedure, the content of the 
complete representation will be said to map a situation s to the true iff for Q situation s’ such 
that s’ bears a certain relation R to s, the content of the embedded representation maps s’ to 
the true. (The operator at stake will determine both the nature of the determiner Q and the 
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nature of the relation R.) So, in the course of evaluating the complex representation with 
respect to a given situation s, one shifts from s to s’ and one evaluates the embedded 
representation with respect to s’. Since s is the current situation of evaluation for the complete 
representation, an o-shift indeed represents a departure from the current situation of 
evaluation. 
In addition to its content, the complete representation has a mode, which determines 
the situation s with respect to which it is to be evaluated. That situation, as we have seen, is a 
function of the situation or context c in which the representation is tokened. Whenever s  c, 
that is, whenever the function determined by the mode is not the identity function, an m-shift 
takes place. Such a shift from c to s is very different from an o-shift, since an o-shift is a shift 
from s (the global situation of evaluation for the complete representation) to s’ (the shifted 
situation of evaluation for the embedded representation). The two sorts of shift are so 
different that it may be a mistake to use the same word ‘shift’ in both cases. (The use of that 
single word was justified in the case of Lewis by his belief that there is a single phenomenon : 
for him, every failure of the GRC has to be accounted for in terms of an o-shift.) 
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 Chapter 40 
Free shiftability 
 
 
 
Two features : automaticity and (generalized) reflexivity 
 
In chapters 32-33, I rejected the Externality Principle, on the grounds that the situation a 
representation concerns need not be determined by the external environment. A representation 
may concern a situation that the subject is thinking or talking about, rather than the situation 
he or she is in.
cxxxvii
 So for example the sentence ‘At this time of the year it is freezing’ may 
be uttered in reference to Chicago, the place being spoken about, even though the place of 
utterance is Berkeley. I described such cases as cases of ‘free shiftability’ (as opposed to 
‘operator-shiftability’). 
Free shiftability, as illustrated by this sort of example, has something in common with 
m-shiftability : it is a counterexample to the Generalized Reflexive Constraint. The speaker is 
in Berkeley (place of utterance) but the place relevant to the evaluation of what is said is 
Chicago. Similarly, the situation a memory concerns is temporally distinct from (anterior to) 
the situation the subject who remembers is in. In both cases, the situation the representation 
concerns is distinct from the situation in which the representation is tokened. The evaluation 
index is not the index of the context. 
Still, there is also an important difference between cases like ‘It is freezing’ and 
memory. In memory, just as in perception, the psychological mode automatically determines 
the situation of evaluation as a function of the context, and it leaves the thinker no choice : a 
perception can only concern the situation the subject is currently experiencing, and a memory 
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can only concern a certain situation she has experienced in the past, namely, that which left 
the memory as a trace. This is what I described as parametric invariance. But free shiftability 
is not so constrained (it seems). When I say ‘It is freezing’, I am free to talk of whatever place 
I like. It may be the place of the context, but it may be any other place that I happen to be 
talking about. 
The freedom we have to shift the topic situation as discourse proceeds suggests that 
there is no ‘invariance’ at all in this sort of case, whether absolute or parametric. In the cases 
of parametric invariance I have talked about so far, the situation of evaluation is determined 
automatically as a function of the context ; it is highly constrained, even though it varies 
systematically as the context itself varies. But in discourse the situation of evaluation is not so 
constrained. Not only does it vary, it varies freely. The only thing that matters is the hearer’s 
‘uptake’, that is, his or her recognition of the speaker’s intention to talk about this or that 
situation, however remote and different from the situation of utterance. 
[Table 3 near here] 
 Table 3 summarizes the commonalities and differences we have just registered. As the 
table shows, perception and memory are two cases of parametric invariance for which the 
situation of evaluation is determined automatically as a function of the situation in which the 
representation is tokened. In discourse there is no such automaticity : what determines the 
topic situation is the speaker’s intention (provided it is made sufficiently manifest to the 
hearer). At the same time, perception is distinguished from both memory and discourse by the 
fact that the situation of evaluation is bound to be the situation the subject is in when 
entertaining the representation : the Generalized Reflexive Constraint is satisfied, while it is 
not satisfied in the case of memory. In the case of discourse the GRC is not satisfied either, 
since the topic situation may be very different from the situation of utterance. However, 
nothing prevents the topic situation from being the situation of utterance, in the discourse 
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case, while this is simply not possible in the case of memory. This latitude, expressed by the 
response ‘It depends’ in the slot for generalized reflexivity, is undoubtedly linked to the 
freedom with which the situation of evaluation can be shifted (or not) in discourse, as opposed 
to the automaticity/rigidity of its determination in standard cases of parametric invariance. 
 
Reducing free shiftability to o-shiftability 
 
Operator-shiftability has been opposed both to free shiftability, the most salient examples of 
which can be found in discourse, and to m-shiftability, the most salient examples of which are 
provided by certain psychological modes such as memory. But we have just seen that there 
are also differences between free shiftability and m-shiftability. Does it mean that we wind up 
with three distinct categories of shift ? Not necessarily. Despite the superficial differences 
between them, we can attempt to reduce free shiftability to one of the other two 
categories. There are two ways to do this, of course. We can (attempt to) reduce free 
shiftability to operator-shiftability or to m-shiftability. In this section, I will be concerned with 
the first of these options. The second option, which I favour, will be presented next. 
If we use the invariance criterion which both Perry and Millikan appeal to, the 
apparently unconstrained freedom we have to shift the situation in discourse suggests that, 
even though it is tacitly rather than explicitly referred to, still the topic situation in such cases 
belongs with those elements of content that are explicitly represented as opposed to those that 
are carried implicitly, via the mode of representation. 
It seems odd to say that something implicit can be part of explicit content, but the idea 
is simply that of an ‘unarticulated constituent of the lekton’, talked about at length (and 
eventually rejected) in part IX. There I discussed the case of Perry’s son saying ‘It is raining’ 
after a phone call to his brother, and meaning by this that it is raining at the brother’s place 
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(Murdock). Perry’s son tacitly referred to his brother’s place, and the question was : Is the 
place in question the place which the utterance ‘concerns’, or is it a constituent of the lekton ? 
Perry’s own tendency is to treat this sort of unarticulated constituent as a constituent of the 
lekton, unarticulatedness notwithstanding. Similarly, we might say that the place (viz. 
Chicago) is a constituent of the lekton in ‘At this time of the year, it is freezing’ because it 
lacks the right sort of invariance and can be shifted freely. 
The suggestion, then, is that ‘It is raining’ is elliptical for ‘It is raining in Murdock’ in 
Perry’s example, and that ‘At this time of the year it is freezing’ is likewise elliptical for ‘In 
Chicago, at this time of the year, it is freezing’ in the other example. ‘Elliptical’ here should 
not be understood in the strict syntactic sense, but in a more general, semantic sense.
cxxxviii
 
What the subject means, the belief he expresses, is that it is raining/freezing in 
Murdock/Chicago. But some constituent of the content thereby expressed is left unarticulated 
because it is contextually inferable. Despite being unarticulated, the constituent in question is 
a constituent of content. To show this it is tempting to appeal to the ‘mental articulation 
argument’ which I discussed (and criticized) in chapter 32 : 
 
1. In this context the utterance ‘It is raining’ expresses the speaker’s belief that it is 
raining in Murdock. 
2. The place is an explicit constituent of (the content of) the speaker’s belief that it is 
raining in Murdock. In other words : the subject is thinking about Murdock, i.e. 
entertaining a mental representation of Murdock.  
3. An utterance has the same content as the belief it expresses. 
4. Therefore, the place (Murdock) is a constituent of the content of the speaker’s 
utterance just as it is a constituent of the content of his belief. The only difference is 
that it is linguistically unarticulated while it is mentally articulated. 
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This argument I tentatively reconstructed on the basis of Perry’s description of the Murdock 
case. In criticizing it, I argued that the speaker’s belief itself may ‘concern’ Murdock rather 
than being explicitly about it. Because that option has not been ruled out, the argument is 
without force. But the fact that the place need not be construed as a constituent of content 
does not entail that it cannot be so construed. On the view I am presently discussing, the place 
is an unarticulated constituent of the lekton. Even though the sentence is a simple sentence (‘It 
is raining’), the content it contextually expresses — the lekton — has a more complex 
structure, due to the presence of the implicit operator ‘In Murdock’. 
 When, on behalf of Lewis, I introduced the idea of an implicit operator to handle 
alleged counterexamples to the GRC, I rejected it on the grounds that this strategy has 
unwelcome consequences and leads one to put too much into the lekton (chapter 38). But this 
criticism was targeted at the use of the implicit operator strategy to deal with instances of m-
shift. Now we are talking about free shiftability in discourse, and the implicit operator 
strategy might well be legitimate in this particular case, even if it is objectionable as a way of 
dealing with m-shifts. 
 
Reducing free shiftability to m-shiftability 
 
In chapter 33 I rejected the very idea of unarticulated constituents of the lekton, and I 
suggested that the notion of parametric invariance could be extended so as to cover the 
Murdock case. This suggestion is what I am now going to pursue. 
Perry himself distinguishes several ‘modes of thinking or discourse’ about the 
weather, depending on whether one is talking about the local weather or about the weather at 
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some other places. When one talks about the local weather, the relevant parameter is the place 
of utterance : one’s weather talk concerns the place where one is (and the GRC is satisfied). 
Why not say that, in the other type of case, the weather statement concerns whichever place 
happens to be cognitively salient or is currently the topic of conversation ? On this view, the 
two sorts of cases are on a par, appearances notwithstanding — they are both cases of 
parametric invariance. In both cases, the mode of discourse fixes the relevant parameter (the 
place of utterance vs the place one is talking about). There is variation in both cases, and in 
both cases the variation is channeled through the relevant parameter. 
 What about the idea of free, unconstrained variability ? How can we explain the fact 
that the place of evaluation can be any place, without restriction, including the place of 
utterance ? Doesn’t this unrestrictedness show that there is no invariance whatsoever in that 
sort of case, not even parametric invariance ? 
 No, it does not. Whenever there is parametric invariance, there is something that does 
not vary (the function) and something that varies (the value of the function, which varies as a 
function of its arguments). If we decide to treat free shiftability as another case of parametric 
invariance, the relevant parameter will be the topic of conversation. Now the value of that 
parameter varies as a function of the intentions which the speaker makes sufficiently manifest 
to the hearer. What varies freely here are the speaker’s intentions, which are indeed fairly 
unconstrained. But those intentions serve as argument to the function, and the arguments to 
the function are unconstrained in all cases of parametric invariance. When the mode of 
discourse concerns local weather, the argument is the place of utterance, and that is 
unconstrained too : one can say ‘It is raining’ anywhere, and wherever one says it (in that 
mode), what one says will be true iff it is raining there. Similarly, in the other mode, one can 
intend to characterize the weather at any place by saying ‘It is raining’, and whatever the 
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place one thereby intends to characterize, what one says will be true iff it is raining in that 
place. 
 Free shiftability is not to be found only in discourse. Our thoughts too may concern 
whatever entity is currently salient in our mind, even though the entity in question is not 
articulated in the thought that concerns it, but only in some other mental representation that 
serves as cognitive background for it. To accept this relation between thoughts, where one 
thought serves as background for another and determines what the other concerns, is to accept 
the existence of a mode characterized by the parameter : thing currently being talked or 
thought about. This mode, whether in discourse or thought, we may call the ‘anaphoric 
mode’. It is involved in the phenomenon I described as ‘mental projection’ in earlier writings 
(Recanati 1997, 2000b): 
 
A situation is first mentioned (that is, it is a constituent of some fact which is stated) ; 
the speaker then ‘projects herself in that situation’ or assumes it, and states something 
with respect to that situation, as if it was given in the external context (while it is only 
given ‘in the discourse’). (Recanati 2000b : 67) 
 
The idea that in the anaphoric mode one does ‘as if’ something was given in the context, 
while it is given only mentally or discursively, will be pursued in chapter 41. 
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Chapter 41 
The anaphoric mode : 
a Bühlerian perspective 
 
 
 
The primacy of the egocentric 
 
Egocentrism is the view that every thought is about the hic et nunc situation — about the 
context of its tokening. On this view, a simple sentence like ‘It is raining’ talks about the 
place and time of the context, unless it is elliptical for a more complex sentence, ‘At l, it is 
raining’. Such a sentence headed by an operator is also evaluated with respect to the current 
context, even though, in the course of so evaluating it, the embedded sentence it contains is 
evaluated with respect to a shifted index. 
 Against this view, I argued that only certain modes (e.g. the perceptual mode) are 
egocentric and satisfy the GRC. Other modes (e.g. the memory mode) impose a shift away 
from the index of the context. Such a shift, imposed by the mode, is what I called an m-shift. 
In chapter 40, I suggested that free shiftability itself results from an m-shift. Through such a 
shift, a simple sentence like ‘It is raining’ can be used to talk about a different place than the 
place of the context, without being prefixed with an implicit operator. To achieve that result, 
we need not make the sentence more complex through the addition of implicit material ; we 
only have to use it in a different way, or in a different mode. Thus I distinguished the 
anaphoric mode from the egocentric mode. A representation in the anaphoric mode concerns 
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any situation currently in focus, whether or not it is the situation in which the representation 
itself is tokened. 
 Egocentrism holds that there is only one mode or family of modes: the egocentric 
mode(s). That is what I reject. But that does not mean that I cannot accept a certain primacy 
of the egocentric. It is the universality of the egocentric mode (or family of modes) that I 
reject, but that is compatible with acknowledging its primacy. 
The primacy I have in mind is entailed by views according to which one can go 
beyond egocentricity and entertain thoughts concerning situations distinct from the hic et 
nunc situation only by indulging in a form of mental simulation. Thus, according to Karl 
Bühler, we free ourselves from the hic et nunc situation by an act of ‘imaginative 
displacement’ : in the anaphoric mode, we treat a remote situation which has been evoked as 
if it was egocentrically given.
cxxxix
 Talking about a situation indeed makes it ‘present to the 
mind’ in such a way that it can serve as a substitute for the egocentric situation and give rise 
to ‘imagination-oriented deixis’. As Bühler writes, « remembered or imagined situations with 
a character similar to perception come up and replace the primary givenness of perceived 
situations » (Bühler 1934 : 149). On this view the anaphoric mode evolved from a prior 
ability to simulatively shift the egocentric situation, hence it presupposes the egocentric mode, 
whose primacy must be acknowledged. 
 
Cognitive significance again 
 
In chapter 32 I mentioned an argument against the view that, in the Murdock case, the 
utterance ‘It is raining’ concerns Murdock and expresses the proposition (lekton) that it is 
raining, rather than the proposition that it is raining in Murdock. The argument, due to 
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Michael Devitt, runs as follows. When someone believes that it is raining and does not want 
to get wet, he or she typically does certain things. But in the Murdock case, the relevant 
dispositions to act are absent. After his phone call to his brother in Murdock, Perry’s son says 
that it is raining, but he is not disposed to grab his umbrella.  It seems, therefore, that he does 
not believe the same thing when he says ‘It is raining’ after the phone call to Perry’s older son 
in Murdock, as he expresses when he says ‘It is raining’ after looking out the window in Palo 
Alto. In the latter case, arguably, he harbors the same belief as anyone who looks out the 
window and sees rain ; and the content of that belief can be represented as the place-relative 
proposition that it is raining. But in the Murdock case what he believes is the complete 
proposition that it is raining in Murdock. That explains why, in the Murdock case, he is not 
disposed to act in the way someone who believes that it is raining does: by grabbing one’s 
umbrella, cancelling out picnic plans, and so on and so forth. 
 Still, I want to maintain that even in the Murdock case, Murdock is not a constituent of 
the lekton ; it is only the place which the utterance concerns. How, then, can we account for 
the fact that the cognitive significance is different (as shown by the different dispositions to 
act) in the Murdock case and in the local weather case ? If the lekton is the same, how can 
there be a difference in cognitive significance ? 
 It will not do to invoke the other component of the Austinian proposition, namely the 
situation which the utterance concerns. For the brother in Murdock also believes that it is 
raining, and he is disposed to act in the relevant way. Perry’s son, when talking to him on the 
phone from Palo Alto, has no such dispositions, even though he believes the same thing 
concerning the same place (Murdock). On this description, Perry’s son in Palo Alto and his 
brother in Murdock have beliefs the complete contents of which can both be represented as 
the Austinian proposition consisting of the situation Murdock and the place-relative 
proposition that it is raining. Since the Austinian proposition is the same, while the cognitive 
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significance is different, this seems to raise a problem for the SMR framework. (This version 
of the objection is due to Isidora Stojanovic.) 
 In reply, I would say that the difference is to be accounted for in terms of mode. What 
determines Murdock as the situation of evaluation for the place-relative proposition is the 
egocentric mode in one case (when the brother in Murdock says ‘It is raining’) and the 
anaphoric mode in the other case (when Perry’s son in Palo Alto says ‘It’s raining’ right after 
his conversation on the phone with his brother). The dispositions to act that are normally 
associated with the proposition that it is raining are inhibited when the lekton is entertained in 
the anaphoric mode. This comports well with the idea that the anaphoric mode rests on some 
form of simulation, since the simulation of mental states is generally seen as involving 
inhibition of the associated dispositions to act.  
 
o-shiftability and the anaphoric mode 
 
In chapter 38, to illustrate the anaphoric mode, I used another meteorological example : ‘At 
this time of the year, it is freezing’. This is supposed to be said about a place (Chicago) that 
has been evoked in previous discourse, as in the following sequence: 
 
I would not like to live in Chicago. At this time of the year, it is freezing. 
 
The first sentence in the sequence mentions Chicago. The second sentence is evaluated with 
respect to Chicago. This is like the example of projection I have already mentioned (chapter 
31) : 
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Berkeley is a nice place. There are bookstores and coffee shops everywhere. 
 
Here too the second sentence is evaluated with respect to a location mentioned in the first 
sentence (and the quantifier rangers over bookstores and coffee shops at that location). 
According to Bühler, we can also incorporate into the sentence the material upon 
which it is anaphoric — the ‘exposition’, as he calls it (Bühler 1934 : 426-7). Instead of a 
two-sentence discourse, we get : 
 
In Chicago, at this time of the year it is freezing. 
In Berkeley, there are bookstores and coffee shops everywhere. 
 
The sentence in the scope of the operator ‘in Chicago’ or ‘in Berkeley’ is still in the anaphoric 
mode, but the material it is anaphoric to is now prefixed to the sentence instead of being 
external to it. The integrated sentences that result from incorporation bear the same relation to 
their two-sentence counterparts as conditionals do to what, in Oratio  Obliqua, Oratio Recta 
(Recanati 2000b), I called ‘Ducrot-Mackie pairs’ : 
 
Ducrot-Mackie pair : 
Suppose he comes late. We won’t worry him by mentioning the fire. 
Conditional : 
If he comes late, we won’t worry him by mentioning the fire. 
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In the Ducrot-Mackie pair, the first sentence introduces a hypothetical situation, and the 
second sentence, in the anaphoric mode, is evaluated with respect to that situation. In the 
corresponding conditional, the antecedent is incorporated into the sentence, which now 
consists of two parts, but the relation between the two parts is much the same.
cxl
  
The benefits of incorporation have been insightfully described by Cosmides and 
Tooby within an evolutionary framework. As soon as one departs from the egocentric stance, 
that is, as soon as one is able to entertain representations that do not concern the hic et nunc 
situation, one needs a way of ‘tagging’ these representations so as to relativize their content to 
the right ‘envelope of valid conditions’ (Cosmides and Tooby 2000 : 105). What Cosmides 
and Tooby call ‘scope-syntax’, i.e. a recursive system of structured representations consisting 
of an operator and an embedded representation in the scope of the operator,
cxli
 has evolved for 
this purpose, they claim. Be that as it may, Bühler’s incorporation idea suggests that, far from 
reducing to o-shiftability, as both Lewis’s and Perry’s views imply, free shiftability is more 
basic. We have seen that it can be construed as a form of m-shiftability, involving the 
anaphoric mode. If Bülher is right, o-shiftability itself exploits that mode : it presupposes free 
shiftability, rather than being presupposed by it (Figure 3). On the Bühlerian picture, the 
anaphoric mode, which makes free shiftability possible, is accounted for in terms of the 
egocentric mode plus simulation, and o-shiftability is accounted for in terms of free 
shiftability plus incorporation. 
[Figure 3 near here] 
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Notes
                                            
xi
 Austin 1971 : 124 n. 
xii
 See part ÌX and especially chapter 31 below. 
xiii
 By ‘relativism’, I mean the view that propositions can/should be relativized to indices other 
than/richer than possible worlds. 
xiv
 A more detailed and systematic defense of Temporalism against recent objections can be 
found in Berit Brogaard, Transient Truths : An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions, 
forthcoming. 
xv
 This difference between time-relativity and world-relativity arguably has to do with the fact 
that (in a certain sense) there is a unique world, namely the actual world ; all the « other » 
possible worlds are merely other ways that world might have been. In contrast, there is an 
irreducible plurality of different times. (Of course, one will deny that there is such a contrast 
if one is a modal realist, like David Lewis, or a presentist, like Arthur Prior). 
xvi
 Geach’s statement is alluded to in Prior 1967 : 17 and cited in Evans 1985 : 349. In an 
earlier review (Geach 1949), also quoted by Prior (1967 : 15) and Evans (1985 : 348), Geach 
had written that « for a scholastic, ‘Socrates is sitting’ is a complete proposition, enuntiabile, 
which is sometimes true, sometimes false ; not an incomplete expression requiring a further 
phrase like ‘at time t’ to make it into an assertion». This remark, later amplified by Geach in 
his review of Mates, played an important role in Prior’s intellectual development : « Today 
this has perhaps become a commonplace of logical history, but in 1949 it was quite widely 
informative. It was certainly informative to myself ; I had taken it for granted that it was not 
only correct but also ‘traditional’ to think of propositions as incomplete, and not ready for 
accurate logical treatment, until all time-references had been so filled in that we had 
something that was either unalterably true or unalterably false. Geach’s remark sent me to the 
sources. » (Prior 1967 : 15-16) 
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xvii
 Note, however, that this is not what MacFarlane himself would say. MacFarlane’s brand of 
Radical Relativism consists in making room for a new form of context-sensitivity : sensitivity 
to the context of evaluation and not (or not merely) to the context of utterance. On 
MacFarlane’s view, some expressions are ‘assessment sensitive’, and others are not — just as 
some expressions are ‘utterance sensitive’, and others are not. In this regard, future 
contingents are a special case. (Evans himself seems to accept that there is something special 
about future contingents, and for that reason, he says, he confines his discussion to sentences 
in the past. See Evans 1985 : 350, fn. 9.) As far as ‘Dion is alive’ is concerned, MacFarlane 
holds that its truth depends on the time of utterance, as Frege points out, but not on the time of 
assessment. This shows that one may be a radical relativist with respect to some sentences — 
those whose truth-value is assumed to depend upon the context of assessment and whose 
evaluation is therefore unstable — and not with respect to others. As MacFarlane 
(forthcoming b) puts it, « what makes a semantics ‘relativist’ is that it allows some 
assessment-sensitive readings of some sentences ». 
xviii
 Commenting on the Stoics, William and Martha Kneale draw a similar contrast between 
the facts which verify or falsify an utterance and what the utterance means or expresses : 
« We may say that sentences express the same proposition when they are verified or falsified 
by the same situation or state of affairs… On this view we could, for example, allow 
differently tensed sentences to express the same proposition. It is characteristic of this point of 
view to assign token-reflexives to the means of expression, while excluding them from the 
proposition expressed, and this involves an element of paradox ; for it seems very strange to 
allow that ‘There will be a naval battle’ and ‘There was a naval battle’ ever mean the same. 
We are inclined to think that the temporal relation of the battle to the utterance is part of what 
is meant or expressed and not merely something involved in the means of expression » 
(Kneale and Kneale 1962 : 155 ; see also their discussion of St Thomas at pp. 239-41). 
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xix
 This notion of content as eternal is not only Frege’s ; it is also Russell’s. See Prior 1957 : 
110 for a long quotation from Russell’s review of MacColl (a reference which Prior found in 
Geach’s review of Mates 1953). This is part of an appendix to Prior’s Time and Modality, 
entitled ‘Tenses and Truth in the History of Logic’, and containing an interesting overview of 
the transition to the modern conception of proposition (Prior 1957 : 104-22). 
xx
 Evans also has coined a term for that entity. He calls it the ‘Stoic-proposition’ (Evans 
1985 : 350). Salmon, who has done extensive work in this area, calls it a ‘proposition matrix’ 
(Salmon 1986 : 24-27, 1989 : 342-45). As for ‘infon’, the term is originally due to Keith 
Devlin (see Devlin 1991). In the introduction to his collection of papers The Situation in 
Logic, Barwise writes : « The terms ‘state of affairs’ and ‘infon’ are used interchangeably in 
different chapters of this book. Somewhere during the decade we decided that the former had 
too many unwelcome connotations » (Barwise 1989b : xv). Barwise and Etchemendy (1987) 
still use ‘state of affairs’. 
xxi
  See e.g. Stanley and Szabo 2000. 
xxii
 A well-known difficulty for the situation-theoretic approach to contextual domain 
restriction comes from the fact that distinct quantifiers in a single sentence may involve 
distinct restrictions. The answer to that difficulty consists in associating sub-sentential 
expressions with (local) circumstances of evaluation. See e.g. Recanati 1996. 
xxiii
 Partee herself mentioned a similar analysis, giving narrow scope to the negation : « It 
might be possible to… contend that the sentence asserts only that there is some time in the 
past at which I did not turn off the stove, with the narrowing down to relevant times 
explanable by conversational principles. » (Partee 1973/2004 : 57 fn.) 
xxiv
 The past tense sentence ‘I did not turn off the stove’ can also be given such an 
interpretation, rather than a deictic interpretation. One week after the event reported by her 
utterance ‘I did not turn off the stove’, Partee might have told the story as follows : ‘Last 
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week, I did not turn off the stove and I risked a serious accident’. Even though the sentence 
contains a reference to the time-span within which the event talked about is said to occur 
(‘last week’), there is no deictic reference to the time of the event itself, which remains 
indefinite. 
xxv
 Evans notes that Prior’s ‘metric tense logic’ makes it possible to represent referential uses 
of the past tense : « [Partee] wrongly thinks that [the existence of such uses] rules out the 
recognition of tense operators in English, forgetting Prior’s metric tense operators » (Evans 
1985 : 361 fn.) 
xxvi
 In this system ‘t’ is a propositional atom of a special sort, a ‘nominal’, true at exactly one 
time in any model. Though they are propositional atoms, nominals have a referential 
function : they name (or at least, identify) the only state they are true at. The ‘@’-operator 
allows one to shift to the state thus named and to evaluate a formula there. For a technical 
introduction to hybrid logic, see Blackburn, de Rijke and Venema (2001 : 434-45). 
xxvii
 For a lucid presentation of Prior’s view, see MacBride forthcoming. 
xxviii
 Higginbotham also adduces these facts in support of his ‘reflexivist’ analysis of tensed 
sentences, to be criticized below (chapters 22-26). 
xxix
 Note that there are also pragmatic reasons, such as compactness or computational 
tractability, for preferring the modal approach. See Blackburn (1994, 2000). 
xxx
 Prior would deny that it is ‘about’ possible worlds in the same sense in which it is about 
Brigitte Bardot and the property of being French. For the sake of the argument, I ignore this 
complication. 
xxxi
 To keep things simple I skip accessibility relations (or rather, I leave them implicit). 
xxxii
 According to some authors there is an implicit modal component in our simplest 
concepts, so the users of the language we are imagining should be said to lack the reflective 
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abilities necessary for explicitly thinking about modal issues. (I am indebted to Robert 
Brandom for raising this issue.) 
xxxiii
 These are not the only options. Tenses can also be represented as temporal predicates of 
events in an event-semantical framework. 
xxxiv
 As C.J.F. Williams puts it (commenting on Prior), the present tense is « the zero case of 
time indication » (Williams 1989 : 172). 
xxxv
 ‘Past’ here means something like ‘anterior to the current time’, where the current time 
typically is (but need not be) the time of utterance. If the past tense sentence is in the scope of 
some other temporal operator, then the current time will be the time to which that other 
operator takes us. 
xxxvi
 Sauerland’s note is a critical amendment to Abusch’s theory (Abusch  1997), and Abusch 
is one of the leading tense theorists who have opted for the extensional approach. 
xxxvii
 According to Richard (2003a : 41-2), in ‘Every time he goes there he thinks that’, ‘that’ 
does not refer to a temporal proposition denoted by the antecedent ‘that’-clause ‘that he has 
been infected with the Ebola virus’. Nor does it refer to an eternal proposition. Rather than 
construe ‘that’ as a device of reference, we may, « with a fair amount of plausibility », 
construe it as a device of ellipsis, Richard says (p. 42). On his analysis ‘Every time he goes 
there he thinks that’ is short for ‘Every time he goes there he thinks that he has been infected 
with the Ebola virus’, and in that sentence the belief that is ascribed to Bob is temporally 
specific (eternal) rather than temporally neutral. The sentence says that for every t such that 
Bob visits the monkey house at t, he comes to believe (after t) that he has been infected with 
the Ebola virus at t. 
xxxviii
 In the SMR framework, the complete content of an utterance or thought is the Austinian 
proposition, which determines the representation’s truth-conditions. But different Austinian 
propositions can have, or determine, the same truth-conditions, and what matters for 
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(dis)agreement are only the truth-conditions. Two people with two different perspectives on 
some fact may nevertheless agree or disagree : the complete contents of their beliefs are 
distinct Austinian propositions, but that over which they (dis)agree is more abstract and 
corresponds to an equivalence class of Austinian propositions. That is what I have in mind 
when I talk of the content of belief as being a ‘classical proposition’. (Classical propositions 
abstract from the perspective which Austinian propositions encode.) In other words, I reject 
the assumption that doxastic agreement requires identity of belief content. We can define 
(dis)agreement as follows : Two persons (or the same person at different times) agree iff the 
Austinian propositions which is the complete content of their beliefs belong to the same 
equivalence class from the truth-conditional point of view. In such a case they can be said to 
believe the same classical proposition. 
xxxix
 A similar point is made in Aronszajn 1996. 
xl
 A similar example is discussed in Santambrogio forthcoming. 
xli
 Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, commenting upon a draft of this book, provided the following 
explanation compatible with eternalism. « ‘Being president’ and ‘Being pregnant’ are 
temporally extended properties, and known to be so by speakers and subjects to whom we 
ascribe attitudes. Thus, what is ascribed to Mary in premise [1] of Richard’s original 
argument, ‘Mary believed that Nixon was president’, is a belief with an absolute content such 
as this: that Nixon is president for a time interval including the time of her belief, and 
extending more or less into the future depending on how long it is supposed to have extended 
already into the past, and other more or less indeterminate matters, but not more than, say, 8 
years. (…) Suppose that the ‘still’ and ‘then’ in a version of Richard’s second premise closer, 
I think, to Recanati’s [2'], ‘Mary still believes everything she then believed’, contextually 
refer to a time whose distance from the time contextually referred to by ‘was’ in the first 
premise (the time of Mary’s ascribed belief) is assumed to be clearly inside the interval of 
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Nixon’s presidency expected at the time to extend into the future; for instance, ‘was’ in 
premise [1] refers to one day before that referred to by ‘still’ in the second premise. In that 
case, I think we can feel the original argument (in this version) as ‘valid’, i.e., intuitively 
truth-preserving; the ascribed content would not be exactly the same as the one ascribed in the 
first premise (…) but the conclusion would follow from the premises PLUS acceptable both 
specific and general assumptions about belief-retention, which are part of the contextual 
presuppositions. Of course, this means that the argument is not formally valid, for it depends 
on suppressed empirical presuppositions such as the ones just mentioned; but our intuitions of 
validity are not sensitive to the philosophical distinction between purely logical, semantic, and 
empirically informed inference. I think that this is what is going on in the intuition about his 
Rip van Winkle-ist Susan-argument that Recanati appeals to, with the only difference that, in 
this case, the belief ascribed to Susan in the conclusion is false, because her temporal beliefs, 
presupposed I think in taking the inference to be ‘valid’, are also wrong. But this account is 
compatible with the ascribed content being nothing but truth-absolute. » 
xlii
 MacFarlane protests that in many cases, he does not take the lekton to be complete, even 
though he is a radical relativist : « So, for example, I could say (with the temporalist) that the 
time of utterance is not part of the lekton, but rather part of what a use of the lekton concerns, 
and still tell my story about the assessment-sensitivity of future contingents» (MacFarlane, 
p.c.). But MacFarlane’s Radical Relativism is not absolute, as we have seen (footnote 7) : 
MacFarlane is a radical relativist with respect to some examples but not with respect to others. 
My claim is conditional : if one is a radical relativist with respect to a given type of sentence, 
e.g. ‘The treasure may be under the palm tree’, whose truth-value is relative to something in 
addition to a possible world (in this case, an epistemic state), then one holds that the lekton, 
that is, the content of the sentence independent of that thing, is complete and can be the object 
or assertion, belief, or (dis)agreement. 
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xliii
 Kölbel : « The relativism I am considering does not claim that the content expressed varies 
with context of utterance, but rather that the truth-value of the content itself is relative. In this 
respect, my proposal is similar to the world relativity of truth proposed in possible world 
semantics. (…) However, there is an important dissimilarity. Any two people communicating 
with each other will always be at the same possible world. By contrast, two communicators 
can possess different perspectives. This is the crucial difference between perspectives and 
worlds, for this makes possible that they believe contradictory propositions without 
committing any mistake, i.e. without believing something not true in their own perspective » 
(Kölbel 2003 : 72). Lasersohn : « What I would like to suggest is that we refine the notion of 
disagreement so that two people can overtly disagree (…) even if both their utterances are 
true… All we have to do is assign words like fun and tasty the same content relative to 
different individuals, but contextually relativize the assignment of truth values to contents, so 
that the same content may be assigned different truth values relative to different individuals » 
(Lasersohn 2005 : 662). 
xliv
 I will discuss only a case involving standards of taste. Whether the type of solution I put 
forward extends to other cases (such as epistemic modals) is an issue I will leave for further 
research. (On epistemic modals, see von Fintel and Gillies 2006 and MacFarlane forthcoming 
b.) 
xlv
 Lewis’s notion of ‘accommodation’ may also be useful here, as MacFarlane suggests in a 
recent paper (on behalf of a view similar to mine — DeRose’s ‘single scoreboard 
contextualism’ — which he does not himself hold). « There are… cases in which two parties 
will continue to disagree over whether something is ‘delicious’ even after it has become clear 
that their tastes are not consonant enough to establish a single shared standard of taste for 
their conversation. One might wonder what they could possibly be arguing about, if (as the 
single scoreboard view has it) their claims concern a shared standard of taste. Why don’t they 
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give up once they realize that there is no shared standard ? But it seems to me that the single 
scoreboarder has a decent response here : even if there is no hope of either assertion being 
true (given that there is no established common standard of taste), the speakers might make 
these assertions as a way of trying to establish a common standard of taste, through what 
Lewis (1979b) has called ‘accommodation’» (MacFarlane forthcoming c : 6). In contrast to 
the single scoreboard view, MacFarlane himself holds that a statement such as ‘This is 
delicious’ is legitimately evaluated from different ‘contexts of assessment’ by people with 
different tastes ; this implies that « there is no (nonrelative) truth on which both parties can 
converge » (p. 21). Again, the question arises : Why don’t they give up ? What is the point of 
disagreeing about subjective matters ? MacFarlane’s answer is, again, in terms of something 
like (though not quite) accommodation : « The point is to bring about agreement by leading 
our interlocutors into relevantly different contexts of assessment. If you say ‘Skiing is fun’ 
and I contradict you, it is not because I think the proposition you asserted is false as assessed 
by you in your current situation, with the affective attitudes you have, but because I hope to 
change these attitudes. Perhaps, then, the point of using controversy-inducing assessment-
sensitive vocabulary is to foster coordination of contexts. We have an interest in sharing 
standards of taste, senses of humor, and epistemic states with those around us » (pp. 21-22). 
xlvi
 In the sense which has been defined in footnote 28. 
xlvii
 Since both disputants implicitly appeal to the standards of the community, we can also 
treat that case as a case in which the situation of evaluation is shared. 
xlviii
 Similarly, in an appropriate context, a simple sentence such as ‘It is raining’ may well 
concern a hypothetical world rather than the actual world. The world an utterance concerns is 
determined by context but it need not be the world of the context. 
xlix
 Lewis’s claim will be scrutinized (and rejected) in chapter 38. See also chapter 36 on the 
difference between situation-relativity and context-relativity. 
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l
 The distinction between indexicality in the broad sense and indexicality in the strict sense is 
not identical to the distinction I made earlier between indexicality in the broad and the narrow 
sense (Introduction, §1). The two distinctions have a term in common : an expression is 
indexical in the broad sense just in case its content depends upon the context. Within that 
category, however, expressions that are indexical in the narrow sense are distinguished by the 
fact that their linguistic meaning is or involves a token-reflexive rule, while indexicals in the 
strict sense are characterized by their ‘unshiftability’. Under-specified expressions such as 
‘John’s book’ happen to be unshiftable, hence they qualify as indexical in the strict sense, 
even though they are not token-reflexive (and therefore, do not qualify as indexical in the 
narrow sense). Prototypical indexicals such as ‘I’ or ‘tomorrow’ are indexical in both the 
strict and the narrow sense. 
li
 Is it the case that only expressions that are indexical in the narrow sense (i.e. token-
reflexives) have that freezing power ? I don’t know, but an affirmative answer to that question 
would greatly simplify the typology of indexical expressions (in the broad sense). 
lii
 « Does a tensed sentence determine a proposition which is sometimes true, sometimes false, 
or does it express different timeless propositions at different times ? I doubt that a single 
general answer can be given. » (Stalnaker 1970 : 289) 
liii
 See part VII for a discussion of Prior’s example, with special  reference to Higginbotham’s 
analysis. 
liv
 For Perry, such propositions are believed under varying guises or modes of presentation. 
So, in the Prior example, Perry would maintain that what is believed is the classical 
proposition that the time of the conclusion of the painful event is t, where the time t is thought 
of under a certain indexical mode of presentation. It is the mode of presentation which 
accounts for the subject’s relief. Or, in the Hume-Heimson case, Perry says that Hume rightly 
believes the proposition that Hume is Hume, while Heimson wrongly believes the proposition 
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that Heimson is Hume. Each of them believes the relevant proposition under a mode of 
presentation involving his self-concept ; so each believes that he himself is Hume, and that 
captures the sense in which (it seems that) they believe the same thing. 
lv
 It is not true that they believe the same thing, since they believe distinct propositions ; but it 
is true that they believe what they believe – distinct propositions – under the same (type of) 
mode of presentation, corresponding to the indexical sentence they would both utter : ‘I am 
Hume’. (See chapter 15 on the distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance’.) 
lvi
 Once again, contingency turns out to be a form of indexicality. 
lvii
 As one referee pointed out, Kaplanian contents could hardly play that role, since the 
contents of all co-referring names are the same, and occurrences of ‘I’ and ‘he’, in the right 
contexts, have the same Kaplanian content. 
lviii
 What about supposing (assuming) that p ? Can this type of illocutionary force also be 
handled through the specification of the situation against which the utterance is meant to be 
evaluated ? Not quite. Like John Mackie (1973), I take ‘supposing’ to be a proper part of a 
complex illocutionary act. To assume or suppose something is to specify an (imaginary) 
situation against which further materials — statements made ‘within the scope of the 
supposition’, as Mackie puts it — will be evaluated. This is a special case indeed, as two 
reviewers objected, but I think it can be handled within the general framework I put forward 
in this book. 
lix
 I know this is not how Searle himself puts the matter, but the difference in formulation is 
not important in the context of the present discussion. 
lx
 Thus I concur with Kent Bach : « It is not the content of a visual experience that determines 
that its cause is its object. Rather, it is the psychological mode. It is the fact that the 
experience is perceptual that determines that its object(s) is that which causes, in the 
appropriate way, that very state. » (Bach forthcoming) 
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lxi
 Searle draws a distinction between the content in this narrow sense (e.g. what is seen), and 
the overall content he takes to be self-referential : « when I say that the visual experience is 
causally self-referential I do not mean that the causal relation is seen, much less that the visual 
experience is seen. Rather, what is seen are objects and states of affairs, and part of the 
conditions of satisfaction of the visual experience of seeing them is that the experience itself 
must be caused by what is seen. » (Searle 1983 : 49) 
lxii
 As Johann Frick objected, this may be too strong. If the adressee, aware that he has been 
given an order, has independent reasons for doing what he is ordered to do and does it for 
those reasons, has he not obeyed the order ? I asked various informants without getting 
uniform answers. It seems that there are conflicting intuitions regarding such cases. 
lxiii
 As Savas Tsohatzidis pointed out to me, the analysis of directives I am criticizing here as 
incorrect (that which construes their content as self-referential) is explicitly endorsed by 
Searle in Intentionality (Searle 1983: 86). 
lxiv
 « Episodic memory is memory for personally experienced events… It transcends semantic 
memory by being ego-centred : its contents include a reference to the self in subjective 
space/time » (Tulving 1993 : 67). On the implicit self-reference at work in episodic memory, 
see part VI. 
lxv
 « [Suppose] I have on some occasion, a strong recollection of a scene at which I was 
recently present, and no specific reason to doubt it. (…) My recollection may well be wrong ; 
but, so long as I trust it, I cannot separate the knowledge I suppose myself to have now from 
the knowledge I surely had at the past time. For the former is derived from the latter ;  more 
exactly, it simply is the knowledge I had as an eyewitness, maintained in being. » (Dummett 
1993 : 414-415) 
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lxvi
 That feeling is « a distinctive, unique awareness of re-experiencing here and now 
something that happened before, at another time and in another place. The awareness and its 
feeling-tone is intimately familiar to every normal human being » (Tulving 1993 : 68). 
lxvii
 For an insightful discussion of the possible interpretations of the notion of proper part in 
this context, see Fernandez 2006 : 51-53. 
lxviii
 We see, once again, that the explicit content of a state does not capture its cognitive 
significance, contrary to what Barwise suggests. For cognitive significance and 
phenomenology are inseparable, and it we treat the mode (hence the situational component it 
determines) as relevant to the phenomenology, it will have to be relevant to cognitive 
significance as well. See chapter 40 for a related point. 
lxix
 For an overview of the Shoemaker/Evans debate, and a discussion of the recent literature 
on the topic (with special reference to Pryor 1998), see Coliva 2006. 
lxx
 For a possible defense of Shoemaker’s distinction, see footnote 86. 
lxxi
 That distinction is arguably what Shoemaker is after. See Coliva 2006 : 422 ff on ‘logical’ 
vs ‘de facto’ immunity. 
lxxii
 This is an oversimplification. As Johann Frick pointed out to me in class, the suitable 
relation in the memory domain has to be causal, like the relation in the perception domain. To 
remember something, it is not sufficient that one seems to remember it and that one has 
actually experienced it in the past ; the conscious memory state one is in must causally derive 
from the initial experience. From now on, when I talk of the relation of ‘having experienced’, 
that is what I mean. 
lxxiii
 According to Campbell (1999b), who invokes the phenomenon of ‘thought-insertion’ in 
schizophrenic patients, there are such cases. I will myself invoke thought-insertion 
phenomena in chapter 25 (in arguing against Higginbotham’s reflexivism). 
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lxxiv
 « The fact that [certain] methods of discovering a person’s states are for the exclusive use 
of the person in question, is a matter of quite reliable but not quite necessary facts. We could 
imagine, for example, cases involving spinal columns that are connected across bodies which 
had the result that one knew about the state of another person’s stomach in the way that we 
normally know only of the states of our own stomach. » (Perry 2000 : 335-336) 
lxxv
 See Dennett 1978 : 312-315 for an elaborate scenario in which such displacements would 
take place. 
lxxvi
 The ‘freshness’ of a memory is a qualitative feature that tells us something about the time 
of the original experience. This feature — arguably a parametric property of the mode — 
could be exploited in a more systematic manner than it is. 
lxxvii
 Again, we must add a causal component to properly characterize the contribution of the 
internal mode and the memory mode, which are like the perceptual mode in this regard. The 
subject’s instantiating the property must be responsible for the occurrence of the state in 
which that property is represented in the internal mode ; and the subject’s having experienced 
the represented scene must be responsible for the occurrence of the state in which that scene is 
represented in the memory mode. 
lxxviii
 The expression ‘reflexive state’ comes from Higginbotham (1995). 
lxxix
 Besides this condition, which is common to the intention to do x and the desire to do x 
and makes them both reflexive states, there is an extra condition which is specific to intention 
(and is similar to what I talked about in connection with promises in chapter 16) : the subject 
of the state must do the action as a causal result of entertaining the state. It follows that « a 
positive intention is… always in part about itself. It is always the intention that it itself will 
lead in such and such a way to such and such a result » (Harman 1986 : 85 ; see also Searle 
1983, ch. 3). So intention is, as it were, a doubly reflexive state. It is reflexive because it 
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requires the represented action to be performed by the subject of the state, but also because it 
requires the action to be performed as a causal consequence of the state. 
lxxx
 See the quotation from Prior’s eponymous article in chapter 13, p. 00. 
lxxxi
 Higginbotham actually uses Davidsonian event variables : rather than directly 
establishing relations between times, the tenses establish temporal relations between e.g. the 
situation talked about and the situation of utterance. 
lxxxii
 Perry distinguishes different levels of content. The reflexive level is one, to be 
distinguished from what he sometimes calls the ‘official content’. In Knowledge, Possibility 
and Consciousness, Perry introduces a contrast between « believing a [reflexive] proposition 
P and having a belief a reflexive content of which is P » (Perry 2001 : 132). I will not discuss 
the subtleties of Perry’s reflexivism here nor compare it in detail with Higginbotham’s, which 
will be my main target. 
lxxxiii
 This might be disputed, in light of the distinction, to be introduced in the next chapter, 
between implicit and explicit de se thoughts. Only explicit de se thoughts are a variety of de 
re thought, it may be argued. See chapter 36 for detailed discussion. 
lxxxiv
 Kaplan’s example involves a man pointing to himself in the mirror and saying (or 
thinking) ‘His pants are on fire’, without realizing that he is the man whose pants are on fire. 
lxxxv
 This notation with subscripts, which enables us to distinguish the mode of presentation 
type (EGO) from its instances (e.g. EGO Lauben) is Peacocke's. See Peacocke 1981, 1983. On the 
distinction between indexical modes of presentation considered as types, as instances, and as 
occurrences, see Recanati 2005b : 24-25. 
lxxxvi
 It is important to realize that he de re/de dicto and transparent/opaque distinctions are 
orthogonal : there are transparent and opaque ascriptions of de re thoughts. See Recanati 
2000a and 2000b, ch. 9. 
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lxxxvii
 The following example, discussed on the blog ‘Thoughts Arguments and Rants’ in 
February 2004 (http://tar.weatherson.org/2004/01/30/de-se-desire-reports/), shows that the 
emphatic reflexive is not always used as a Castañedan quasi-indicator : « While running a 
race, Bill is watching a race (on his video sunglasses) among three participants. Unbeknownst 
to him, he’s actually watching the race he’s running, and the runner he favors is actually 
himself. Though he doesn’t know it, he wants himself to win. » 
lxxxviii
 I say ‘almost’ because the infinitival construction is replaced by a gerund. I will ignore 
this difference. 
lxxxix
 A personal proposition is the counterpart of a temporal proposition in the personal 
domain : it is a proposition that is true at some persons, and false at others. The counterpart of 
an eternal proposition is an impersonal proposition. (The terminology personal/impersonal 
comes from Nagel 1970, chapter 11). 
xc
 Nozick criticizes the approach to de se thoughts in terms of an internal (first person) way of 
gaining information, on the following grounds. « We might imagine there is some way of 
observing ourselves which cannot be used to observe anything else. On this view, I know it is 
I who is in pain, for example, by observing in that particular way that someone is in pain. (…) 
This does not fit easily knowing nonpsychological statements that are reflexively self-
referring (as my knowing I was born in Brooklyn, New York). (…) Reflexive access to 
ourselves, then, cannot be a special mode of relating to ourselves as objects » (Nozick 1981 : 
81). I dispose of this objection by taking implicit de se thoughts as explainable in terms of the 
internal mode, and explicit de se thoughts (such as the thought that one was born at such and 
such a place) as explainable in terms of the concept EGO, which itself is explainable in terms 
of implicit de se thoughts. 
xci
 Evans criticized this extension of the Reichenbachian analysis as illegitimate. According to 
Evans (1982), the ability to demonstratively individuate a thought cannot be presupposed to 
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be independent of the ability to entertain thoughts about persons in general, and de se 
thoughts in particular. 
xcii
 Higginbotham might argue that a crucial condition is not satisfied in this case: the 
description ‘the subject of e
1
’ is not used attributively, since the subject intends to refer to 
himself, and picks this mode of presentation only because he believes he is the subject of e
1
. 
But that objection is not convincing. Since ‘e
1
’ is characterized as whatever visual state 
(token) the subject actually is in, ‘the subject of e
1
’ can only refer to the blindsighted 
neuroscientist ; it cannot refer to anybody else. So we can stipulate that what the blindsighted 
neuroscientist thinks is : ‘The subject of e
1
, whoever he is, is seeing a canary’, since that will 
make no difference whatsoever. Here the description ‘the subject of e
1
’ is used attributively, 
but immunity is still not achieved. 
xciii
 As Nozick puts it, « reflexive self-knowledge is not merely a person’s knowing that the 
semantics of self-reference holds of some (thought or sentence) token. We need to add the 
very phenomenon to be understood : his knowing that he himself produced the token » 
(Nozick 1981 : 80-81). 
xciv
 In view of such cases, as Garcia-Carpintero pointed out in the review of this book he 
wrote for OUP, one should decide whether the ‘mode’ of an experience or state is « the 
objective mode, i.e. the mode of what the state in fact is [e.g. a perception, in Richard’s 
example], or rather the subjective mode, the mode of what the subject takes the state to be » 
[here, a memory]. Given my claim that the mode contributes to the phenomenology/cognitive 
significance of the state, I have no choice : I must take the mode to be the subjective mode. 
Indeed, as Garcia-Carpintero pointed out, « the subject is disposed to behave as if the bells 
tolled in the past, not as if they were tolling simultaneously with the state ». What I do not 
understand is why Garcia-Carpintero thinks this option does not allow me to « provide 
adequate correctness conditions for the experience ». In Richard’s example, the seeming 
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‘memory’ is true if and only if the bells were tolling in some antecedent situation which the 
subject experienced and whose perceptual experience left the ‘memory’ as a trace. Since those 
conditions are obviously not satisfied in the example, the apparent ‘memory’ is a false 
memory. I do not see any problem with this conclusion. 
xcv
 See also Mellor 1998 : 42, on the ‘self-intimating’ character of experience and its role in 
the analysis of tensed thoughts. (On the idea of ‘self-presenting state’, see Chisholm 1976 : 
25-27, Shoemaker 1990/1996 : 51-52, and, on the Brentanian roots of the idea, Textor 2006). 
xcvi
 Note that (as Marie Guillot pointed out to me) Shoemaker’s distinction between absolute 
and circumstantial immunity can also be defended along those lines. A thought whose 
complete content is ‘I am seeing a canary’ can be said to be immune to error through 
misidentification in the ‘absolute’ sense. The alleged counterexample, viz. the blindsighted 
neuroscientist example, is a case in which ‘I am seeing a canary’ captures the explicit content 
of the subject’s thought, but not its complete content. As I said, the complete content of the 
thought is ‘I hear that I am seeing a canary’. 
xcvii
 Remember Perry’s distinction between « believing a [reflexive] proposition P and having 
a belief a reflexive content of which is P » (Perry 2001 : 132). 
xcviii
 I shall henceforth refer to them as ‘de re thoughts’ tout court, when no misunderstanding 
is to be feared. 
xcix
 Kendall Walton may be interpreted as denying this in the following passage : « When 
Gregory imagines playing in a major league baseball game and hitting a home run, he may 
imagine this from the inside… But suppose he imagines hitting the home run from the 
perspective of a spectator in the stands. He visualizes the scene from that point of view, and 
his image of the field includes Gregory as he slams the ball over the center field fence and 
rounds the bases. This imagining is, I believe, best classified as de se. It is perfectly natural to 
describe Gregory as imagining hitting a home run » (Walton 1990 : 30). For me, this is not an 
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implicit de se imagining, and I would be reluctant to use the PRO construction. I would rather 
say that Gregory imagines himself hitting a home run. (For more on de se imagination, see 
below, chapters 27-29.) 
c
 Kendall Walton makes a related point: « Wittgenstein observed that when a person imagines 
King’s College on fire, there may be no room for questioning his claim that it is King’s 
College which he imagines — even if another college or a Hollywood movie set perfectly 
matches his visual image (if he has one). Doubt about the identity of the imagined college is 
not entirely out of the question, however. If the imaginer has prevously mistaken another 
college for King’s, and if his intention is to imagine that college, he may think the college he 
is imagining is King’s when it is actually the other one. If he saw King’s College without 
realizing it was King’s, he might then imagine King’s College on fire without realizing that 
King’s is the college he is imagining » (Walton 1990 : 29-30). In Walton’s example, the 
imagining is anaphoric on an earlier visual state. 
ci
 The contrast between memory and imagination might be questioned on the grounds that 
memory is, as it were, constitutively anaphoric upon an antecedent representation in another 
mode (viz. perception). A memory can be de re about oneself only by depending upon some 
prior de re perception of oneself, as in the salesmen example. Still, I think the contrast holds : 
the de re case is possible in the imagination mode only given a non-constitutive anaphoric 
link to some prior representation in another mode. 
cii
 That is so even in daydreaming, an imaginative activity in which the will plays no part. 
ciii
 In defence of his version of the ‘simulation theory’ of attitude ascription, Robert Gordon 
has argued that there are two ways of ‘putting oneself in someone else’s shoes’. Building on 
William’s work, he emphasizes « the crucial difference between simulating oneself in O’s 
situation and simulating O in O’s situation » (Gordon 1995b : 55). Both simulations, he points 
out, are instances of first person imagination. Gordon invokes the Kahneman-Tversky 
 345 
                                                                                                                                        
example of the man  — Mr Tees — who misses his flight by just five minutes (Kaheman and 
Tversky 1982): « I have the option of imagining in the first person Mr Tees barely missing his 
flight, rather than imagining myself, a particular individual distinct from Mr Tees, in such a 
situation and then extrapolating to Mr Tees. » (Gordon 1995b : 55; see also Gordon 1995a : 
106-112) 
civ
 Bernard Williams makes much of this distinction in his discussion of Berkeley’s famous 
argument, to the effect that we cannot imagine anything unperceived. (To make Berkeley’s 
argument more appealing Williams changes the formulation and discusses the possibility of 
visualising something unperceived.) « Even if we accept the description of visualising as 
thinking of oneself seeing », Williams says, « [that] does not mean that an element or feature 
of what I visualise is that it is being seen. (…) We can in fact visualise the unseen, because 
the fact that in visualisation I am as it were seeing is not itself necessarily an element of what 
is visualised » (Williams 1973 : 34-35). 
cv
 Sometimes, Perry even speaks as if all unarticulated constituents were constituents of 
content rather than aspects of the situation which the representation concerns. « [A] statement 
is about the unarticulated constituent[s], as well as the articulated ones » (Perry, Thought 
without Representation, 1986b/1993b : 209). Barwise 1989a understands Perry’s 
unarticulated constituents that way. On this usage — which I will not follow — Z-land is only 
a prima facie unarticulated constituent of Z-landers’ thoughts (but in fact, not an unarticulated 
constituent at all, since it is not a constituent of content in the first place but only an aspect of 
the situation of evaluation). 
cvi
 « Here it is natural to think that we are explaining which unarticulated constituent a 
statement is about, in terms of something like the articulated constituents of the beliefs and 
intentions it expresses. » (Perry 1986b : 211) 
cvii
 This assumption corresponds to my ‘Congruence Principle’ (Recanati 1993 : 54-55). 
 346 
                                                                                                                                        
cviii
 It might be argued that the answer is actually elliptical for ‘it’s raining there’ (just as, in 
answer to ‘what is Jones doing ?’, an utterance of ‘Raking the leaves’ would be elliptical for 
‘Jones is raking the leaves’). If this is right, then Murdock is not an unarticulated constituent 
at all. I assume, with Perry, that there is no ellipsis in the linguistic sense and that Murdock is 
an unarticulated constituent : the issue between us is whether the unarticulated constituent in 
question goes into the content or merely features as an aspect of the situation the utterance 
concerns. 
cix
 Dokic (forthcoming) claims that a mental representation is never related to the situation it 
concerns in a purely external manner but always by way of cognitive facts about the subject. 
On the relation between the Externality Principle and Dokic’s ‘Anchoring Constraint’, see 
Recanati 2007a : 218-19. 
cx
 I am indebted to Michael Devitt for suggesting that argument in discussion during the 4th 
Barcelona Workshop on the theory of reference. 
cxi
 As Frege pointed out, the complete sign involves more than the sentence, it also includes 
the time of utterance (and, according to Millikan, the place as well). On this aspect of Frege’s 
work, see Künne 1992. 
cxii
 Note that the time of a remembered event is not reflexively represented by the time of the 
memory episode : we remember an event after its occurrence. To account for such cases, 
Millikan broadens the notion of a reflexive sign so as to encompass what she calls ‘relative 
reflexives’ (Millikan 2004 : 53), i.e. signs whose reference is determined as a direct function 
of the sign itself. For a discussion of Millikan’s theory of signs, see Recanati forthcoming c. 
cxiii
 This parametric approach to nonlocal weather talk will be elaborated in chapters 40-41. 
cxiv
 Stalnaker suggests that the two accounts are only superficially different, but that is 
because he believes that Perry appeals to relativized propositions to characterize what the 
believer ‘accepts’ (Stalnaker 2003 : 255 n ; see Lewis 1979a : 151 for an analogous claim). 
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Yet, as we will see in chapter 35, Perry explicitly argues against accounts in terms of 
relativized propositions. 
cxv
 Bar-Hillel follows Carnap here: 
The logical character of [nonindexical sentences] is... invariant in relation to spatio-
temporal displacements; two sentences of the same wording will have the same 
character independently of where, when, and by whom they are spoken. In the case of 
[indexical sentences], this invariance can be attained by means of the addition of 
person-, place-, and time-designations. (Carnap 1937 : 168) 
cxvi
 See Recanati 2004 and 2005a on ‘Eternalism’ as a general philosophical position 
regarding the place of context-sensitivity in natural language. 
cxvii
 At least this follows from the Principle of Effability as formulated by Katz. Searle's 
formulations are not as clear-cut. On the relations between the two principles, see my article 
‘The Limits of Expressibility' (Recanati 2003). 
cxviii
 See Castañeda's and Perry's respective collections of papers: The Problem of the 
Essential Indexical and Other Essays (Perry 1993b), and The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: 
Essays on Self-Consciousness (Castañeda 1999). 
cxix
 The guise or mode of presentation under which a proposition is believed would, of course, 
be a function of the guises or modes of presentation of its constituents (if propositions 
themselves are taken to be structured, as they are in Perry’s framework). 
cxx
  Such senses are of ‘limited accessibility’ since they « can only be expressed in special 
circumstances » (Perry 1979/1993b: 45.) 
cxxi
 As I have already mentioned in the introduction (footnote 9), Chisholm holds a very 
similar view. 
cxxii
 This is Lewis’s terminology. Perry would say : the ‘context of evaluation’ may be distinct 
from the context of the token state whose content is evaluated. 
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cxxiii
 Here we spot a significant tension in Perry’s position (as I have reconstructed it). On the 
one hand he holds, or seems to hold, that some unarticulated constituents do not belong to the 
situation of concern because they are not fixed by environmental factors but by cognitive 
factors. He therefore accepts, or seems to accept, the Externality Principle. On the other hand, 
when he insists that the problem of the essential indexical cannot be solved by appealing to 
relativized propositions, he argues that the Generalized Reflexive Constraint must be rejected. 
There is a tension because, as I have said, the Externality Principle and the GRC are two sides 
of the same coin. 
cxxiv
 There are apparent exceptions to that principle (e.g. shifted indexicals in free indirect 
speech) but I will not deal with them here. See Recanati forthcoming b. 
cxxv
 ‘It is raining here’ can only refer to the place of the context ; but if we substitute the 
(arguably) pronominal adverb ‘there’ for the true indexical ‘here’, the situation changes : ‘it is 
raining there’ can refer to any place, and can even be used in quantificational environments, 
where no specific place is at issue. 
cxxvi
 Millikan (2004 : 179) calls this an ‘ego-implicit’ representation. 
cxxvii
 What makes them context-relative is a feature distinct from their content, namely their 
mode. (The perceptual mode of representation is what forces the index of evaluation to be the 
index of the context, in conformity to the GRC.) Hence it was a mistake to talk of ‘context-
relative propositions’, as I did in ‘Relativized Propositions’ (Recanati 2007b: 146): only 
representations, endowed with a mode in addition to a propositional content, can be said to be 
context-relative. 
cxxviii
 « In certain circumstances, we may… adopt an exocentric perspective, assessing 
sentences for truth relative to contexts in which someone other than ourselves is specified as 
the judge… For example, suppose John is describing to Mary how their two-year old son Bill 
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enjoyed a recent trip to the amusement park. Something like the following dialog might 
occur : 
 Mary : How did Bill like the rides ? 
 John : Well, the merry-go-round was fun, but the water slide was a little too scary. 
We intuitively regard John’s utterance as true if the merry-go-round was fun for Bill, not if it 
was fun for ourselves (or for John). » (Lasersohn 2005 : 670-72) 
cxxix
 See Recanati 1993, 2005b, and 2006 for a more detailed presentation of this familiar 
account. 
cxxx
 The idea of ‘internalizing’ acquaintance relations appears in Kaplan (1969). 
cxxxi
 It can perhaps be met by assuming that the relevant relation to Cicero is thought of 
through the description ‘the one I heard of under the name Cicero’. This seems to have been 
Lewis’s view (1979a : 155). 
cxxxii
 Lewis acknowledges this. He claims both that de re reduces to de se, and that de se is a 
special case of de re, namely the case where the ‘acquaintance relation’ R such that, for some 
F, the subject self-ascribes the property of having R to an x that is F is the relation of identity. 
But he does not draw a distinction between self-ascribing a property F and self-ascribing the 
property of being identical to an F. 
cxxxiii
 As I pointed out in chapter 15 (p. 00), the subject who self-ascribes a property is the 
same thing as a Lewisian context. 
cxxxiv
 I assume that it is not freezing in Berkeley in February. 
cxxxv
 For a comparative discussion of Lewis’s and Perry’s views of the relations between de re 
and de se, see chapter 37. 
cxxxvi
 Lewis’s individuals are world-bound. They have counterparts in other worlds but exist 
only in their own world. 
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cxxxvii
 « Human thought-processes differ radically from the analogous processes in animals, 
and, in particular, by their capacity to be detached from present activity and circumstances. 
Our thoughts may float free of the environment : we may follow a train of thought quite 
irrelevant to our surroundings or what we are engaged in doing. » (Dummett 1991 : 285) 
cxxxviii
 See Neale 2000 : 286-87 on the ‘sellarsian’ sense of ‘elliptical’. The general idea is that 
of ‘free enrichment’ : the sentence is given a richer interpretation in context than its literal 
meaning strictly licenses. In the case of implicit operators like ‘in Murdock’ or ‘in Chicago’, 
see Recanati 2002 for a description of the type of enrichment at issue. 
cxxxix
 That simulative process is what Campbell calls ‘deep decentring’ (Campbell 2002 : 183-
87). 
cxl
 In Campbell’s terms, that means that even in the integrated sentences headed by an 
operator, ‘deep decentring’ is at work. Campbell himself applies that idea to the analysis of 
tensed thoughts (Campbell 2002 : 186-87). 
cxli
 Such complex representations are what, in Recanati 2000b, I call ‘-structures’. 
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